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Summary in Finnish
Kiinan kansallisidentiteetin historiallis-kulttuuriset juuret ja väittely perinteisten 
oppisuuntien elvyttämisestä
Tämä väitöskirjatutkimus tarkastelee Kiinan poliittisen johdon pyrkimystä luoda 
maalleen uusi strateginen narratiivi, joka kuvaa maan nousua johtavaksi mutta rauhan-
omaiseksi suurvallaksi. Strategista narratiivia tarvitaan kertomaan sekä kiinalaisille että 
muulle maailmalle, minne Kiina on matkalla, miten sinne aiotaan päästä, ja millainen 
onnellinen loppu tavoitteessa odottaa. Olennainen osa narratiivia on kiinalaisuuden 
määrittely. Siihen liittyy ”kansallisen opin” esiinnousu eli se, miten Kiinan perinteisten 
oppisuuntien arvoja on ryhdytty valikoiden esittämään kiinalaisuuden ytimenä.
Tämä tutkimus muodostuu neljästä julkaistusta, vertaisarvioidusta artikkelista tai 
kirjan luvusta sekä kokoomaraportista. Ne tarkastelevat eri puolilta samaa kysymystä: 
mikä rooli ”kansallisella opilla” on niiden narratiivien muokkaamisessa, joita Kiinan 
johto käyttää asemansa legitimoimiseksi ja perustellakseen maansa kasvavaa vaiku-
tusvaltaa maailmassa? Kysymyksen sisältämän prosessin kuvaaminen auttaa ymmär-
tämään, miten Kiinan kansallinen identiteetti on muuttumassa. Kiinan perinteisten 
oppisuuntien edustamien arvojen tulkinnat heijastuvat niin Kiinan sisäiseen kehityk-
seen kuin sen ulkopolitiikkaan. 
Tutkimus osoittaa, että Kiinan johto käyttää puheenvuoroissaan lainauksia klas-
sisista teksteistä instrumentaalisesti eli korostaa vain niitä perinteisten oppisuuntien 
arvoja, jotka palvelevat sen etuja. Tällaisiin arvoihin lukeutuu muun muassa kungfut-
selaisuuden korostama kuuliaisuus esivaltaa kohtaan. Tutkimus kyseenalaistaa lisäksi 
kansallisen identiteetin muokkaamisen apuna käytetyn historiallisen narratiivin to-
tuudenmukaisuuden. Tutkimuksen johtopäätelmä on, että vaikka Kiinan johto sanoo 
pitävänsä perinteisiä oppisuuntia suuressa arvossa, se ei ole valmis muuttamaan kom-
munistisen puolueen doktriinia millään ratkaisevalla tavalla. 
Kiinalaisuuden ytimen määrittämisen lisäksi uuden strategisen narratiivin tulee vah-
vistaa puoluejohdon asemaa Kiinan kansallisen yhtenäisyyden ja kunnian puolustajina. 
Kiinan historiallisen narratiivin mukaan maa kärsii edelleen siirtomaavaltojen keisa-
rikauden aikaisten toimien seurauksista. Kiinan uusimman iskulauseen, ”Kiinan unel-
man” toteutumisen sanotaan tarkoittavan kansallista uudelleenheräämistä eli lopullista 
irtipääsyä menneisyyden nöyryytyksistä. Tämä vaikuttaa Kiinan ulkopolitiikkaan. Kii-
nan taloudellinen nousu on herättänyt odotukset maan aseman vahvistumisesta po-
liittisesti ja sotilaallisesti. Yhteiskuntatieteellisissä piireissä Kiinassa on nostettu esiin 
ajatus, että ”kansallisen opin” pitäisi vaikuttaa jopa kansainvälisen politiikan teoriaan ja 
tuoda siihen kiinalainen ulottuvuus. 
Tutkimus käsittelee ensisijaisesti perinteisten oppisuuntien instrumentalisoinnin 
vaikutusta Kiinan ulkopolitiikkaan. Strategista narratiivia luodaan Kiinan johdon aat-
teelliseksi työkaluksi, jonka avulla on mahdollista haastaa länsimaiden johtoasema ja 
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muuttaa lopulta koko vallitseva maailmanjärjestys Kiinalle suotuisemmaksi. Tutkimus 
esittää, että vaikka kiinalaista kansainvälisen politiikan teoriaa ei olekaan vielä synty-
nyt, perinteisten oppien mukainen maailmankatsomus näkyy jo puoluejohdon retorii-
kassa. Siinä korostuvat historiasta ja perinteestä kumpuavat “kiinalaiset erityispiirteet”, 
joiden nojalla voidaan kyseenalaistaa arvojen yleismaailmallisuus ja kansainvälisen jär-
jestelmän länsikeskeisyys. 
Tutkimus pitää mahdollisena, että ylhäältä johdettu perinteen kunnianpalautus 
voi johtaa uuden ”sisäsyntyisen” arvojärjestelmän muodostumiseen, mikä voi heijastua 
kaikkialle kiinalaiseen yhteiskuntaan, esimerkiksi oikeuskulttuuriin. Ilman historiallis-
ten ja kulttuuristen prosessien tuntemusta on mahdotonta ymmärtää ja tulkita Kiinan 
yhteiskunnan ja politiikan kehityskulkuja.
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background
This doctoral dissertation explores the Communist Party-led process to construct a 
new narrative which endorses China’s status as a rising but peaceful superpower. The 
process is driven by two interlinked phenomena, one internal and the other external. 
First, as widely perceived by Chinese social scientists and the general public alike, 
there is an ideological, or spiritual, vacuum in China. This is a result of the funda-
mental and rapid changes in Chinese society that have diminished the relevance of 
communism or socialism to the challenges in a market economy. The existence of the 
vacuum means that there is a need to build a new ideological basis for the people. 
Second, the leadership wishes to legitimize China’s growing hard power, which gives 
rise to concern among the international community about China’s assertiveness, with 
a soft power-based, non-threatening narrative. Understanding this process will be 
essential in delineating China’s changing identity both internally and externally. 
President and Party-leader Xi Jinping has coined the phrase “the Chinese Dream” 
to describe China’s goals in the coming decades. According to the dream, China 
should rid itself of the last remnants of the perceived humiliations of the colonial era. 
Then China should regain its “rightful position” among the leading nations and the 
greatest civilizations in the world. Substantiating the dream requires a new narrative, 
and such a “strategic narrative” is probably being composed by the academic com-
munity with close affiliations to the Party. The narrative has to highlight the Party 
as the successor of all the dynasties that kept China unified and stable. It also needs 
to portray present-day China as the mantle-bearer of the best elements in traditional 
Chinese culture and a model to be emulated by the rest of the world. The composi-
tion of the narrative is supported by the Party’s efforts to utilize traditional values 
– selected teachings from China’s ancient philosophies, in particular from societally-
oriented Confucianism – as a remedy for filling the ideological vacuum. There is a 
sense of urgency which is highlighted by the fact that in all previous decades of com-
munist rule, traditional schools of thought, especially Confucianism, were considered 
reactionary, but now they are welcomed. The Party sees them as a patriotic alternative 
to any despicably “Western” or “universal” values. 
The focus of this doctoral dissertation research is largely, but not solely, on the effects 
of the identity-building process on China’s role as an international actor. The related 
phenomena and domestic debates have relevance for many aspects of Chinese society, 
including the discussion in China about democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. 
By identifying the elements of the new narrative in formation, this doctoral disser-
tation contributes to the deconstruction of China’s identity-building process. First, the 
study illustrates how the Party is instrumentalizing the traditional schools of thought, 
particularly Confucianism, by selecting only those elements that serve its interests, 
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such as loyalty to the state or diligence. Second, this research questions the credibility 
of the historical narrative used to substantiate the new identity. The study also pin-
points several loopholes in regard to the interpretation of the traditional philosophi-
cal concepts that are used to complement the narrative. Through a critical reading of 
both the contemporary policy sources and the classical texts quoted therein, the study 
illustrates how the teachings of the traditional schools of thought are often utilized in 
a misleading manner, and thus many of the claims used to build the basis of China’s 
new state ideology do not stand up to closer scrutiny, even in the Chinese context.
This research is based on both primary Chinese sources, such as speeches and writ-
ings of Chinese leaders, as well as traditional philosophers, and secondary sources 
originating from academic research communities engaged in related research, both in 
China and internationally. It has been necessary to conduct careful studies of many 
classical texts in order to be able to evaluate whether, for instance, the numerous clas-
sical quotations in President Xi’s speeches are selected out of context or represented 
in a misleading manner.1 The Chinese academic articles have also been read with a 
similar awareness in regard to their content being possibly political in nature.
1.2 Objectives and scope
Understanding the domestic background is vital for analyzing China’s external actions. 
Different political, economic and societal pressures influence the direction of all coun-
tries’ foreign policies by limiting the choices available for the leadership. In the case of 
China, one has to pay special attention to the role and nature of the Communist Party. 
While the Party is often depicted as omnipotent and self-sufficient due to its opaque-
ness and lack of truly democratic structures, in reality it is also bound by domestic 
realities and popular pressures: even a single-party rule must enjoy a sufficient level of 
legitimacy in order to be able to survive in the long term. One particular aspect upon 
which the Party itself largely builds its legitimacy is the historical narrative describ-
ing its rule as a necessary and even inevitable outcome of past events. This narrative 
has a strong foreign policy-related dimension, as it stresses the dire straits of the late 
imperial China being the result of encroachment by colonial powers, and depicts the 
Communist Party as the final liberator. 
The communist jargon habitually includes condemnation of many aspects of Chi-
na’s traditional society. After all, the Communist Party is the follower of the repub-
lican revolutionaries who already saw tradition mainly as an impediment to progress 
and development. It can therefore appear surprising that various official statements 
and speeches since Hu Jintao’s era (2002–2012) have been putting a positive slant 
on many such aspects of tradition that had formerly been dismissed as feudal rot, or 
at least as meaningless remnants of the backward past. For instance, traditional festi-
vals were made official holidays in 2007, and Hu Jintao called for the promotion of 
Chinese culture in a way which indicated more than just a gradual change from Jiang 
1  This has required analytical research of the traditional schools of thought and has resulted in a 
Finnish-language monograph on Confucianism, comprising, in addition to the historico-philo-
sophical chapters, a new, critical translation of the Analects (Kallio 2014).
1 Introduction | 19
Zemin’s era (1989–2002). Jiang had also spoken of “the fine tradition of our national 
culture”, but only as an element of “socialist spiritual civilization”, equal to the strong 
points of other nations which should also be studied ( Jiang 2002). In contrast, Hu 
called Chinese culture “an unfailing driving force for the Chinese nation”.
Chinese culture has been an unfailing driving force for the Chinese nation to 
keep its unity and make progress from generation to generation. We must have 
a comprehensive understanding of traditional Chinese culture, keep its essence 
and discard its dross to enable it to fit in with present-day society, stay in har-
mony with modern civilization, keep its national character and reflect changes 
of the times. We will further publicize the fine traditions of Chinese culture 
and use modern means of science and technology to exploit the rich resources 
of our national culture (Hu 2007).
Hu’s call was preceded in 2004 by the closing remarks of the fourth plenum of the 16th 
Central Committee of the Communist Party, which affirmed that “China’s advanced 
socialist culture” needs to be constructed on the basis of 5,000 years of traditional cul-
ture (Makeham 2008, 318). In the years that followed, institutes of traditional learn-
ing were established in several prestigious universities, and publishers began churning 
out book series that promoted traditional schools of thought.2 These developments 
in China, which began in the middle of the last decade, have been dubbed “National 
Learning fever”, with National Learning, guoxue (國學), referring broadly to tradi-
tional Chinese culture or, more narrowly, to the core teachings of traditional Chinese 
schools of thought (Makeham 2011).3 
This “fever” was not the result of a sudden infection but emerged gradually, fol-
lowing the heyday of the so-called Asian Values. In the 1990s, several Asian leaders 
expressed their belief in the power of traditional values, such as respect for education, 
loyalty to both the extended family and the state, preference for social harmony, and 
collectivism, in enabling the rise of the East Asian Tigers, South Korea, Singapore, 
Taiwan and Hong Kong (Ai 2008, 44–45). There was also a movement to “indigenize” 
social sciences, arising from the desire to challenge the universalistic claims of West-
centrism (Makeham 2011, 19). This is what prepared the ground for the Chinese lead-
ership, with their country in the next wave of rapid economic development, to embrace 
the idea of traditional Asian, or rather Chinese, values as the ideological means of 
countering Western dominance and the allurements of individualism (see Lodén 2006, 
179–181). The official commendation functioned as an umbrella under which grass-
roots-level interests towards tradition, and related activities, could freely flourish.4 
2  The first ‘national learning college’ (guoxueyuan, 國學院) was established at Renmin University 
in 2005. 
3 The definition and demarcation of guoxue are contested.
4  The process of the rise of traditional values in all its complexity in China in recent decades 
has been perhaps most extensively, albeit not exclusively, analyzed by John Makeham in sev-
eral books and articles (see Makeham 2008 & 2011). As pointed out by Ralph Weber (2013), 
Makeham has been treating the rise predominantly as an intellectual movement, overlooking its 
orchestration by the party-state.
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Hu Jintao’s era coincided with record-breaking economic growth, making China 
the second largest economy, surpassed only by the USA. Naturally, this was largely the 
result of the exponential growth which had already started much earlier, due to the 
systematic work of previous leadership generations since the beginning of the open-
ing up and reform era in the 1980s. China’s new wealth led observers both inside and 
outside China to start presenting evermore bolder visions of China’s growing political 
and military power in the global arena. 
Scholars in China have since become increasingly active in suggesting that a Chi-
nese international relations theory will inevitably emerge as a consequence of China’s 
growing role on the world stage on the one hand, and the rise of traditional values 
in China on the other (Yan 2011, 200). This indicates that the National Learning 
fever and Chinese foreign policies are potentially interconnected. Furthermore, the 
way in which the core of National Learning (or Traditional Learning, as I translate 
guoxue elsewhere in this dissertation) is interpreted by the Communist Party is inher-
ently related to the Party’s historical narrative, which in turn is reflected throughout 
its rhetoric and even in its actions. 
The incumbent leader of China, Xi Jinping, coined the phrase “the Chinese Dream” 
as a slogan for his term which began in 2012, and it has since been used to describe 
China’s goals in the coming decades. While undoubtedly influenced by the American 
Dream, it is in essence very different, being not a dream for Chinese individuals to 
pursue but a dream for the Chinese state to realize. According to Xi, the realization of 
the dream embodies “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (Xi 2014, 37–38). 
Seen against the Party’s historical narrative, the rejuvenation means ridding China of 
any remnants of past humiliations, inflicted by colonial powers and wars, and further 
cementing China’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Hence, the Chinese Dream 
has strong patriotic, if not nationalistic, undertones.
Nationalism is a tool that is often used by any government in order to bolster its 
legitimacy, and none of the governments in East Asia is an exception is this regard. 
The wounds of history, in particular those inflicted by World War II, are kept pur-
posefully open because they provide the easiest source for feeding nationalist senti-
ments when needed. For the Communist Party in China, this convenient tool is also a 
double-edged sword on two accounts. First, clinging onto the particular historical nar-
rative of the humiliations wrought by Japan renders the Party incapable of making any 
concessions without appearing weak, even if letting bygones be bygones would make 
economic sense in terms of closer cooperation. Secondly, nationalism is a difficult 
concept in China as such because of the country’s multi-ethnic character. Building a 
nation-state is still an uncompleted project, as witnessed by the rising Han national-
ism, namely the nationalist sentiments of the majority ethnic group, as a challenger to 
the official nationalism (Kallio 2011, 31–40). What being “Chinese” actually means is 
not a clear-cut issue in Chinese society today. This is also reflected in the discussions 
regarding National Learning and its definition. 
Confucianism plays a dominant role in the discourse relating to National Learning 
and its applications to politics, international relations included. It is impossible for 
the Communist Party to openly endorse Confucianism, which it once so vehemently 
condemned as reactionary, and efforts are being made to show that Xi Jinping treats 
the Chinese tradition as an organic amalgamation of the three oldest, major schools of 
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thought, namely Confucianism, Taoism and Legalism (Ye 2013). Buddhism has also 
enjoyed governmental attention in recent years as one of the main “indigenous” tradi-
tions in China. However, National Learning fever in China is largely discussed more 
or less synonymously with “the revival of Confucianism”. To what extent such a revival 
is a real phenomenon is debatable (see 4.2). Nevertheless, the plethora of books, jour-
nal articles and newspaper stories published both inside and outside China in recent 
years discussing the concrete or potential influence of Confucianism on Chinese soci-
ety and politics makes the revival and its impact impossible to ignore.
Furthermore, in the light of the recent interest or even hype regarding China’s One 
Belt, One Road initiatives, which arguably stem from traditional Chinese thinking about 
the political order and may even have the potential to transform the structure of the 
existing international order, increasingly making China a challenger to the West, it is 
important to understand the nature of the said challenge and its historico-ideational 
roots (Godehardt 2016, 22–23). If the Communist Party of China is indeed in the pro-
cess of redefining its strategic approach and rewriting parts of its narrative to allow more 
space for the teachings and values of the traditional schools of thought in its guiding ide-
ology, alongside Marxism-Leninism and the legacies of the party leaders, starting with 
Mao Zedong,5 it is of major significance to the deciphering of China’s political actions. 
In order to be able to explain the changes properly, one needs to understand where 
they originate from. This requires careful analysis of all their different elements and 
aspects, going beyond the superficial level and “deep-reading” the nuances instead in 
the Chinese cultural and linguistic contexts. The desire to provide some input into the 
exploration of how history and the traditional schools of thought, especially Confu-
cianism, are being utilized in China has been the motivation for this study. The study 
has grown organically, and was not written as a doctoral dissertation originally. Never-
theless, all four peer-reviewed essays which — together with this summarizing report 
— form this dissertation (a research report, two book chapters, and a journal article) 
have a similar thread running through them. All discuss different aspects of the same 
question: What is the role of the so-called revival of traditional schools of thought in 
the formulation of the narratives that the party-state uses in order to legitimize its 
rule and China’s position in the world?
1.3 Methodological and theoretical considerations
This study differentiates between three narratives. Two of them, China’s national/
historical narrative and the Communist Party’s narrative, are almost identical. They 
both build upon a set of attributes stemming from the perceived lessons learned from 
Chinese history, related to what lies at the heart of China’s core interests, namely 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. These attributes are discussed in chapter 2.1, and 
the main ones are listed in the upper box of Figure 6.1. They include the myth that 
5  The current mantra for the ideological foundation of the Communist Party is “Marxism-Lenin-
ism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, and the important thoughts of the ‘Three 
Represents’ and the ‘Scientific Outlook on Development’”. The two ‘important thoughts’ refer to 
Jiang Zemin’s and Hu Jintao’s theoretical contributions.
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China has predominantly been a unified state historically, and that unity has been 
the best guarantee of China’s prosperity; the fabricated portrayal of China as a multi-
national state since time immemorial, its peoples having always inhabited more or less 
the same territories; and the collective memories, purposefully sustained by the party-
state, of the humiliations inflicted upon China by colonial powers, including Japan. Of 
course, these represent only a rough classification, which can be contested. 
The two aforementioned narratives can be said to differ in their respective empha-
sis. While China’s national/historical narrative underlines defending national integ-
rity and the importance of national unity, the Communist Party’s narrative stresses 
opposing hegemonism in the world as China’s core value and goal. The third narrative, 
China’s strategic narrative, is still being formulated. 
National identity and national/strategic narratives are usually discussed in interna-
tional relations studies, while the traditional Chinese schools of thought belong to the 
realm of Sinology. This doctoral dissertation in effect combines social sciences phe-
nomena with humanistic research and, in so doing, recognizes the potential power of 
history, culture, and tradition, while being cognizant of the commonalities of societies 
and international politics. 
Chalmers Johnson, a renowned American scholar on Japan, once posed the rhetori-
cal question ( Johnson & Keehn 1994): “Why do you need to know Japanese or any-
thing about Japan’s history and culture if the methods of rational choice will explain 
why Japanese politicians and bureaucrats do the things they do?” The answer can be 
found in a social science classic (King, Keohane & Verba 1995, 35): “Good social sci-
ence attempts to go beyond [the] particulars … to more general knowledge. General-
ization, however, does not eliminate the importance of the particular. In fact, the very 
purpose of moving from the particular to the general is to improve our understanding 
of both.” Obtaining the best results in area studies calls for a multidisciplinary approach 
and cross-fertilization between different fields, such as social sciences and humanities. 
This dissertation thus rests on theoretical eclecticism, which does not imply draw-
ing methods and theories haphazardly from different frameworks, but rather refers to 
the avoidance of any single theoretical straitjacket; it is a means of rational instrumen-
talization of those elements that are useful in reaching a comprehensive understanding 
of the phenomena at hand. Accordingly, this dissertation follows a holistic approach, 
not aimed at the formation of a new theory but only at providing feedback for a better 
generalized understanding of China by deciphering those uniquely Chinese elements 
in the rhetoric of the Communist party leaders and other parties in the societal debate 
in China, which ordinarily might escape the attention of international relations schol-
ars not specialized in China and the Chinese language.6 
To this end, this dissertation perhaps provides some input towards a “single-coun-
try theory of foreign policy” for China, such as that suggested by James N. Rosenau 
for the Soviet Union (Rosenau 1989). Rosenau stated that “leaders and publics in 
any society at any moment in time are responsive to both their own pasts and the 
dynamics of prevailing domestic and international structures” (ibid., 63). Hence, he 
was sketching a developmental theory that would help to anticipate how the major 
6  This approach may or may not be akin to what Geremie R. Barmé has called “New Sinology” 
(see Barmé 2011). 
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determinants of a country’s external behaviour interact over time through within-
system, across-time comparisons. One would need to be able to distinguish both the 
idiographic and the nomothetic factors in order to be able to tackle the core question: 
How and when do the unique aspects modify or override the general dynamics, and 
vice versa? Such a theory would then help to explain and anticipate “the likely devel-
opments and/or choices at crucial junctures” (ibid., 72).
In the light of Rosenau’s idea, this dissertation can be said to further the identifi-
cation and analysis of the idiographic factors in the “case study” of China, especially 
through highlighting the nature and character of China’s “strategic narrative”. In this 
dissertation, strategic narrative is first and foremost regarded as a form of national 
narrative, namely a narrative that “set[s] out what the story of the state or nation has, 
what values and goals it has” (Roselle, Miskimmon & O’Loughlin, 2014, 76). Narra-
tives can be power resources, and they “can be used strategically as representational 
force” (ibid.). Strategic narrative “directly addresses the formation, projection and dif-
fusion, and reception of ideas in the international system” (ibid., 74) and asks (ibid., 
71): “What are the best methods to influence international affairs?” 
The concept of a strategic narrative is discussed with reference to the United States 
in A National Strategic Narrative (Woodrow Wilson Center, 2006). It defines the term 
and its rationale as follows:
We have a national security strategy, which sets forth four core national inter-
ests and outlines a number of dimensions of an overarching strategy to advance 
those interests in the 21st century world. But that is a document written by spe-
cialists for specialists. It does not answer a fundamental question that more and 
more Americans are asking. Where is the United States going in the world? 
How can we get there? What are the guiding stars that will illuminate the path 
along the way? We need a story with a beginning, middle, and projected happy 
ending that will transcend our political divisions, orient us as a nation, and give 
us both a common direction and the confidence and commitment to get to our 
destination (Woodrow Wilson Center, 2006).
The launch of the Chinese Dream and the related rhetoric is a clear indication that 
China aims to have its own strategic narrative. The Dream as national rejuvenation is 
strongly based on China’s historical narrative, but projects it further into the future. 
The formation of this strategic narrative is outlined in graphical form in Figure 6.2. 
The Dream aims to answer the questions of where China is going and how it will 
get there. These are questions of national identity. National identity in the Chinese 
context is extensively discussed by Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim (ed., 1993a). 
According to Dittmer & Kim (1993b, 30), “[w]hat the state ‘is’ is defined in a symbol 
system known as the national essence, which consists of the myths, ritual, ceremonies, 
and folklore that relate how the nation came to be and what it stands for”. This closely 
aligns China’s historical narrative with Traditional Learning, the supposed amalgama-
tion of China’s traditional wisdom.7 
7  In the early 20th century, the guoxue movement was originally interlinked with the desire to 
define China’s national essence, guocui (國粹). 
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Furthermore, Dittmer and Kim (1993b, 30) postulate that an identity is consti-
tuted by the accumulated roles of a state-actor, and its roles in turn are made up of its 
foreign-policy actions. National roles were first comprehensively discussed by Kalevi 
Holsti. Holsti (1970) focused on the idea that a state’s leaders harbour beliefs or 
images about the identity of the state, which in turn shape the way that the state acts 
in the international system. He called these beliefs or images “national role concep-
tions”, and argued that they made states act differently at different times. There are 
thus differing views on how the interconnection between roles and identity works, 
and the question remains of how one operationalizes the theoretical linkage between 
identity and foreign policy in the empirical analysis. Lisbeth Aggestam (1999) draws 
together Dittmer and Kim’s views (1993b) on the one hand, and Holsti’s on the other, 
by arguing that “roles may be generated not only from international systemic forces, 
but from the dynamics found within … domestic politics”. 
Dittmer and Kim (1993c, 241) call attention to the view in national identity theory 
that “domestic societal factors are generally more important than external systemic 
ones in the formation of national identity whereas external systemic factors generally 
take precedence in determining the outcomes of national identity role enactments”, 
which means that there may be a disconnect between the identity and the roles. This 
disconnect can, however, often be explained through the Chinese leaders’ world view, 
which is reflected in the national narrative: While China is inherently peaceful, as 
the narrative states, it must also never be humiliated again, and must protect its core 
interests even militarily. 
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, the world view of the Chinese leaders, 
and the corresponding national narrative, rests on defending (or redefining) China’s 
national integrity and dignity. This is known as National Salvation (see 2.1). It has 
been central to the revolutionaries’ and their successors’ ideology since the late 19th 
century, as described in the first essay of this dissertation (Kallio 2011). National Sal-
vation is in essence the Chinese national doctrine, and thus the narrative has elements 
of dogma. There are also efforts by the Party-state to address the spiritual vacuum, 
caused by the lack of ideological content in China’s current form of ‘communism’, 
through the creation of a new ideological basis that would be nurtured by two sources 
– the national narrative on the one hand, and the indigenous, traditional schools of 
thought on the other. From the point of view of political science, these efforts are 
akin to the creation of a civil or political religion. Both terms refer to a political ideol-
ogy that has sociological and ideological similarities, and that may fulfil cultural and 
political functions similar to a religion.
Mika Aaltola describes one type of politico-religious role that is central to contem-
porary world politics as follows: 
They offer a hope of restoration and of a return to fundamental values. They do 
this by applying culturally embedded visions of right and wrong. These visions 
are often overtly religious in tone. … The captivating and enigmatic mythologi-
cal gallery of historical figures provides a rich source of authority and charisma 
for the custodians of principle (Aaltola 2008, 17). 
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Today, there are many political actors in China who comport themselves as such “cus-
todians of principle”. Many of them, both on the side of the establishment and of the 
dissidents, use Traditional Learning or, more specifically, Confucianism, as their source 
of authority. Whether we label them promoters of civil or political religion depends 
on our angle of vision. 
As Aaltola points out, civil religion is associated with pluralism, voluntarism and 
individualism, whereas political religion is often equated with coercive totalitarian 
systems. Political religion is often connected with Islam in particular (Aaltola 2008, 
28–29). “The distinction between civil religion and the more conservative formula-
tion of political religion partially overlaps the distinction between society-centric and 
state-centric approaches to the problem of international order”, writes Aaltola (ibid.). 
Intriguingly, in China today we see processes furthering both civil and political 
religion at the same time, and those promoting a political religion-like ideology do 
not always represent the establishment, Jiang Qing being a case in point (described 
in Kallio 2011, 99–100, 121–123). Civil and political religion in China are also dis-
cussed by Bart Dessein (2014) and Anna Sun (2013). Dessein shows how China had 
a “religious” narrative, featuring a divine origin and a divine mission, even when China 
was just a proto-nation. Dessein further illustrates how the narrative brought “China” 
together as a civilization and as a state, creating the image of the country as a moral 
high ground surrounded by barbarians. With the adaptation of the modern, Western 
ideas of nation and state, the narrative developed into political theology, which was 
used by the ruling authorities — first by the leaders of the Republic and later by the 
People’s Republic — as an instrument “to ensure the stability of the state through 
appealing to the population’s patriotic sentiments for a divine nation” (Dessein 2014, 
59–60). As Dessein expounds, this has been achieved through political historiography, 
which connects the mission of the unified Chinese state — the doctrine of National 
Salvation — to the inherited, age-old politico-historical narratives. He concludes: “In 
China, therefore, the contemporary politico-religious narrative appeals to the Chinese 
citizens as heirs of a divine tradition, and as responsible to bring the divine mission of 
the nation to a good end” (ibid., 60). 
Dessein argues particularly about the Confucian “doctrine” being utilized to sup-
port the Party-state’s top-down political religion, whereas Sun discusses Confucian-
ism more from the angle of a bottom-up civil religion, albeit pointing out that civil 
religion is difficult to define: According to one view, civil religion can only exist in 
a democratic, republican society (Sun 2013, 181). Sun concludes by remarking that 
there is conflicting evidence on whether the moral and ethical ideals of Confucianism 
will eventually fill the spiritual vacuum (ibid., 182). This doctoral dissertation simply 
asserts that it is possible to bring some sense to the discrepancy between China as 
a civilization and China as a nation-state using political religion as a lens through 
which to focus the analysis.
In this dissertation, the positions of the Party-state are analysed through the 
authoritative speeches and writings ostensibly reflecting the collectively agreed party 
line. This does not imply that the Communist Party is to be understood as a monolith, 
nor does it preclude the possibility of the existence of different viewpoints within the 
Party on the role of the traditional schools of thought. Indeed, it is likely that some 
influential actors within the party apparatus regard tradition as a potential ideological 
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element to be merged into the party doctrine, while others may put more emphasis on 
the practical, Realpolitik-related uses of tradition, such as its nationalistic attraction. 
Furthermore, one may plausibly expect that there are many differing interpretations of 
the various aspects of tradition, just as there are within society at large. Nevertheless, 
in view of the nature of political religion as a dogmatic ideology, it is reasonable to 
regard the Party as a unitary actor for the purposes of this study.
A major element in all of the essays forming this dissertation is discussion and analy-
sis of the concepts and categories of Confucianism used in the argumentation promot-
ing the “correct doctrine” of either the Party-state or others. Methodologically, the study 
thus adopts a basic, interpretative, humanistic research approach in posing questions 
about common assumptions in an analytical manner. In particular, it reflects on con-
temporary usages set against early references in the Confucian canon, and demonstrates 
that many modern references to classical texts, or quotations therefrom, are instrumen-
tal deviations or simplifications that are not supported by the early texts themselves.
It can be justifiably argued that any modern usages of classical texts are forms of 
instrumentalization, and all interpretations may be influenced by political or other agen-
das, even in an unconscious manner. Therefore, it is not suggested in this dissertation 
that “true” readings of any textual passages are any more likely than “false” readings. On 
the contrary, there are often several acceptable interpretations. As pointed out in the 
fourth essay (Kallio 2015c), any one concept or category may belong to several locu-
tions, while their semantic usages are not necessarily consistent over time and context 
(Raphals 1992, 231). When discussing any early textual passage, it must therefore be 
recognized that it does not necessarily possess an “original” meaning.8 It must also be 
acknowledged that there are different interpretational practices based on different meth-
odologies which may all result in equally valid, yet sometimes differing, interpretations. 
With regard to the classical textual passages, the philological approach used in this dis-
sertation is reductionist instead of traditionalist in the sense of disregarding the read-
ings imposed by the commentarial tradition, while the relevant context is nevertheless 
taken into account. The goal has been to produce clear and concise translations instead 
of defining the “true” meaning. In other words, the purpose of comparing the modern 
and early interpretations of classical textual passages is to “rise above Confucian herme-
neutics” (see Kallio 2015c, 80–81) by demonstrating that even the earliest usages of tra-
ditional concepts or categories were subject to interpretational difficulties, and therefore 
choosing one meaning as the “true” one is an act of instrumentalization in itself. 
This doctoral dissertation has benefitted from the basic ideas of thematic narrative 
analysis, which is a process for comparing the function of the language at the textual 
as well as the cultural level. The sources used in this study, particularly the primary 
ones (speeches and writings by Chinese leaders, as well as traditional philosophers), 
are well-suited to analytical study due to the formalized nature of the language used in 
modern Chinese politics as well as many ancient classics (Schoenhals 1992, 1–3). The 
language of Chinese politics is used as a form of perlocution, which is “the intentional 
use of language to produce consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts, and 
8  See for example the discussion on the different interpretational traditions regarding the key 
Confucian concept ren (仁), and the difficulties in translation arising from it, in Kallio (transl. & 
ed.) 2014, 37–38 and passim.
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actions of people” (ibid., 5). Formalized language often serves “the political function 
of maintaining social cohesion and/or national unity” (ibid., 26), which is clear when 
probing China’s historical/national narrative and the Communist Party’s narrative. 
Interestingly, anthropologists studying traditional societies have noted that the use 
of formalized language leads the societies into confrontation with modernity. The code 
used in the formalized speech, as well as the system which lends power to the code, 
are dismissed as anachronistic by the “modernistic” younger generations (ibid., 26). 
This is similarly evident in contemporary China, as the first essay of this dissertation 
(Kallio 2011) reveals, and this confrontation is also the motivation behind the Com-
munist Party’s construction of a new discourse (the strategic narrative) as well as the 
reason why the Party seeks to maintain its monopoly over the formalized language. 
In his seminal study on formalized language in China, Michael Schoenhals (1992) 
underlines the necessity to study Chinese rhetoric and other elements in the Chinese 
political discourse in the original language (Schoenhals 1992, 6). This doctoral dis-
sertation relies on a careful reading of original Chinese sources and translating their 
key components. Producing English translations of the texts, both contemporary and 
classical, has proved very useful because in the Chinese cultural context a concept can 
exist just as an empty word laden with the assumption that its meaning is both clear 
to all readers and always the same, whereas producing a translation would reveal the 
different meanings in different contexts. 
This dissertation has been inspired by the coding practices of thematic analysis, 
although they have not been followed in a strict manner. The emphasis areas, or 
themes, in China’s national/historical narrative and the Communist Party’s narrative 
(marked with bullet points in Figure 6.1) can be considered “codes”, as they are labels 
for the most important recurring and defining themes in the narratives. However, the 
thematic analysis of narratives should, at least according to Catherine Kohler Riess-
man (2008, 74), be case-centred, reject the idea of generic explanations, and be guided 
by prior theory. In this sense, this dissertation represents neither narrative nor dis-
course analysis methodologically, nor does it aim to qualify as social sciences research. 
Nevertheless, the Sinological ponderings in the essays are meant to advance under-
standing of China’s national identity and foreign policy.
1.4 Dissertation structure
This dissertation consists of four peer-reviewed essays published between 2011 and 
2015, namely a research report, a journal article and two book chapters, as well as this 
summarizing report. 
The research report (Kallio 2011: Tradition in Chinese Politics. The Party-state’s rein-
vention of the past and the critical response from public intellectuals. FIIA Report 27, 2011. 
Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs. 147 pages.) introduces and 
analyses the debate related to the content and interpretation of history, and provides the 
historical and philosophical basis necessary for understanding the phenomena related 
to defining the essence of Chinese tradition. The focus of the report is on two subjects: 
Confucianism and unity. In regard to the former, the report questions the efforts to 
delineate Confucianism in any absolute manner. In regard to the latter, the report asks 
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whether the dogma of unity can really be based on history. In regard to both, the report 
maps the elements in both the Party’s narrative and the other competing narratives.
The first book chapter (Kallio 2015a: “Toward a Harmonious World? Emerging 
Thinking on a Chinese International Relations Model”. In New Trends and Challenges in 
China’s Foreign Policy. Edited by Joseph Y.S. Cheng and Marita Siika. Hong Kong 2015: 
Contemporary China Research Project/City University of Hong Kong. Pp. 87–113.) 
was written in 2012 and provides an initial analysis of the Party-supported efforts to 
create a Chinese international relations theory. It critically discusses several Chinese 
academic articles that have been written with the aim of producing elements for such a 
theory, based on the authors’ interpretations of a traditional, Confucian world view. The 
chapter asks what can be deciphered from the different elements in that discussion with 
a view to understanding or even predicting China’s foreign policy behaviour. 
The journal article (Kallio 2015b: “Dreaming of the Great Rejuvenation of the Chi-
nese Nation”. Fudan Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences. Vol. 8, Issue 4 [2015]. 
Pp. 521–532. ) discusses the meaning of “the Chinese Dream”, starting with the fact 
that President Xi Jinping has defined its realization as “the grand rejuvenation of the 
Chinese nation”. The article elucidates how the rejuvenation is often conceptualized 
through the ancient concept of Tianxia, All Under Heaven, as a system in which 
China was seen as the central civilization, a non-hegemonic power which relied on 
force only in order to protect itself against outside aggression. The article questions 
China’s ability and willingness to follow this ancient tradition of peacefulness, as well 
as the historicity of the tradition itself.
The second book chapter (Kallio 2015c: “Carving Out a Role for a Confucian 
China on the World Stage”. In Contemporary East Asia and the Revival of Confucian-
ism. Edited by Jana Rošker & Nataša Visočnik. Newcastle-upon-Tyne 2015: Cam-
bridge Scholars Publishing. Pp. 75–97.) analyses further the possible nature of a 
Chinese international relations model, focusing on the challenges related to the use of 
traditional values in rhetoric aimed at international audiences. The chapter investigates 
the central Confucian concepts used in the rhetoric, analyses their original meanings 
and connotations, and scrutinizes the inherent problems within the Confucian narra-
tive itself. The article contributes to the discussion on the compatibility between Con-
fucianism and democracy and asks where among contemporary societal movements 
“the wandering soul” of Confucianism might find a new home. 
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2 Research contribution
2.1 Tradition in Chinese politics
The research report Tradition in Chinese Politics (Kallio 2011) forms the foundation 
of all the other parts of this dissertation. Based on the works of Chinese and other 
researchers, it debunks the myth of unity, which states that the main flow in Chinese 
history has been unity and that the current territory of the People’s Republic reflects 
the “natural” and historical boundaries of the empire. It concludes that China was a 
unified, “Chinese-ruled” state for only two-fifths of the imperial era. Even this refers 
only to “China Proper”, the historical core region of the Han-Chinese nationality. The 
unity of “greater China” is a relatively modern phenomenon that has been achieved 
mainly through coercion, and the “Chinese (Zhonghua) Nation” is a modern invention. 
Similarly, China’s past as a “culturalist” union which has “always” encompassed the 
minority areas of the present-day People’s Republic is a historiographic fabrication. 
The myth of unity is upheld by the Communist Party because it is a central ele-
ment in the narrative legitimizing the Party’s rule. The narrative rests on the doctrine 
of National Salvation (jiu guo, 救國; ‘saving the nation’), referring to defending (or 
redefining) national integrity and dignity, and invariably presented as modernization: 
shedding the old shackles that constrained economic, scientific and military develop-
ment. The doctrine, which has been central to the revolutionaries’ and their successors’ 
ideology since the late 19th century, can be regarded as China’s political religion (Li 
1994, 155, 157–158). Today, it largely explains the political sensitivities related to the 
Taiwan Issue as well as the tensions in Tibet and Sinkiang, because it is inherently 
tied to the dogma of unity. The Party’s narrative stresses unity as the norm in China’s 
history, and presents the periods of division as anomalies, plagued by chaos and misery. 
This is based on the theory which is at least a millennium old and which affirms that 
the unity of the state is the prerequisite of the ruler’s true mandate (Beck 1986, 374). 
The narrative makes the Party the primal authority in the interpretation of the doc-
trine and its essential dogmas by designating the Party as the successor of all the 
dynasties that kept China unified and stable. The narrative also portrays present-day 
China as the mantle-bearer of the best elements in traditional Chinese culture and a 
model to be emulated by the rest of the world. The realization of Xi Jinping’s Chinese 
Dream, then, ultimately means that China will regain its “rightful position” among the 
leading nations as well as the greatest civilizations in the world.
Furthermore, the research report concludes that Confucianism, as instrumental-
ized by the Party, is just another tool for National Salvation. Confucianism, a central 
component of the artificial concoction called Traditional Learning, is used to provide 
legitimization for the Party through such values as harmony and loyalty to the state, 
and thus the Party in turn mobilizes resources which enhance the so-called revival 
of Confucianism. The report points out that there are many elements in the revival 
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which are not under the Party’s control, and which do not all go in the same direc-
tion. This is due to the very nature of Confucianism itself. In particular, the elements 
of Confucianism stressing personal enlightenment don’t chime with the Party dogma. 
What’s more, it is impossible to reach a singularly concise or indisputable definition 
of the “core” of Confucianism, as the report demonstrates. Therefore, and keeping in 
mind the Party’s history as a force which used to strongly condemn Confucianism, the 
report attests that there will most likely be no room for Confucianism as the “gram-
mar” of Chinese society in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, Confucianism faces 
difficulties in simply becoming part of the “vocabulary”, too. 
2.2 Towards a harmonious world?
The second essay (Kallio 2015a) contends that the efforts to create a “Confucian Inter-
national Relations (IR) Theory” have so far yielded few results. This was true when the 
essay was originally drafted in 2012, and the situation still remains largely the same. 
Behind the idea of creating an IR theory for China is the desire to present China’s 
rise as peaceful. A white paper discussing China’s peaceful development, published by 
the State Council in 2011, stated: “The world has been believed to be a harmonious 
whole in the Chinese culture ever since the ancient times. This belief has a lasting 
impact on the thinking and acts of the Chinese nation, which is an important value 
that the Chinese people follow in handling interpersonal relationships, the relation-
ship between man and nature and relations between different countries. … China’s 
peaceful development has broken away from the traditional pattern where a rising 
power was bound to seek hegemony” (Gov.cn 2011). 
Against this background, it is understandable why the traditional Chinese world 
view, and the corresponding system of inter-state relations, is almost invariably pre-
sented through the concept of Tianxia, ‘All Under Heaven’, by Chinese academics. 
Tianxia was a cultural union with the Chinese empire (and its ruler, the Emperor) 
as the centre. It was surrounded by widening circles of “the other”: first vassal states 
ruled by the Emperor’s blood relatives closest to the centre, then the nations that had 
agreed to pay homage to the Emperor, followed by other barbarians furthest away. It 
is usually presented as a “value-regime”, held together by the virtuous morality of the 
Chinese Emperor, who would gain the respect of the lesser rulers as naturally as stars 
orbit the Polestar (see Analects, “Wei zheng” 1, as reprinted in Sturgeon, ed., 20119). 
From the “Chinese” perspective, the Westphalian system, in contrast, merely signifies 
a loose collection of states driven by their own national interests; in the words of one 
Chinese scholar, it is a “non-world” (Zhao 2005).
The ideal of the Tianxia system can easily be contested just by looking at the quota-
tions that Chinese scholars use to bolster their claims. For instance, Li Fawei reminds 
his readers about the conciliatory foreign policy of the Ming Dynasty, and quotes 
Emperor Xuande, who wrote in 1428: “In controlling the barbarians, defence is the 
9  The locations of the classical textual references provided in this paper, unless otherwise indi-
cated, refer to the Chinese Text Project website (Sturgeon, ed., 2011). Unless otherwise indicated, 
all translations from Chinese are by the author.
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best method”. Li omitted the part of the quotation where Emperor Xuande also said 
that the barbarians are uncivilized vermin that must be kept at bay: “The sages (of old) 
compared All Under Heaven to a household: The Central Kingdom is the building, 
and the barbarians of the four compass points are what is outside the garden walls. In 
the house there are people living, rites and music, and a proper hierarchy; whereas only 
grass, trees and insects live outside the walls. Such is the Heavenly Order”.10 Li also 
explains that the proprietary formalities – rites – associated with the tributary system 
signalled comity between China and the tribute-bearing nations, by quoting Hanshu: 
“Rites are necessary for regulating external relations and setting the differences; … the 
differences mean fear and respect, … and when there is fear and respect, there is no 
contention” (Hanshu, “Liyuezhi” 3, as reprinted in Sturgeon, ed., 2011). Although Li 
says that this exemplifies the tradition of courtesy and reciprocity in China’s external 
relations, the quotation speaks of a rather unequal system. In actuality, it would be 
possible to draw the conclusion from the same quotations that the real heritage of 
imperial China’s foreign relations is simply a sharp division between “us” and “the 
other” and a blind faith in the moral and cultural superiority of the Central Kingdom.
Judging by the related discussion in China so far, the essay argues that no Confu-
cian IR Theory has been formulated as yet. It is, nevertheless, possible to detect the 
outline of a skeletal model. Putting traditional concepts aside, and reading morality 
as a code of conduct, we may then interpret Tianxia in “modern” terms simply as a 
model for rule-based community or commonwealth, global in scope and international 
or even supranational in character. The authority to define the rules would lie within 
the state that manifests responsible and moral leadership. In essence, there would be 
a mental tributary system where the other states revolve around the moral leader. The 
essay poses the question of whether the model implies that the position of the Pole-
star may only belong to China.
The essay concludes that the theorizing efforts, and the skeletal model, may be just 
another way of hiding China’s real identity behind the mask of benevolent Confucius, 
and leaves it to further research to determine to what extent the “model” will actually 
guide China’s foreign policy decision-making.
2.3 Dreaming of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation
The third essay (Kallio 2015b) further questions China’s ability and willingness to fol-
low the ancient tradition of peacefulness, already outlined above, as well as the historic-
ity of the tradition itself. The essay starts by discussing “the Chinese Dream” (Zhongguo 
meng, 中國夢), the slogan coined by Xi Jinping, which is presented as the guiding prin-
ciple of China’s politics all the way up to the 100th anniversary of the People’s Republic 
in 2049, and which posits that the Chinese Dream is fundamentally different from the 
American Dream. When President Xi Jinping coined the slogan, he was undoubtedly 
inspired by the existence of the American Dream. While many Chinese are tempted to 
10  The original as copied on the website Fanren8.com (no year): 盖圣人以天下为家、中国犹
堂宇、四夷则藩垣之外也。堂宇人所居、有礼乐有上下、藩垣之外草木昆虫从而生长
之、亦天道也。
32 | Jyrki Kallio: Towards China’s Strategic Narrative
make their own interpretations of what the “Dream” should mean for them personally, 
the Chinese Dream – in contrast to the inherently individualistic American Dream – is 
collective. Zhongguo Meng should really be translated as ‘the Dream of China’ because 
it refers to the aspirations of the entire nation as to what China should become in the 
future. Xi has stated quite clearly that the Dream is about China’s great national reju-
venation (Xi 2014, 37–38). Seen against China’s official historical narrative, the reju-
venation means ridding China of any remnants of past humiliations, brought about 
by colonial powers and wars, and further cementing China’s territorial integrity and 
sovereignty. Thus the Chinese Dream has a strong patriotic, if not nationalistic, ethos.
The essay goes on to discuss the possible ways in which China is aiming to realize 
its Dream and its rejuvenation, based on the clues which Xi Jinping’s speeches offer. 
He has stated repeatedly that the answers to China’s questions will be found in Chi-
nese soil, in Chinese tradition, and that China needs no Western models, which have 
been tried and found wanting (Tang & Han 2014). This leads one back to China’s 
traditional schools of thought, and indeed Xi has reiterated that traditional culture is 
China’s most profound form of soft power (Global Times 2014a). 
The essay focuses on the discussions by Chinese academics related to the ancient 
concept of Tianxia and its possible modern manifestations, paying particular attention 
to the widely publicized book Zhongguo Meng (‘The Chinese Dream’) by Professor Liu 
Mingfu from China’s National Defence University. He draws on the historical casu-
istry which is often heard in China, namely that the Chinese society was historically 
agricultural and sedentary, and claims that this has given birth to the culture which 
makes China inherently peaceful and anti-hegemonistic, whereas it is the nomadic 
origin of the “West” which has made it warlike (Liu 2009, 129–130). Similar think-
ing is also used to prove the tenability of China’s most famous foreign policy adage, 
“Bide our time and build up our capabilities”, coined by Deng Xiaoping. It is usually 
explained as meaning that China contents itself with domestic development and has 
no ambitions to exert its power outside its own borders. 
The essay points out that the best-before date for Deng’s slogan seems to have expired, 
due to Xi Jinping’s statements. Xi has stated that China already has more confidence 
and capability than at any other time in Chinese history (People.com.cn 2012), and that 
China should use “proactive” diplomacy in particular in relation to its neighbours (Xin-
huanet 2013). Correspondingly, Liu Mingfu has warned that China should not forget its 
martial spirit nor shy away from war should it be necessary for safeguarding its peaceful 
development (Liu 2009, 245–247). The essay contrasts Liu’s ideas with those of the long-
time China-watcher within the US administration, Dr Christopher Ford, who is wary of 
accepting the Tianxia-based Confucian model of the international system as a true alter-
native to the prevailing one, voicing fears that the over-emphasis on maintaining har-
mony may be used as justification for suppressing “unharmonious” conduct (Ford 2014).
The essay concludes that China’s national rejuvenation, as well as the realization 
of the Chinese Dream, are closely related to safeguarding and strengthening China’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. That makes the status of Taiwan the most impor-
tant unresolved issue regarding the rejuvenation.11 The separation of Taiwan from 
11  Vice Premier Qian Qichen explicitly tied the reunification of Taiwan and Mainland China 
together with the national rejuvenation in a speech delivered on 22 January, 2001 (Qian 2001).
2 Research Contribution | 33
the Mainland is the biggest obstacle preventing China from completing its territo-
rial integrity. As long as Taiwan remains a de facto independent nation, the Party 
cannot boast of having returned China’s borders to what they were before foreign 
interventions in the colonial era. In other words, as long as Taiwan is not an integral 
part of China, the legitimacy of the Communist Party is incomplete. Therefore, the 
only acceptable solution to the issue from the perspective of the Party is reunifica-
tion. When one remembers that the feud between Taiwan and the Mainland has the 
potential to escalate into an international military conflict between major powers, an 
entirely peaceful China is not on the cards in the long term.
2.4 Carving out a role for a Confucian China on the world stage
The fourth essay (Kallio 2015c) focuses on the historicity of “Confucian International 
Relations” on the one hand, and on their contemporary relevance on the other. It dis-
tinguishes between three approaches used in Chinese academic discussions in sup-
port of the claim for the existence of Confucian IR thought. The first approach is to 
list some relevant key Confucian concepts and virtues and discuss their applicability 
to international relations. The second approach is to look at those Confucian texts 
that explicitly talk of state-to-state relations, and to analyse the modes of behaviour 
expressed in them. Finally, the third approach is to sketch a Chinese world view on 
the basis of a variety of Confucian texts and to project that idealized world view into 
the practicalities of the modern world.12 
The first approach can be criticized for disregarding the numerous semantic shifts 
that many of the central concepts and categories of Confucianism have undergone. 
Furthermore, it fails to recognize that rival schools of rival philosophers have used 
the same concepts to advance very different ideas (Raphals 1992, 7), or that any one 
concept, or Confucian virtue, may belong to several locutions while their semantic 
usages are not necessarily consistent over time and context (Raphals 1992, 231). The 
second approach often leads to the pitfall of extrapolating even those remarks that 
are predominantly related to the state’s internal affairs into the realm of international 
relations. Many of the instances in the classical texts, superficially referring to state-
to-state relations, actually speak of the ruler’s soft power, which emerges only as a 
byproduct of his virtuousness towards his own subjects.13 
The essay approves of the validity of the third approach to an extent. This approach 
tries to distill something essential and permanent from the Chinese worldview, which 
again leads to the concept of Tianxia, and how it has remained central to Chinese 
thinking even up to the early republican era. Most famously, the “Father of the 
Republic”, Sun Yat-sen, adopted as his slogan the ancient adage Tianxia wei gong 
(天下為公), which is today most often understood as “We all share a common world”. 
12  A completely different, fourth approach is presented by Qin Yaqing who promotes a “relational 
theory of world politics” built upon the idea of interrelatednesses resulting from the interplay of 
yin and yang (Qin 2016).
13  Another discussion, not touched upon in the essay, questions the relevance of the Confucian 
ideals, such as the preference for non-violence, in the face of the historical realities (see e.g. 
Johnston 1998, 236–242).
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Many Chinese scholars see the epitome of China’s modern foreign relations, the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (which include the principle of non-interference in 
other countries’ internal affairs), as parts in a continuum of the traditional Confucian 
principles. Nevertheless, the essay calls for regarding the origin of the saying Tianxia 
wei gong in its original setting, and questions the tendencies to extrapolate Tianxia 
and the ideal revolving around that concept into a form of cosmopolitanism. Instead, 
supported by the thinking of the prominent political theorist Wu Jiaxiang, the essay 
argues that Tianxia wei gong originally related to the opposition towards hereditary 
rule and meant that the Empire belonged not just to one clan but to all. 
Based on Wu Jiaxiang’s ideas, the essay furthermore attests that the ancient Confu-
cian ideal, epitomized in the aforementioned interpretation of Tianxia wei gong, bears 
at least a superficial resemblance to a modern theory of government advocating a fed-
eration of autonomous communes, known as communalism. It has been said that since 
the revolutions which ended the position of Confucianism as China’s main ideology 
at the turn of the last century, Confucianism has been a wandering soul without a 
body (Yu 1998, 229). The essay suggests that by joining hands with the communalist 
movements, the Confucian soul might find a new home in a way that would allow for 
Confucianism to be seen as compatible with liberalism and democracy, thus tenta-
tively repudiating those Sinologists who present Confucianism as an alternative road 
to modernization and use it to criticize liberal democracy.14 
14  This suggestion, dealt with only in passing in this book chapter, is discussed more thoroughly in 
Kallio 2016b.
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3 Results summary
3.1 The communist core values and the six new virtues
The essays in this doctoral dissertation firstly explore thoughts drawn from ancient 
Chinese philosophy and evaluate their application in contemporary rhetoric (see 3.1 
below). Second, the essays examine the application of ancient Chinese philosophy in 
the field of foreign relations in particular (see 3.2). Third, the essays discuss the instru-
mentalization of ancient Chinese philosophy (see 3.3). Furthermore, the essays and 
the conclusions drawn in this summarizing report also contribute to the analysis of 
the formation process of China’s strategic narrative (see 4.4).
The Chinese leadership is actively trying to tie selected ancient values to the social-
ist jargon. Looking at the Confucian values in particular, they are increasingly defined 
through the interests of the state, society, and the collective, encapsulating patriotism, 
social stability, and self-sacrifice (see e.g. Luo 1999, 405–441). In contrast, such argu-
ably “original” Confucian ideas (see Jiang 2007) as seeing people as active subjects, or 
rebelliousness, are disregarded.15
In February 2014, the Communist Party published its list of “socialist core values”. 
The list includes prosperity, democracy, civility, harmony, freedom, equality, justice, the 
rule of law,16 patriotism, dedication, integrity and friendship (Xinhuanet 2014). Since 
then, the list has been prominently displayed on billboards all over China. 
An article in the Chinese Party organ Renmin ribao (Ye 2016), an installment in a 
series explaining Xi Jinping’s principles of governance, had this to say about the roots 
of the socialist core values: “The national spirit with patriotism as its core as well as 
our splendid traditional culture of promoting philanthropy, keeping the people’s best 
at heart, guarding honesty, cherishing justice, fostering harmony, and seeking Univer-
sal Commonwealth contribute equally to our outlook on the core values through the 
profound, historical, accumulated wisdom which they represent”. The article further 
stressed the principles of making the past serve the present (gu wei jin yong, 古為今
用) and weeding out the old to bring forth the new (tui chen chu xin, 推陳出新). The 
article then posed a rhetorical question about the importance of the core values, and 
responded thus: “The (correct) outlook on the core values is the soul of cultural soft 
power; it is the most important factor in building cultural soft power” (ibid.). 
The set of six elements of the “splendid traditional culture” originates from a speech 
by Xi Jinping where it was used as an example of how the traditional Chinese values 
are an important source of the socialist core values (Xiao 2015, 357). It is actually a list 
15  I have comprehensively analysed different interpretations of Confucianism during various eras 
in Chinese history in Kallio 2014. 
16  In Chinese, fazhi 法治. It is debatable whether it can be translated as the rule of law. A more 
accurate translation would be ‘rule by law’.
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of Confucian guidelines, written into a slogan in literary Chinese, complete with the 
‘Universal Commonwealth’ (Datong 大同), which originally referred to a Confucian 
ideal society.17 Professor Xiao Qunzhong from Beijing’s prestigious Renmin Univer-
sity has dubbed the values presented in the slogan Xi Jinping’s “six new virtues” (ibid, 
359), and has attempted to bridge them with the socialist core values. Although Xiao 
agrees with Xi and claims that the latter are an embodiment of the former (ibid., 364), 
he is unable to find direct links between them. 
It is unclear how the “six new virtues” have been chosen. Xiao Qunzhong (ibid., 
359) is only able to find a partial “pedigree” in Sun Yat-sen’s writings, in which he 
presented an eight-character set of four virtues: loyalty and filial piety, benevolence, 
trustworthiness (or honesty) and righteousness, and peacefulness.18 His set was meant 
to replace the eight-character phrase representing the orthodox Neo-Confucianism 
of the Song Dynasty, which included filial piety, brotherly submission, loyalty, trust-
worthiness, propriety, justice, integrity, and the sense of shame. Later in the 1930s, the 
nationalist government began propagating a new set, which combined both the four 
virtues listed by Sun and the last four virtues from the Neo-Confucian list (ibid.). 
Compared to Sun Yat-sen’s list, Xi Jinping’s set has dispensed with loyalty and filial 
piety, while peacefulness has been broken down into harmony on the one hand, and 
seeking the Universal Commonwealth on the other. Loyalty (to the ruler) has perhaps 
been replaced by keeping the people’s best at heart, which sounds more democratic, 
while not overlooking the fact that the people in the People’s Republic are supposedly 
represented by the Party. Filial piety, probably considered a feudal concept, has been 
replaced by China’s new mantra since Hu Jintao – harmony. 
The presence of the ancient concept of the Universal Commonwealth is not as sur-
prising as it might seem because Mao Zedong had made Datong synonymous with 
the Communist utopia, an age of both peace and equality, even though he other-
wise condemned Confucianism as the core of everything rotten and reactionary. It is 
also noteworthy that the Chinese word for ‘peacefulness’ or ‘peace’, heping (和平), is 
a modern compound and carries connotations of both harmony and evenness (while 
evenness refers both to stability and equality) (Motoh 2015, 101–106, 110–111). The 
connection between these ideas and the socialist core values, however, remains unclear. 
No matter how much the Party pays lip service to the importance of tradition, the 
Party doctrine and Confucianism continue to exist in two parallel universes that do 
not seem to be merging. 
3.2 China’s world view and the Tianxia ideal 
The Communist Party designated the promotion of cultural development and the ele-
vation of China’s cultural soft power as one of the priorities in the 12th Five-Year Plan 
for 2011–2015 (Xinhuawang 2010). This followed the rise of China’s hard power, and 
the Party-state has been keen to construct a new strategic narrative which legitimizes 
17  In Chinese: 讲仁爱、重民本、守诚信、崇正义、尚和合、求大同。
18  This set is also mentioned in my third essay (Kallio 2015b, 525), where I quote Liu Mingfu. In 
Chinese: 忠孝、仁愛、信義、和平.
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China’s position as a world leader also from the soft power perspective. A country’s 
narrative can be regarded as a reflection of its leaders’ world view. According to Kim 
(1993b, 10), a world view could be said to constitute the most constant level of input 
into China’s foreign policy decision-making process. However, a world view can be an 
artificial construct, reflecting the current needs and trends of its time and its creators. 
This doctoral dissertation illustrates that the project to outline a Chinese orientation 
to world politics is part of the efforts to legitimize China’s foreign policy actions, at 
least in the short term. 
As already stated, the key concept of the newly constructed Chinese world view 
is Tianxia, All Under Heaven. Through this concept, the Communist Party aims to 
assert that China’s foreign policy goal is harmony on a global scale, just as it claims to 
promote harmony within China. Unfortunately, the definition of harmony is far from 
straightforward. It can refer to accepting differences while opposing conformity, as 
well as calmness within society and keeping within the bounds of propriety. Harmony 
also needs to be maintained, sometimes even with force, which is the reason why Ford 
(2014) sees Chinese-style harmony as fundamentally opposed to Western liberalism. 
From a non-Chinese point of view, it can be argued that “All Under Heaven” may 
become accepted by other nations only if one abandons the principle of the centre, 
which was originally the Chinese Emperor himself. Some Chinese thinkers, like Yan 
Xuetong (2006; 2011, 39–64), have tried to overcome this by emphasizing the differ-
entiation between a “true”, benevolent king (or emperor) and a hegemonic king. In the 
classical texts, the former are said to follow the “Kingly Way”, wangdao (王道). The 
ensuing logic is that a unified Tianxia system, while requiring the existence of a cen-
tre, need not be a hegemonic one. The benevolence and morality of a “true king” was 
a kind of soft power, remarks Li Cunshan (2012, 13), quoting ancient thinker Dong 
Zhongshu (179–104 BCE): “A (true) king exerts his caring even to the barbarians of 
the four compass points, whereas a (tyrannical) hegemon only exerts his caring to the 
vassal lords under him”. 
However, Li notes that Wang Chong, who lived over a century after Dong, bal-
anced soft and hard power by noting that morality was not enough in ruling a country, 
just as strength was not enough in subjugating the enemy.19 Furthermore, as noted by 
many scholars, the Kingly Way is also a hegemony of sorts (see Peng 2013). How else 
would “those who are far off (become) attracted” (the Analects XIII.16, cited in Legge 
1972, 269) and acknowledge the superiority of the benevolent king? It might not be 
hegemony through force, but rather akin to soft power, but it is hegemony nonethe-
less. This adds clout to Ford’s claim that the world as envisioned by the Chinese Com-
munist Party is a challenger to the prevailing liberalist order. In parallel, the discussion 
in China tends to stress the fundamental difference between the Tianxia ideal and the 
Westphalian system which, according to the Chinese interpretation, merely signifies a 
loose collection of states driven by their own national interests. 
Of course, China is a member of the United Nations and has thus accepted the 
Westphalian system in practice. Furthermore, the prevailing doctrine in China is still 
19  The quotation by Dong Zhongshu originates from Chunqiu Fanlu: “Ren yi fa” 1, as reprinted in 
Sturgeon, ed., 2011. The quotation by Wang Chong originates from Lunheng: “Fei Han” 10, as 
reprinted in Sturgeon, ed., 2011.
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that of National Salvation, which in Chinese refers to saving the guo, the state. The state 
and its unity are central to the Communist Party’s historical narrative. What makes the 
contradiction with the doctrine of National Salvation and the alleged adherence to the 
ideal of Tianxia even more glaring is the cultural exceptionalism which shrouds the 
concept of the state, the guo. This is amusingly reflected in the inability of many Chi-
nese people to see themselves as foreigners — in Chinese, waiguoren (外國人), ‘people 
from outside the guo’ — abroad, because in the popular mindset, guo refers to China 
alone, and the Chinese are therefore always “people from inside the guo” no matter 
where they are. Conceptually, there is only one guo in the world for the Chinese. 
There being only one guo in the world also means that there can only be one China. 
This is not only the official position of the Party-state but also that of a large part, if 
not the vast majority, of the Chinese people (Chublic Opinion 2016). Indeed, the real 
litmus test for harmony and China’s real willingness to challenge the Westphalian 
system is related to the Taiwan Issue: As long as the Party-state does not give up 
the military option for “reunifying” China, there is no reason to believe that China 
is ready to abandon its doctrine of National Salvation and move beyond the nation-
state-based Westphalian system. Therefore, as long as the Party-state insists on annex-
ation or amalgamation being the only possible solutions to the Taiwan Issue, their 
Tianxia ideal is nothing but empty rhetoric. The same conclusion must correspond-
ingly be drawn vis-à-vis all the other undertakings by the Party-state to place China’s 
traditional culture, Traditional Learning, or Confucianism at the core of Chinese soft 
power. They cannot be deemed genuine until proven otherwise by concrete changes in 
policies and action.
3.3 Utilitarian justice and pragmatic interests
Considering the liberal and often uncritical usage of the central traditional concepts 
and categories in diverse official and semi-official contexts against the background of 
the inconsistencies in their semantic usages, and their varying interpretations in dif-
ferent frames of reference or by different schools of thought, it is tempting to see their 
implementation as nothing more than instrumental. 
The instrumental character of the dissemination of traditional values in the official 
rhetoric is clearly demonstrated in the commentaries regarding what is being pre-
sented as the core principle of Xi Jinping’s foreign policy, namely “the correct handling 
of justice and interests”. This is discussed in the last two essays forming this disser-
tation (Kallio 2015b & 2015c). In Chinese, ‘justice’ and ‘interests’ are yi (義) and li 
(利), respectively. Li can also be translated as ‘benefits’ or ‘profit’. The idea that foreign 
relations should be guided by a correct handling of justice and interests (or benefits) 
has been promulgated in many authoritative articles. In my essays, I state that For-
eign Minister Wang Yi maintains that achieving a proper balance between justice and 
interests has always been a key trend in Chinese tradition. This is something of a 
misreading, and Wang has actually called for giving priority to justice (Wang 2014, 
27). While his message is in unison with Confucian thought, which stresses that when 
one is offered benefits, one must consider whether they are justified or not, there are 
other interpretations which diverge from this idealist understanding and reveal a more 
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nuanced approach, which reflects the application of the “correct handling of justice 
and interests” in a more realistic manner. 
An author on the online discussion forum of the Party’s theoretical magazine 
Qiushi commented that Confucianism is not about negating interests, and in a market 
economy one cannot concentrate on justice alone. The abovementioned author called 
for getting rid of the passivating aspects of the Confucian approach, which puts too 
much emphasis on justice (Chen 2013). Ye Zicheng, a prominent scholar from Peking 
University, has argued that even when seen from a traditional Confucian viewpoint, 
justice and interests should not be considered extreme opposites. In his view, this sup-
ports the fact that a country cannot abandon its core interests, meaning that China 
should neither act blindly in accordance with some abstract principles, nor concentrate 
on its own profit or external fame. Instead, one should understand that what is right 
for China is the appropriate and timely course of action in any given situation (Ye 
2014).20 Another view regards “interests” as economic interests and “justice” as politi-
cal and security interests. This means that sacrificing interests for the sake of justice 
does not imply putting the greater good of the global community above China’s own 
needs but, on the contrary, that economic interests can be abandoned for the sake of 
national security (Xu & Du 2015, 277–278). In the light of these views, the correct 
handling of justice and benefits translates into a pragmatic, utilitarian foreign policy: 
China will safeguard its core interests and push for an international system that is 
more just, namely less unipolar.
20  The ensuing logic here is that in etymological dictionaries yi is traditionally explained through 
its homonym 宜, which refers to what is appropriate: when man does what he ought to do, that 
is right.
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4 Discussion
4.1 General implications
The editor of the Communist Party organ Renmin Ribao (“the People’s Daily”), Yang 
Kai, wrote in an editorial on 19 February, 2016, entitled “China’s rise will bring the 
world positive energy”21: 
How to regard China’s rise? … First of all, China’s ideals transmit the positive 
energy of peaceful development. The thought of promoting ‘harmony but not 
conformity’ present in ancient Chinese philosophy, as well as the concept of ‘the 
commonwealth of the destiny of mankind’ given prominence by President Xi 
Jinping, or more concretely, the emphasis on ‘no conflict and no confrontation’ 
in the new type of great power relations between China and the United States, 
as well as the principles of ‘closeness, sincerity, benevolence and inclusiveness’ 
followed in China’s peripheral diplomacy or the prominence of ‘peace’ in ‘the 
four major partnerships’22 between China and Europe — all of these reflect 
the nature of China as a nation striving for peace. Just as President Xi Jinping 
remarked in his speech at the Körber-Stiftung in Germany, 2014: To say that 
China follows the road of peaceful development is not opportunistic trickery 
nor diplomatic rhetoric, but instead a conclusion based on an objective assess-
ment of our history, the realities and the future; it is the organic amalgamation 
of our ideological self-confidence and practical self-awareness (Yang 2016).
The same newspaper published another editorial on 20 February, 2016 by Xiong Jian, 
entitled “Tell the tale of China effectively in order to better connect with the world”, 
in which the writer complains that China has been beaten when weak and vilified 
when strong, and infers that the only way to remedy the situation is to improve the 
manner in which China projects its image to the outside world. The writer quotes 
Xi Jinping, who has said that “having a good narrative makes any task half accom-
plished”. The editorial does not sketch out China’s narrative but contends that there 
is a lot to work on: “The Chinese way, the Chinese miracle, China’s accomplishments, 
the Chinese spirit, Chinese values and China’s strength demonstrate how there are 
myriad elements and an endless stream of materials for a good story” (Xiong 2016).23
21  In Chinese, ‘positive energy’ is zhengnengliang (正能量). It is a catchphrase allegedly popu-
larized in China by Xi Jinping and Wang Qishan and originating from the works of British 
psychologist Richard Wiseman. Zhengnengliang is the Chinese translation of Wiseman’s book 
entitled The Luck Factor, in which the author argues that luck is not fate but can be learned by 
creating chance opportunities and thinking positively.
22  Sino-European partnerships in peace, growth, reform and the progress of civilization.
23  In Chinese, the word for ‘tale’, ‘story’ or ‘narrative’ is invariably gushi (故事).
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All the essays forming this dissertation, viewed separately and as a whole, take issue 
with the statements presented in the above-mentioned editorials. Has China always 
adopted the role of peaceful development? What is China’s self-awareness like? Is 
there a “Chinese way”? What are the Chinese values? How should harmony be inter-
preted? Where does the idea of the commonwealth of destiny come from? How is the 
story of China being formulated? All of these questions, among others, are discussed 
in this dissertation in the hope that finding some answers would shed light on the 
processes that may lead to the formulation of a new, strategic narrative for China. 
The Chinese leadership desire their country to be seen simultaneously as a ris-
ing power destined for greatness, and as an inherently peaceful, Confucian beacon 
of civilization. The strategic narrative will therefore also be a subjective description of 
China’s role. As a manifestation of this role, China adheres to the principle of non-
interference and is resolutely against all attempts to interfere in the internal matters 
of any sovereign nation. However, there are signs that it is becoming increasingly dif-
ficult for China to maintain this role. Its own interests overseas are increasing at a fast 
rate, and it is easy to imagine a situation where China would be forced to interfere in 
the matters of another state to protect its own interests. This means that the historical 
narrative behind China’s identity may have to be modified accordingly, perhaps under-
lining that while China has interfered in other countries’ affairs on occasion, it has 
always done so differently from the colonial powers, namely for altruistic and not for 
hegemonistic reasons. 
Furthermore, pursuing the Tianxia ideal to its logical conclusion would mean relin-
quishing the goal of unification with Taiwan as a nation-state. Indeed, it may be that 
the present-day official insistence on clinging to unity could at least partly be due 
to a “rhetorical trap”, into which the Chinese leaders have fallen in their effort to 
build their own legitimacy upon unity, and from which they are now unable to extri-
cate themselves. At the present time, there clearly exists a “correct” national narrative 
which dictates how China should be defined as a state and a nation. The main exhibi-
tion in the Museum of History in Beijing concentrates solely on showing a consistent 
trend towards a multi-national, unified state in Chinese history. It stands as an exam-
ple of how the ideal of Grand Unity has been artificially kept alive and deliberately 
interpreted falsely. The narrative legitimizing the rule of the Communist Party gives 
the Party credit for ending the humiliating war with Japan 70 years ago. The Party 
therefore has to continue along that same path, safeguarding China’s unity and stabil-
ity, if it wants to remain in power. According to Dessein (2014, 59), “contemporary 
political historiography connects the mission of the unified Chinese-state to inherited 
politico-religious narratives”.
The insistence on the dogma of unity is a reflection of the weakness of the state in 
China, as paradoxical as this may sound when talking of a one-Party dictatorship. The 
Party may be strong, but the nation-state is not. Historically, what we understand by 
‘China’ today – a unified state with an area equal to that of Europe and inhabited by 
the Chinese – is a recent construct dating back no more than two centuries. China has 
been characterized as “a civilization trying to squeeze itself into the form of a nation-
state” (Pye 1992, 235–236). Nation-building is still a work in progress. It is therefore 
theoretically possible, albeit not probable in the foreseeable future, that the Party-
state will try to find a way out of the rhetorical trap of its own making and welcome 
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interpretations based on softer, civilization-based forms of unity. This would possibly 
be partly a result of mounting external pressures if China continues to advocate its 
Tianxia model in international relations research. Signs of such a change are not yet 
visible, and whether they will ever present themselves is another question which can 
only be answered with time. 
We are currently witnessing the era of Xi Jinping, and all indications point to cling-
ing onto the old doctrines instead of experimenting with new ones. While Xi’s con-
stant quotations of classical, often Confucian, sources have been interpreted even as a 
sign that the Communist Party is turning into a “Confucian Party”, it is most likely all 
just a ruse. It is doubtful whether Xi has really invented anything new. For example, his 
“new” foreign policy concepts originate from the speeches of his predecessors, but the 
way in which they are currently accredited to Xi himself seems to be an orchestrated 
effort to bolster his authority as China’s supreme leader (Kallio 2016a). In effect, he has 
simply combined a Maoist anti-American and anti-hegemonic rant with Confucian 
sayings to please the conservative and patriotic public. When the climate is becoming 
increasingly uncertain both domestically and internationally, the public also wants to 
see a sagacious man in charge. If such a person does not exist, he has to be created. 
Again, only history can deliver the final verdict on Xi Jinping’s leadership. However, 
it seems likely that the optimistic future view of Michael Schoenhals (1992, 29) is 
still only wishful thinking: “One may … expect to see a de-emphasis on formalized 
language in the PRC in the future, once the leaders who presume that a single formu-
lation can make the difference between national salvation and national decline have 
passed from the scene”. The realization of Xi’s Chinese Dream is, in essence, the com-
pletion of National Salvation, and until that goal has been reached, the formulations of 
the dogma must surely be carefully deliberated so that unity and stability remain solid.
With regard to unity, it is possible that there are differing opinions within the Com-
munist Party, as well as within other relevant State institutions, about the ideological 
formulations. It is improbable that all the important players would have a similar view 
on the role of tradition and traditional values, for example. Further research would be 
needed to crack open the black box of the party-state in order to see how factionalism 
affects the processes relating to the formation of the Chinese way. 
Leaving these questions open for the future serves to illustrate the main premise of 
this dissertation: Chinese traditional schools of thought, and how their teachings are 
interpreted, will not be merely of theoretical interest, but will impact the practices in 
China both externally and internally, with far-reaching repercussions. The formula-
tion of China’s new national identity is comparable to gene technology, where genes 
are not only studied but manipulated to form a new kind of creature. It is important 
to try to envision the characteristics of that creature in advance because China is fast 
becoming an increasingly powerful player in the world, also in regard to setting global 
rules and standards.
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4.2 The revival of tradition and auto-Orientalization
The revival of tradition in general and Confucianism in particular has been discussed 
in recent years by Arif Dirlik (2011), John Makeham (2011), Ralph Weber (2015) and 
Dessein (2015). Dirlik and Makeham both discuss the demarcation and definition 
of guoxue, and both emphasize the particularistic or culturalistic motivation behind 
the revival of the traditional Chinese schools of thought, which puts such a revival in 
opposition to Eurocentrism and universal values. Ford (2014) shares this assessment, 
and regards it as a result of a conscious effort by the Party-state: 
In response to its internal challenges of legitimacy, one might say – including 
its persisting fear of ideational subversion from the “spiritual pollution” of polit-
ical ideals associated with the West – the Chinese Party-State has increasingly 
“Orientalized” itself and its political discourse. This auto-Orientalization has, in 
turn, given rise to a curious cadre of Confucio-authoritarian cheerleaders, for as 
it has progressed, a group of academics and public intellectuals has emerged in 
China to advance this discourse still further – and to make more explicit and 
self-aware the quasi-Confucian themes already prominent in the CCP’s mod-
ern legitimacy narrative (Ford 2014). 
With the modern legitimacy narrative, Ford is referring to a “new quasi-Confucian 
political discourse of a technocratically-guided but civilizationally-grounded national 
unity and strength” (Ford 2014). Ford’s judgement is in line with the conclusions of 
this dissertation research. However, it disregards the possibility of a genuine grass-
roots interest towards the revival tradition, possibly taking on different forms than 
what the Party-state is promoting. This possibility has been discussed in the first essay 
of this dissertation in particular (Kallio 2011). 
Focusing on Confucianism, both Weber and Dessein also emphasize the instru-
mentalist nature of the “so-called embrace of Confucianism by the Party” (Weber 
2015, 185). Furthermore, both argue that the Confucian revival as a bottom-up pro-
cess has been greatly overestimated. As Weber (186) concludes: “I believe that a sub-
stantial revival of Confucianism that would impact the societal or political realm is 
merely wishful thinking on behalf of the Confucian scholars and other actors (with 
or without a political agenda of their own) and non-Confucian scholars who study 
Confucian scholars and their invention”. Dessein (2015, 193) refers to an interesting 
distinction between two perceived forms of Confucianism in the Qing era, namely 
pro “state Confucianism” (junxue, 君學), which was used to legitimize the govern-
ment’s rule, and pro “radical Confucianism” (guoxue, 國學), which was a form of moral 
teaching critical of political and social injustice.24 Dessein (2015) leads the reader to 
understand that guoxue, Traditional Learning, including Confucianism promoted by 
the Party-state today, follows the statist tradition. 
Torbjörn Lodén (2006, 187) points out that “Confucianism has been used as a tool 
by political leaders to legitimize their rule but also as a weapon in the hands of critics 
24  The jun (君) in junxue refers to ‘ruler’. Dessein (2015, 193) contains an error mixing guoxue with 
junxue and vice versa.  
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and reformers”. He cautions against asking too simple questions. While it is custom-
ary to ponder whether Confucianism as such is essentially a conservative or a dynamic 
force, one should perhaps focus on how people choose to interpret Confucian ideas 
and the roles they assign to them (ibid., 191). After all, in the words of Lodén, Confu-
cianism can be described as “a continuous discussion on some fundamental questions 
concerning the human predicament” (ibid.). 
This dissertation is an example of a “non-Confucian scholar” studying the phenom-
enon called the rise of Confucianism, and while concurring with the instrumentalist 
nature of the Party-state’s campaign to promote tradition, it refrains from delivering a 
definitive verdict on the future of “radical Confucianism” in China. Rather, that is an 
issue that should be readdressed after some years. Perhaps the “Confucian fever” will 
die out together with the related political campaign — after all, all political campaigns 
in China have had a limited lifespan — but the phenomena are various and the actors 
multiple, which is why the issue is best referred to future research. 
Nevertheless, the revival of tradition — regardless of whether it is seen as a state-
run or grass-roots project, or both — has practical implications for many aspects of 
Chinese society, including the discussion in China about democracy, human rights, 
and the rule of law, even though the essays forming this dissertation focus mainly 
on the field of China’s foreign policy. On the other hand, examining the discussion 
related to the rule of law in China offers more examples of the trend of auto-Orien-
talization in the different Chinese discourses.
4.3 Relevance to the rule of law in China
The top-down process of reviving tradition in China may, if successful, result in the 
emergence of a new set of philosophical values, which may be reflected even in the 
language of the law and legal concepts, all of which will influence the development of 
China’s legal culture. Therefore, seen from the wider perspective of comparative law, 
it is important to examine the issue of the roots of the law, and to study the interde-
pendency and reciprocity between the law and culture in the Chinese context.25 One 
particular aspect is the apparent difficulty of introducing the concepts of the rule of 
law and rule by law into the Chinese language in an unambiguous manner. 
As mentioned in the fourth essay (Kallio 2015c), Professor Ye Zicheng (2013) from 
Peking University has coined the term Huaxia zhuyi (華夏主義), ‘Chinese-ism’26 to 
refer to a combination of traditional schools of thought which he believes should form 
the basis of government in China. He suggests that China should endorse the Tao-
ist “natural” way of government, the Confucian “people-centred” government, and the 
Legalist “law-based” government. Furthermore, Ye (2014) believes that Xi Jinping is 
already putting such a combination into practice. In Ye’s analysis, Xi’s personal take on 
China’s legal framework is based on a Legalist School understanding of society. 
The Legalist School, which promoted punishments and rewards as the most effective 
way of keeping subjects in hand, was favoured by the founder of the Qin Dynasty, who 
25  Related issues are extensively discussed in Husa 2015, 29–48. 
26  Huaxia refers to the Chinese cultural sphere.
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found the ideas useful in forming the first unified empire in China in 221 BCE. Shang 
Yang, a Legalist scholar and statesman who lived a century before the Qin Dynasty, 
stated: “Punishments create force, force creates strength, strength creates awe, awe cre-
ates mercy (of the ruler); thus mercy (of the ruler) has its origin in force” (Shang jun 
shu, “Qu qiang” 8, as reprinted in Sturgeon, ed., 2011). Ye (2014) notes that in 2006, 
Xi quoted Shang Yang: “All states have laws but there is no law that forces the people 
to obey them”. This means that laws alone are not enough and need to be guided by 
a higher principle or actor. As Shang Yang wrote, the disorder in a country is not the 
fault of the laws being in disorder, it is just that the laws are inadequate in general.27 
This view chimes with China’s official aim of promoting “a socialist Rule of Law 
with Chinese characteristics”, which basically means that the Communist Party will 
remain above the law and play the role of the higher actor guiding the laws. The Con-
stitution of the People’s Republic (Article 1) stipulates that China “is a socialist state 
under the people’s democratic dictatorship led by the working class”. That is some-
thing quite different from constitutionalism. Hongqi Wengao, a Party-run theoretical 
magazine, published an article in October 2014 accusing the promoters of constitu-
tional rule of renouncing the class struggle. The article warned of replacing the people’s 
democratic dictatorship with the rule of law, stating that this would be falling into the 
trap of “universal values”, and would play into the hands of international capital but 
be detrimental to the Chinese people (QStheory.cn 2014). On the eve of the Fourth 
Plenum, the Global Times (2014b) declared that “China must chart its own course to 
the rule of law”. The Communiqué of the Plenum states: “The leadership of the Party 
and the Socialist rule of law are identical, the Socialist rule of law must persist in the 
leadership of the Party, the leadership of the Party must rely on the Socialist rule of 
law” (Xinhuawang 2014).
The phrase used for the rule of law in China already in itself contains a deviation 
from the internationally accepted understanding, which stresses the accountability 
under the law of all government or private entities and individuals, as well as judicial 
independence and adherence to international human rights standards (UNSC 2004). 
The Chinese phrase, yi fa zhi guo (依法治國), translates literally as ‘to rule the country 
according to law’, or ‘rule by law’, which lacks the “rule under law” aspects mentioned 
above.28 In addition, yi fa zhi guo is often abbreviated to fazhi (法治) in Chinese par-
lance, which stresses the difference between the rule of law and the rule of man (in 
Chinese renzhi, 人治).29 According to the Global Times (2014c), in an article on the 
Fourth Plenum, “China was stubbornly influenced by thousands of years of ‘the rule 
of man’, and the remnants are still impacting modern ruling mechanisms”. Today, ren-
zhi refers not only to the Emperor’s rule in history, but also to the kind of unlimited 
power which Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping were still able to wield before the 
Party started promoting collective rule and inner-Party democracy.
27  The original text can be found in Shangjun shu, “Huace” 3, as reprinted in Sturgeon, ed., 2011.
28  Yi fa zhi guo was previously written homonymically as 以法治國, literally ‘utilising law to rule 
the country’, which is even more clearly a synonym for rule by law.
29  Fazhi (法治) also stands in contrast to its homonym (法制), which means ‘legal system’ or ‘rule 
by law’.
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However, the differentiation between the rule of law and the rule of man is mud-
dled by the Party-state’s stated goal of integrating the former with rule by virtue. The 
Communiqué of the Fourth Plenum of the 18th Central Committee of the Commu-
nist Party of China (Xinhuawang 2014) brings together Xi Jinping’s reform policies 
and the project to revive tradition: “We … must persist in the integration of ruling the 
country according to the law (yi fa zhi guo) and ruling the country by virtue (yi de zhi 
guo, 以德治國) …”.30 The latter part of the phrase reeks of Confucian political ide-
als, which presented rule by sagacious men as the most desirable, albeit rare, state of 
affairs. According to the Confucians, virtue was a more effective tool in government 
than laws. The Analects records that Confucius said: “If you guide the commoners with 
directives and constrain them with punishments, they will try to avoid getting into 
trouble but have no sense of shame. If you guide them with virtue and constrain them 
with propriety, they will have a sense of shame and mend their ways” (“Wei zheng” 3, 
as reprinted in Sturgeon, ed., 2011).
Li Buyun from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences explains that from the 
viewpoint of the Legalist school, there is nothing wrong with rule by sagacious men 
as such; the problem is that genuine sages appear only once in a millennium. This was 
also pointed out by Sun Yat-sen, the father of the Chinese Republic, in his critique 
against imperial rule (Li 2015, 7–9). And naturally, the kind of Confucian thinking 
which the quotation above reflects is not foreign to Communist indoctrination either, 
and has been manifested in the public shaming of dissidents and political opponents. 
The Party now seems to be creating space for rule by virtue, just in case. Seen against 
the clear signs of a personality cult being constructed around Xi, this opens the door 
for speculation on the nature of Xi’s ambitions. Ye Zicheng (2014) stopped short of 
calling Xi a sagacious leader by presenting his leadership as the embodiment of the 
best values of China’s traditional schools of thought (Ye 2014). 
There is a new catchphrase in the field of legal studies – “China rests on the prin-
ciples of rule of/by law” (fazhi Zhongguo, 法治中國).31 This is accredited to Xi Jinping 
himself ( Jiang 2015, 3), and serves as another recent example of the personification of 
the Communist Party’s principally collective leadership in Xi Jinping. According to 
Professor Jiang Ming’an from Peking University, Xi Jinping’s fazhi Zhongguo consists 
of four distinct elements: the state, the government, the society, and the ruling party, 
which must all rest on the principles of rule of/by law ( Jiang 2015, “Qianyan”, 3–11). 
In regard to the Communist Party, Jiang says, its role is to lead the overall develop-
ment of the country and to coordinate the different demands of different actors within 
the state and society. Fazhi in terms of the Party refers to its internal ability to act in 
a manner which guarantees its legitimacy by avoiding arbitrary decisions and taking 
heed of the political and economic realities ( Jiang 2015, “Qianyan”, 9–10). Therefore, 
when the Party says it wants to promote fazhi in China, it is simply referring to a col-
lective government supported by a solid legal system with the caveat that Xi Jinping is 
currently at the core of the collective. 
30  In the official translation (China Copyright and Media 2014), “by virtue” reads as “according to 
virtue”. 
31  The translation of fazhi Zhongguo differs in various sources. Sometimes it is rendered as ‘China 
ruled by law’, sometimes as ‘Rule of Law China’. 
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In light of the Party’s aforementioned goal to rule the country by integrating law 
and virtue, China’s legal culture, as well as the political discourse of the Party in gen-
eral, can also be characterized as a form of “auto-Orientalization”. For political pur-
poses, the Chinese leadership is downplaying the European roots of the country’s 
legal culture, even though the modern Chinese legal language is heavily influenced 
by European and American models.32 Instead, the Party is putting emphasis on the 
“indigenous” elements, or rather an essentialized understanding of them. This under-
standing perceives the Confucian moral code and the rule of man as having been 
superior to law in the field of governance during the imperial era, while in reality the 
rulers still relied on the principles of Legalism due to their practical value, even though 
Confucianism was at the same time the orthodox state ideology.33 Therefore, imperial 
rule is commonly characterized as “Legalism under the guise of Confucianism”. 
Following a similar logic, Xi Jinping’s idea of fazhi could be dubbed “legalism in 
the guise of the rule of law”. Xi is promoting the rule of law instead of the rule of 
man, but at the same time the Party and its core leadership are allowed to continue 
controlling all aspects of society, including the judicial organs, and the Party is fur-
thermore flirting with the idea of rule by virtue, which belongs to the same Confucian 
tradition as the rule of man. Hence, it is difficult to draw any conclusion other than 
that the Socialist Rule of Law with Chinese Characteristics is just another moniker 
for the single-party dictatorship, similar to the “people’s democratic dictatorship”, and 
that talk of rule by virtue is just another attempt to appease the population by present-
ing a culturally familiar image of a strong, sagacious man at the helm. 
4.4 Towards China’s strategic narrative 
It is hypothesized in this dissertation that the Chinese leadership is currently compos-
ing a new strategic narrative to legitimize their chosen policy paths both inside China 
and in the international arena. While nothing resembling a strategic narrative has 
been publicized as yet, there are signs of its being formulated in the rhetoric related to 
China’s rise, the Chinese Dream, and China’s emerging international role. 
A strategic narrative for China would need to describe where China is going, how 
it will get there, and what kind of happy ending will emerge at the destination. The 
building blocks for such a narrative must include something old and something new 
but, unlike wedding attire, preferably nothing borrowed. Due to the trend of auto-
Orientalization, if anything is borrowed it must at least be “with Chinese character-
istics”. The new has already been formulated as the great rejuvenation of the Chinese 
nation. The old is China’s Traditional Learning, the supposed amalgamation of Chi-
na’s traditional wisdom.
The prominent, critical-Marxist philosopher Li Zehou has coined the term shiyong 
lixing (實用理性), perhaps best translated as ‘pragmatic rationality’, which he and oth-
ers have presented as China’s “national wisdom”, the most profound mental construct 
32  The relation between language and the law is highlighted in Husa 2015, 46–48.
33  The processes of orientalizing the Chinese legal culture both at home and abroad are compre-
hensively examined in Ruskola 2012, 179–234.
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affecting the Chinese culture (Li 1994, Liu X. 2012). The term refers to the alleged 
Chinese tradition of objective, practical and results-oriented deliberation preceding 
action. According to Li, pragmatic rationality can be partly seen as a positivist-realist 
world view, but it also includes the understanding that practical results are not the sole 
standard of human behaviour. Li explains that traditional Confucians believed that 
they had a mission to cultivate their person morally, reaching ‘inner sageliness’ (nei-
sheng, 內聖), and then to work for the betterment of society in the spirit of ‘outward 
kingliness’ (waiwang, 外王). While laudable, the emotionality of the mission has often 
led to a fanatical fixation on ideas, oftentimes to National Salvation, and at other 
times to patriotism, science, or democracy. The problem with these quasi-religious 
fanatics is the merger of politics and creed (zheng-jiao heyi, 政教合一), which Li finds 
deplorable. He famously accuses National Salvation of having suppressed enlighten-
ment in China (Li 1994).
Li attests that ethics should not be subordinate to politics, and believes that moral 
principles were traditionally based on the Way of Heaven (Tiandao, 天道). Li under-
stands Heaven partly as the laws of nature, but also as something akin to a supernatu-
ral force. He recalls how Confucius, otherwise rational, swore by Heaven (Li 1994, 
152–153). Li seems to agree with those Song and Ming dynasty Neo-Confucians who 
regarded the li (理; ‘rationale’) as man’s moral nature, and believed that it reflected 
the li of Heaven (Tianli, 天理; ‘rationale of Heaven’, usually translated as ‘Heavenly 
principle’). Good behaviour was considered to be in accordance with the Heavenly 
principle (Lodén 2006, 114; Kallio 2014, 270).
In Li’s view, the Way of Heaven is what is needed to restrain politics. He wants the 
merger of politics and creed to be replaced by the unity of Heaven and man (Tian-ren 
heyi, 天人合一).34 In essence, his pragmatic rationality would ideally mean a prag-
matic adherence to the rationale of Heaven. Similar views have also been expressed 
by Professor Liu Xiaoying from the University of International Relations (Beijing), 
who is concerned that pragmatic rationality has a tendency to turn into utilitarian-
ism. In his view, God was invented in the West for the purpose of restraining politics, 
and China would need to have something similar (Liu 2012, 114). Despite Li’s strong 
doubts about the so-called Contemporary New Confucians’ metaphysically oriented 
thinking and its applicability to modern, democratic societies (Li 1994, 158), both he 
and Liu seem to imply that a new basis for morality — a basis which is stronger than 
politics and more permanent than mere utilitarian values — could be found in the 
intrinsic moral conviction promoted by traditional Confucians. 
In the light of those assessments deeming the revival of Confucianism as either 
a party-state-controlled project or as not having enough strength as a bottom-up 
process, it does not seem very likely that the defects of pragmatic rationalism can be 
mended. National Salvation has for a century been the end that has justified the means 
as China’s creed. The tides of time do not seem to have changed course in that regard. 
If anything, China is heading towards intensified ideological indoctrination. The new 
strategic narrative may well end up being one of the “holy scriptures” of China’s rein-
forced political religion. That remains to be seen, however, because China still lacks a 
34  Furthermore, Li Zehou promotes the Neo-Confucian ideal of striking a balance between one’s 
rationality and emotions (Li Zehou 2008, 203).
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systematic road map of how the traditional Chinese values are going to be merged with 
the socialist ones, and thus turned into parts of China’s strategic narrative. 
While the key attributes of China’s national/historical narrative, which has been 
created mainly for internal consumption, namely the doctrine of National Salvation 
and the dogma of unity, can be extracted from key speeches and documents, the com-
position of China’s strategic narrative is still guesswork. It can be postulated that it 
will rest on the basis of the older narratives, that it will reflect the country’s recent 
rise, and that it will be aimed not only at the domestic, but also at international audi-
ences. This doctoral dissertation offers a sketch of some elements which are likely to 
become attributes of the strategic narrative. These include the Chinese Dream itself, 
the Tianxia ideal, and the denial of universal values (see Figure 6.2). 
The Chinese Dream stands for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, which 
is an organic amalgamation of the older narratives, China’s national/historical narra-
tive, and the Communist Party’s narrative. The Tianxia ideal, which has become the 
key word in China’s attempt to increase its soft power in the field of international 
relations, is the crystallization of China’s traditional world view. The denial of univer-
sal values, which is a sort of mirror image of the Tianxia ideal, emphasizes the “indig-
enous” character of China’s political system, something which the Communist Party 
has held dear all along, and which can be seen as a continuation of the Communist 
Party’s anti-hegemonism.35 
While these elements can be considered to be likely candidates for attributes in 
China’s strategic narrative in the light of this dissertation, the final composition and 
combination of attributes will only be revealed in time, and are a question for further 
research. Taking into account the two upcoming centennials — the centennial of the 
Communist Party in 2021 and the centennial of the People’s Republic in 2049 — it 
seems likely that a new narrative, or parts thereof, will emerge in the coming years. 
After all, in the light of the continued emphasis on formalized language, an absence of 
major political declarations in the wake of preparing for such important celebrations 
would be quite unprecedented. 
It is also likely that China will continue to send conflicting messages. While want-
ing to tell the world that China is inherently peaceful, the leadership must also keep 
reassuring the people that their country will not be humiliated again. We can there-
fore expect to see China’s leaders alternately stressing China’s role as a developing 
country and as a powerful economy, as a passive victim of colonial powers and as the 
historical leader of its own cultural sphere. Furthermore, there is no reason to expect 
that China will change its utilitarian approach to foreign policy. It is in line with 
pragmatic rationality that the Chinese leaders speak of harmony and justice as some 
sort of Heavenly principles of the Tianxia ideal, while doing what needs to be done 
in order to reach the results that must be reached in accordance with their subjectively 
objective deliberations.
35  Chairman Mao said in 1954: “We are opposed to big countries having special rights. ... The 
current situation in North and South America is like that of a medieval family, with the United 
States as the patriarch and the other countries as its nephews or juniors. We don’t want this kind 
of relationship in Asia” (Mao 1998b, 146–147). 
50 | Jyrki Kallio: Towards China’s Strategic Narrative
5 Summary
This doctoral dissertation, consisting of four, published peer-reviewed essays and this 
summarizing report, explores the Communist Party-led process to formulate a new, 
“strategic” narrative which endorses China’s status as a rising but peaceful superpower. 
A strategic narrative for China would need to describe where China is going, how 
it will get there, and what kind of happy ending will emerge at the destination. One 
fundament of such a narrative is China’s perceived national essence in the form of 
“Traditional Learning”, the supposed amalgamation of China’s ancient wisdom, which 
is currently enjoying a revival. 
All the essays discuss different aspects of the same question: What is the role of 
the so-called revival of Traditional Learning in the formulation process of the nar-
ratives that the party-state uses in order to legitimize its rule and China’s position in 
the world? Understanding this process will be essential in delineating China’s chang-
ing national identity, both internally and externally. Traditional Chinese schools of 
thought, and how their teachings are interpreted, are therefore not merely of theoreti-
cal interest, but also reflect the practices in China both externally and internally, with 
far-reaching repercussions.
Through a critical reading of both contemporary policy sources and the classical 
texts quoted therein, the dissertation illustrates how the Party is instrumentalizing 
Traditional Learning, particularly Confucianism, by emphasizing only those virtues 
that serve its interests, such as loyalty to the state. The dissertation further questions 
the credibility of the historical narrative used to shape and substantiate the national 
identity. The dissertation concludes that despite the lip service the Party pays to the 
importance of tradition, the Party doctrine and Confucianism continue to exist in two 
parallel universes which do not seem to be merging.
Another fundament of the strategic narrative is the same as that which the Party 
builds its legitimacy on: Its role as the ultimate defender of China’s national integrity 
and dignity. This role arises from the humiliations inflicted on late imperial China by 
colonial powers. China’s current leading slogan, “the Chinese Dream”, is analogously 
said to mean the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. This has strong foreign policy- 
related dimensions. China’s economic rise has led observers both inside and outside 
of China to start presenting evermore bolder visions of China’s rising political and 
military power in the global arena. Many scholars in China are suggesting that Chi-
na’s growing role on the world stage on the one hand, and the revival of Traditional 
Learning in China on the other, should lead to the emergence of a Chinese, if not 
Confucian, international relations theory. 
The abovementioned suggestions are the reason why the essays in this dissertation 
focus on the implications of the instrumentalization of Confucianism and the narra-
tive formulation process in particular for China’s role as an international actor. The 
suggestions feed on Chinese traditional thinking about the political order, and their 
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aim is to give the Chinese leaders ideational tools for making China a challenger to 
the West, and ultimately to transform the structure of the existing international order. 
Hence, it is essential to understand the nature of the challenge and its roots. This dis-
sertation concludes that no Confucian international relations model has emerged as 
yet, but elements of a Chinese world view, based on ancient ideals, are increasingly 
finding their way into the foreign policy rhetoric. 
China’s leaders utilize history and tradition in their rhetoric to emphasize the 
uniquely Chinese nature of their politics, and to rationalize their opposition to univer-
sal values and the perceived West-centrism of the international system. The top-down 
process of reviving tradition in China may result in the emergence of a new set of 
“indigenous” values, which can be reflected in many aspects of Chinese society, even 
in the development of the country’s legal culture. The dissertation also briefly touches 
upon this issue and suggests that understanding the domestic historico-cultural con-
text is crucial for decoding any societal phenomena in China. 
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6 Figures
6.1  The formation of China’s national/historical narrative and the 
Communist Party’s narrative
unity equals stability, division equals chaos 
unity as the main trend 
China’s borders unchanged from time immemorial 
the invention of the Chinese (Zhonghua) Nation 
humiliation inflicted by colonial powers 
humiliation inflicted by Japan 
China’s national/historical narrative ≈ The Communist Party’s narrative 
• National Salvation • anti-hegemonism
• unity
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6.2  The formation of China’s strategic narrative
denial of universal values 
Tianxia ideal 
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Introduction 
China’s rise to become a true superpower is overshadowed by tough 
internal challenges. Although the economy is growing at a record 
pace and the living standards of the population as a whole are 
rising, the adverse eﬀ ects of the rapid growth, such as inequality, 
unemployment, working conditions and environmental degradation, 
have given rise to an alarming amount of unrest around the country.1 
Furthermore, the recent ﬁ nancial crisis has been a reminder of the 
uncertainties that beset the economy. Some new crisis, especially one 
related to food, water or energy, might severely aﬀ ect the wellbeing of 
the population. With the country’s stability at stake, the Communist 
Party has to anchor its right to rule to something more permanent 
than economic growth and to strengthen its position as the moral 
and spiritual leader of the nation. However, the Party leaders are 
certainly aware that in the light of today’s realities, communism 
has long since dried up as the fountainhead of moral and spiritual 
inspiration. Instead, the Party seems to be tapping into history and 
tradition to revamp the basis for its leadership. 
Th is study discusses the ways in which history and tradition are 
currently being used to legitimize the Party-state in China. Historical 
precedence and traditional conventions have always been politicized 
and have always held a key position in deﬁ ning the basis of the 
ruler’s power in China. Th is situation prevails today. China as we 
understand it today—a uniﬁ ed state with an area equal to Europe 
and inhabited by the Chinese—is no more ancient than the European 
nation states. Nation-building is still an ongoing process in China. 
To steer the process in the right direction, history is interpreted and 
even reinvented in such a way that makes the current realities—the 
established scope of the territory of the People’s Republic of China 
and the oﬃ  cial one-ness of the multi-ethnic Chinese nation—seem 
like the natural continuation of a 5,000-year-long history. 
Furthermore, the Communist Party is in dire need of some 
ideological backing for its capitalist policies, which have resulted 
not only in great growth but also in a widening gap between 
rich and poor. Th e Party’s ideology has already long been called 
1 See e.g. “Making sense of ‘mass incidents’” by Wang Weilan, Global Times, 30 May 2009, at 
http://special.globaltimes.cn/2009-05/433271.html. Accessed 19 Aug 2010. 
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“socialism with Chinese characteristics”. With socialism rusting 
away, the Chinese characteristics become even more central. Th e 
Party is looking for something to patch up and support its failing 
ideology, and has apparently turned to traditional, Chinese schools 
of thought as a source of suitable national essence. In the slogans of 
the future we will see much less socialism and many more Chinese 
characteristics. Th e Communist Party has begun propagating such 
values as harmony, communality, ﬁ liality, loyalty, unity and stability, 
which can be deduced from the traditional schools of thought. In 
particular, ‘harmony’, a term which is related to Confucianism, has 
gained a central position in today’s political mantra. In eﬀ ect, the 
Party seems to be moving towards “Chinese tradition with socialist 
characteristics”.
In China today there is vigorous, widespread public debate about 
the bigger questions that the Communist Party’s quest for tradition 
raises: What is tradition? What is Chinese? What is China? Who are 
the Chinese? Th e questions are diﬃ  cult ones, because once history 
is made into a political tool, its interpretations tend to lose all 
connection to historical facts. For instance, when the Party deﬁ nes 
the scope of China’s territorial unity as “all of China”, they are 
projecting an ancient ideal into the modern era in a most ahistorical 
manner. Conversely, there are ethnic-nationalist extremists who 
declare that many of the ethnic groups living in China are not Chinese 
at all. Diﬀ erent actors, including many who may be labelled ‘public 
intellectuals’, as well as ordinary netizens,2 both those aﬃ  liated 
with the Party-state and those outside the establishment, take part 
in the debate, which is ongoing in various books and articles, and 
on websites. Th e debate is strikingly open, but not surprisingly so. 
Th e issues often revolve around historiography, philosophy or even 
2 Richard A. Posner deﬁ nes a public intellectual as “someone who uses general ideas drawn 
from history, philosophy, political science, economics, law, literature, ideas that are part of 
the cultural intellectual tradition of the world, to address contemporary events, usually of a 
political or ideological ﬂ avor, and does so in the popular media, whether in the form of Op Ed 
pieces, television appearances, signing full-page advertisements, or writing magazine articles 
or books addressed to a general audience” (http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/resources/
transcripts/130.html, accessed 29 Oct 2010). 
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linguistics, which reduces the danger of attracting the attention of 
censorship oﬃ  cials.3 
This study introduces and analyses the debate related to the 
content and interpretation of history, and provides the historical 
and philosophical basis necessary for understanding the phenomena 
related to deﬁ ning the essence of Chinese tradition. Furthermore, it 
highlights the challenges of opening a discussion on tradition, which 
may turn out to be the proverbial Pandora’s box—or to paraphrase a 
saying about ﬁ re, a good servant but a bad master. Th e Party-state 
will want to ensure that the discussion goes in the right direction, but 
it will not be easy in the increasingly plural society in China today. 
Th is study is primarily based on Chinese-language sources (books, 
articles and internet posts) originating from the People’s Republic 
of China. 
Th e outcome of the debate will be of no minor signiﬁ cance for 
the future of Chinese society, how tradition will be deﬁ ned, and the 
kind of new ideological structure that is likely to emerge as a result. 
It will even have consequences for China’s foreign policy. Domestic 
and foreign politics are strongly interrelated in every country, and 
China is no exception, not least because many diﬃ  cult issues related 
to China’s external image are considered internal (especially Taiwan 
and the border regions of Tibet and Xinjiang). Besides, China’s foreign 
policy has never been devoid of ideology.4 
Th e analysis in this study is, of necessity, focused on two subjects: 
Confucianism and unity. When deﬁ ning tradition in China, it is 
impossible to overlook the importance of Confucianism, which holds 
a central position among the traditional schools of thought in China. 
Unity, in turn, has always been the main dogma in Chinese political 
philosophy. In the debate on history, the concept of unity and its 
diﬀ erent aspects are central.
Although Confucianism, which was the oﬃ  cial ideology during 
the imperial era, has been condemned as feudal and reactionary by 
3  Th is strategy of discussing issues with relevance to contemporary society is very traditional 
in China (as well as elsewhere in the world). My Licentiate Th esis introduces one example of 
using a compilation of classical literature to criticize the establishment during the early Qing 
dynasty (see Kallio 2009).
4 “Th e evidence … suggests that China’s realpolitik behavior is ideationally rooted.” (Johnston 
1996, 221.) 
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both the nationalist revolutionaries in the early 20th century and the 
communists alike, it undeniably retains a pivotal position in Chinese 
thought. Th e Party-state’s chosen ambassador of harmony both 
within and without China is Confucius. Today, not only is lip service 
paid to Confucian values, but Confucianism as a school of thought 
is still alive, especially in the form of so-called New Confucianism. 
Th erefore, in order to draw the battle lines over the real or desirable 
character of Chinese tradition, it is necessary to pay attention to the 
ongoing debate concerning the true essence of Confucianism. 
Confucius is well-known to all and sufficiently vague in his 
teachings for his message to be interpreted at will. During the 
imperial era, he was made something of a saint king. For the 
revolutionaries in the early 20th century, he was the embodiment of 
everything backward. During the Chinese Cultural Revolution in the 
1960s and 70s, he became the scapegoat in the political campaigns 
targeting ‘revisionism’. Th ose who explain the rise of the ‘Asian 
Tigers’ through cultural values like to say that Confucianism is about 
valuing education, selﬂ essness and the common good. Th e Party-line 
‘Socialist Confucian’ scholars today explain that Confucius taught 
stability, unity and harmony. In contrast, some contemporary New 
Confucians equate Confucianism with liberalism and democracy.  
Although the contradictory interpretations of Confucianism 
pose a challenge to the Communist Party, Professor Li Xiangping 
(李向平) and Doctoral Candidate Shi Dajian (石大建) from Shanghai 
University argue that the Confucian revival movement and the 
eﬀ orts of the Party-state to strengthen its legitimacy are actually 
mutually beneﬁ cial processes. Th e rising interest in Confucian values 
has been manifested in the preservation of Confucian cultural relics 
and the promotion of academic research on Confucianism. Th ese 
manifestations have, in turn, allocated and mobilized resources upon 
which Confucianism as a social movement has been building itself, 
Li and Shi maintain.5 
Li and Shi sketch a circular process whereby the allocation of 
“Confucian resources”, amplified by a spiritual crisis and the 
economic downturn, has given rise to the Confucian revival 
movement. Th e movement provides legitimization for national and 
local authorities, while the authorities, in turn, mobilize resources 
5 Li & Shi 2009, 79. 
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which enhance the revitalization of Confucianism. Th us the circle is 
closed. Li and Shi argue that Confucian values and customs, such as 
the ideal of the oneness of family and state, are so deeply embedded 
in Chinese culture that they serve the legitimization of the public 
authorities particularly well.6  
Unity is today presented as the dominant historical trend. 
Traditionally, the importance of unity for the rulers’ legitimacy 
derived from the belief, proven sound by actual and invented historical 
experiences alike, that unity equalled stability, and stability, in turn, 
meant peace and wellbeing. Were the state to become divided, it 
would mean war, suﬀ ering and chaos, and chaos was a sign as serious 
as natural calamities that Heaven had withdrawn its mandate from 
the ruler. An early developer of Confucianism, Mencius, proclaimed 
that the emperor had to be benevolent towards the population lest he 
lose the Mandate of Heaven and the people may exercise their right 
to overthrow him. 
In imperial China, unity was the external manifestation of the 
Heavenly Mandate, the divine blessing of the emperors’ power. Th e 
belief in Heaven and its mandate dates back to the earliest times 
of Chinese civilization.7 Unity was an ideology in itself, known as 
the Grand Unity. After the ideal had become a reality with the ﬁ rst 
uniﬁ cation of China and the birth of the ﬁ rst empire in 221 BCE, 
unity retained its position as the creed of imperial China. It stood for 
unity of not only the concrete realm, the unity of the state, but also 
the spiritual realm, the unity of ideology. Th e Emperor was, after 
all, the Son of Heaven, an earthly ruler as well as a spiritual leader. 
6 Ibid., 80.
7 Th e divinity of Heaven was central to the belief-system of the Huaxia tribes whose state, 
Zhou, gained hegemony over the other states in ca. 1045 BCE. It is debatable whether the cult 
of Heaven of the Zhou should be classiﬁ ed as a religion or a political philosophy (Pines 2002, 
58). Th e unity under the Zhou was based on pledges of allegiance of the other principalities 
and ﬁ efs to the Zhou king. Th is system became wholly nominal in 771 BCE and broke down 
entirely in 476 BCE. Th e ensuing period of internal warfare lasted until 221 BCE when China 
was uniﬁ ed into one empire by the king of Qin state, known thereafter as the First Emperor, 
Shi Huangdi. Confucius, who lived around the turn of the 6th and 5th centuries BCE, perceived 
the Zhou as a lost golden age. By then, Heaven had “transformed from a purposeful deity … 
into impersonal law” which, nevertheless, remained “an ultimate source of political and 
social order” (ibid., 62). 
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Tellingly, the Chinese word for ‘legitimacy’ (zhengtong, 正统) also 
stands for ‘orthodoxy’. From the early imperial era, Confucianism 
was harnessed as the embodiment of ideological unity. 
In pre-imperial China, the most valuable regalia included a set of 
nine three-legged bronze vessels called ding (鼎). It was said that as 
long as the Mandate of Heaven was strong, the ding were heavy and 
their ownership could not be transferred to another ruler.8 Just as a 
ding has three legs, the legitimacy of the Communist Party of China 
today rests upon three pillars. All three are aspects of the Grand 
Unity, and none of the three is rock-solid.9
8 One related story, recorded in Zuo zhuan and dated at 606 BCE, is translated into Finnish in 
Kallio 2005, 66–68. Th e nine ding were the property of the ruling clan of the Zhou state and 
were stolen by the Qin army in the middle of the 3rd century BCE. 
9 Referring to the late 1980s and the international collapse of communism, Wang Zheng (2008, 
788) claims: “China’s Communist rulers feared that, in the minds of ordinary Chinese citizens, 
they had already lost the ‘mandate of heaven’ to rule.”
Figure 1. A bronze ding (鼎) from the late Shang dynasty
Source: Mountain/Wikimedia Commons
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First is territorial integrity: China is one and there is only one China. 
Th e Communist Party was celebrated for its ability to unify the country 
and stabilize the economy after having won the civil war on the 
mainland. Th is put an end to a century-long era of chaos. However, 
the border regions of Tibet and Xinjiang continue to give cause for 
concern in regard to stability. Worse still, the main population, the 
Han Chinese, is also starting to question the preferability of a multi-
ethnic state. Th e inability to put a ﬁ nal end to the civil war and make 
Taiwan an integral part of the People’s Republic of China is a thorn 
in the Party’s side. If China were to break up, or if Taiwan were to 
become an independent country totally separate from China, it would 
signal inexcusable weakness on the part of the communist regime. 
Second is economic growth, which is both a result of and a 
prerequisite for stability. Having learned from the problems created 
by an overzealous planned economy, the strategy followed by 
the Chinese government since the late 1970s is to give free rein to 
capitalism and allow a part of the population to acquire wealth ﬁ rst. 
Th e rationale is that the spillover from the economic development 
will eventually reach the poorest regions and segments of the 
population as well. If the growth stagnates, however, the economic 
discrepancies will remain wide and have the potential to create major 
unrest. Li Xiangping and Shi Dajian argue that the legitimacy of the 
Chinese government has relied mainly on economic growth since the 
beginning of the reform era, but that is no longer the case.10 
Th ird is a unifying ideology. It used to be communism, but in the 
wake of the chosen development strategy, precious little remains, 
except for one-party rule. Th e Communist Party has become the 
most sought-after network for Chinese entrepreneurs instead of the 
vanguard of revolution. At the same time, the people seem to have 
lost faith in communism, and China is therefore commonly perceived 
to be suﬀ ering from a spiritual and ideological vacuum. People are 
seeking to ﬁ ll this vacuum by turning towards (quasi-) religious 
sects and cults, including the infamous Falungong, and other belief 
systems and ideologies. In a similar situation, many rulers across 
history have resorted to bolstering nationalism as the unifying idea, 
and contemporary China is no exception. Nationalism provides no 
ﬁ nal answer, however. Particularly in a multi-ethnic country such 
10 Li & Shi 2009, 79.
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as China, nationalism can germinate dangerous side-eﬀ ects, like 
ethnic chauvinism. Furthermore, strong anti-foreign tendencies 
among the population would harm China’s reputation as an attractive 
investment destination. 
Even the Communist Party media has called on the leadership 
to “re-instill a sense of moral values in society”.11 In order to do so, 
the Party is today resorting to neither communism nor nationalism. 
Instead, it relies upon history and tradition. Not wishing to identify 
any one school of thought with the true tradition, the Party-state 
is promoting ‘Traditional Learning’ (or ‘National Learning’) as the 
eternal and indigenous soul of China’s culture. As the concept is 
based on culture and philosophy, it is nationalistically-ﬂ avoured and 
thus has the appeal of nationalism but not the risks—or so the Party 
would appear to hope.   
Th is study is divided into three chapters. Chapter I shows how 
the Party-state has reinvented history, particularly in relation to the 
dogma of unity, for nation-building purposes. Chapter II focuses on 
the attempts to reinvent tradition by the Party-state and how selected 
elements of tradition have consequently been turned into Traditional 
Learning. Chapter III takes a closer look at Confucianism and how it 
has been reinterpreted and even reinvented by diﬀ erent actors. 
Chapter I summarizes the discussion related to the interpretation of 
China’s history regarding ethnic relations and territory. It demonstrates 
the hollowness of the Communist Party’s apparent belief that ‘whoever 
controls history, controls China’, by showing the real fragility of the 
oﬃ  cially-endorsed myth of China’s territorial unity.
Chapter II shows how Traditional Learning fits in with the 
government-endorsed drive for harmony and patriotism. It also 
discusses the problematic nature of Confucianism in relation to 
Traditional Learning and Chinese communism, and illustrates how 
Confucianism is deeply intertwined with both. 
Chapter III analyzes the historical roots of contemporary 
Confucianism in China and provides an introduction to the ongoing 
debate on the character of Confucianism. It highlights the diﬃ  culties 
in constructing such interpretations of Confucianism or Traditional 
Learning which cannot be contested. It demonstrates how diﬀ erent 
11 “Worshipping money, China won’t gain trust”, Global Times, 26 February 2010, at http://
opinion.globaltimes.cn/editorial/2010-02/508158.html. Accessed 26 Feb 2010.
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actors are able to ﬁ nd justiﬁ cation for widely diﬀ ering views even 
when they are supposedly based on the very same ‘roots’. 
Finally, the Conclusions return to the question of the relevance 
of tradition, and Confucianism in particular, to Chinese society 
today. Th ey touch upon the compatibility of Confucianism with 
modernization, the relation between Confucianism and the dogma 
of unity, and the question of the religious nature of Confucianism. 
Th e last point is related to the desire by certain dissident Confucians 
to turn Confucianism into a ‘state religion’ of China on the one hand, 
and the possibility that Traditional Learning with Confucian values at 
its core may become the new ‘national doctrine’ of the Communist 
Party on the other. Curiously enough, there is no diﬀ erence between 
‘national religion’ and ‘national doctrine’ in the Chinese language. 
I believe that the proponents of a state religion are unlikely to 
succeed, but that it is at least a theoretical possibility that Traditional 
Learning may replace communism one day. If this proves to be the 
case, the phenomenon this study examines may be what, from a 
politological point of view, may be seen as the birth of a new political 
religion in China. Whether that would make the Party’s ding heavy 
enough to remain in situ, or on the contrary, force the Party to 
renounce its position, is a question for the futurologists. Th is paper 
will start by peering into the past.  
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Chapter I 
Historical myths behind Chinese 
nationalism
Introduction to Chapter I 
Th is chapter illustrates how the Party-state has reinvented history for 
its own nation-building purposes. It also discusses the politicization 
of history by other actors. Th e focus is on the dogma of unity—also 
grandly called the Grand Unity (Da yitong, 大一统)—which stipulates 
that wellbeing and prosperity can only exist in a uniﬁ ed China. Unity 
refers both to the concrete and the abstract: unity of the territory, 
unity of the nation, and unity of the ideology. One could say that the 
dogma of unity is an ideology in itself as it is the single most important 
prerequisite for the rulers’ legitimacy in Chinese political tradition. 
Historically, the ruling dynasty was to be considered legitimate 
only if it was able to rule the whole of China. Chairman Mao was 
strongly inﬂ uenced by this traditional view, and the legitimacy of 
the Communist Party has always relied on its ability to safeguard 
peace and prosperity through the maintenance of unity. Moreover, 
the idea that periods of unity have been more customary than periods 
of division in China has become the prevailing view even among 
Western scholars. 
A concrete example of the linkage between unity and legitimacy 
is the Taiwan issue. Viewing unity as the basis for legitimacy is the 
main reason why the Taiwan issue is so politically sensitive. As long 
as Taiwan is not an integral part of China, the Communist Party may 
be seen as having failed to rule the whole of China, and the legitimacy 
of such a ruler is incomplete.
The centrality of the discourse of unity is interrelated with 
the orthodox historiography in the People’s Republic of China. 
Th e periods of division are shown as divisions within China, not of 
China. Similarly, the various ‘minority’ tribes that used to inhabit 
the bordering areas of imperial China are presented as primordial 
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members of the Chinese nation. In this way, the government aims to 
promote belief in one Chinese nation and, subsequently, patriotism. 
In this chapter, I also introduce some of the few Chinese thinkers 
who call into question the conventional historical ‘truths’. Th ey call 
for a more nuanced view of Chinese history, such as diﬀ erentiating 
between ‘China Proper’ (the Chinese heartland) and ‘greater China’ 
(the territory within the borders of the People’s Republic), as well 
as between the ‘Chinese’ (the Han and their ancestors) and the 
‘non-Chinese’ (the non-Han peoples) in history. Hence it becomes 
evident that the claims by the Chinese government that its border 
areas have always been parts of China are ahistorical, and that China 
was a uniﬁ ed, ‘Chinese-ruled’ state for much less time than people 
usually assume. 
Officially, China is a multi-ethnic nation, consisting of the 
dominant Han nationality and ﬁ fty-ﬁ ve minority nationalities. Th e 
events in the troubled border areas of Tibet and Xinjiang indicate that 
the Chinese nation is not as harmonious as the central government 
would like it to be. Th e attempts to emphasize national unity are 
also backfiring among the dominant Han Chinese population, 
whose patriotism is turning into ethnic nationalism. Many young 
Han Chinese see themselves as the standard-bearers of Chinese 
civilization, based on the cultural achievements conceived by their 
ancestry, which has always been the dominant population of the 
Chinese heartland. Han nationalism has become an issue which 
the central government has to address, in addition to the ethnic 
insurgencies in the minority areas. 
In order to understand the depth of Han nationalism, it is 
necessary to acknowledge that the discourse on race is a permanent 
undercurrent in China. Many Han nationalists are no longer content 
with an identity as just one of the ethnic groups, but perceive 
themselves rather as representatives of a superior race. Th erefore, 
racism plays a role in the conﬂ icts between the nationalities. Th e 
reason why Han nationalists call into question the legitimacy of the 
non-Han ruling houses, such as the Qing dynasty of the Manchu, is 
their foreignness.
To negate the ‘Chineseness’ of the Manchu dynasty is to call into 
question the multi-ethnic character of today’s China. To deem the 
Manchu rule illegitimate is to undermine the claim of the People’s 
Republic to Tibet and Xinjiang. To realize that the unity of ‘greater 
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China’ is a relatively new and short-term phenomenon is to query the 
territorial integrity of the People’s Republic. To conclude that even 
the unity of ‘China Proper’ is just a by-plot in Chinese history is to 
shake the very foundations of the legitimacy of the Communist Party. 
Several critical Chinese thinkers caution against the use of 
excessive practices to gain and maintain unity and centralized rule. 
Some note that a pluralist, liberalistic tradition of unity is not foreign 
to China but can be found in classical Confucianism. Some even state 
that commerce and science have ﬂ ourished in China especially during 
periods of disunity, and speculate whether unity may actually be 
detrimental to pluralism, and thus to progress.
It is possible, and even necessary, for the Chinese to learn a lesson 
from history that is diﬀ erent from what is taught in Chinese schools. 
As Wang Zheng from Seton Hall University has written: 
Much of the recent discussion regarding China revolves around the 
government’s national strategy for “peaceful rise”. However, what 
China should modernize in this process is not only its ﬁ nancial 
system and highway network, but also its historical education and 
propaganda apparatus. Many say China can rise peacefully only 
after it has changed from a Communist dictatorship to a multiparty 
democracy. However, without liberation from the compelling 
complex of historical myth and trauma, even a multiparty 
democracy could lead China toward a dangerous development. A 
nationalist leader could easily use history and memory issues as 
tools of mobilization …. … China’s genuine democratization may 
only start with the disclosure of historical truths.12
Th e Chinese creed
Today, China’s history is taught in Chinese schools and presented in 
Chinese museums in a way which emphasizes unity as an underlying 
common thread. Th e dogma of unity is the result of a long historical 
process. Even before the beginning of the imperial era (221 BCE–1911), 
it became necessary to establish criteria which could be used to justify 
a ruler’s right to the throne. 
12 Wang Zheng 2008, 804. 
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For the rulers of the many states before the ﬁ rst uniﬁ cation of 
China in 221 BCE, it was a matter of life and death to know who was 
the true inheritor of the Heavenly Mandate. “Th e true mandate, it 
was believed, would protect them like a spiritual barrier against their 
northern adversaries ….”13 For the historians, charged with the task of 
providing justiﬁ cation for the inheritance of the Heavenly Mandate, 
determining what constitutes legitimate succession was a formidable 
challenge. 
For centuries, many (especially Confucian) scholars perceived the 
ﬁ rst uniﬁ cation by the kingdom of Qin, which subjugated the other 
contesting states under its rule, as an immoral victory.14 However, 
since the dynasty was short-lived and was soon followed by the Han 
dynasty (206 BCE–220), which placed Confucianism on a pedestal as 
the state ideology of sorts, the Qin conquest was accepted as a fait 
accompli. 
What then became the predominant issue in the discussion among 
historians was the legitimate succession following the demise of the 
Han dynasty. Th is issue was debated throughout the entire imperial 
era. Th e Han empire had begun to disintegrate in the late second 
century. In 220 CE, Emperor Xian of Han abdicated in favour of Cao 
Pi, ruler of the Wei Kingdom. Liu Bei, a descendant of the imperial 
family and ruler of the Shu Kingdom, declared himself emperor in 
221. Th e Wu Kingdom ruled yet another third of the former empire. 
Th e period of division lasted for three centuries until the Sui dynasty 
was able to reunify the empire in 589. 
For historians, the hardest choice to make was between Cao Pi 
and Liu Bei. Th e most inﬂ uential interpretation was made by Sima 
Guang (司马光, 1019–1086), who authored the massive dynastic 
history entitled Zizhi tongjian, “Th e Comprehensive Mirror to Aid 
in Government”, which has remained popular ever since. It was a 
favourite read of Chairman Mao.15 Sima Guang ruled that Cao Pi’s 
Wei had been the legitimate successor of Han. Sima Guang also 
“developed a theory in which the unity of the empire was seen as 
the prerequisite of the true mandate”.16 
13 Beck 1986, 373.
14 See, for instance, “Guo Qin lun”, Part I, by Jia Yi (贾谊, 200–168 BCE) and “Liu guo lun” by Su 
Che (苏辙, 1039–1112), translated respectively in Kallio 2007, 27–32, and Kallio 2008, 121–124. 
15 Salisbury 1992, 9. 
16 Beck 1986, 374.
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Sima Guang ’s contemporary Ouyang Xiu (欧阳修, 1007–1072) 
argued that all the three post-Han kingdoms were equally illegitimate 
and that the mandate was discontinued altogether in 220. The 
inﬂ uential Neo-Confucian scholar Zhu Xi (朱熹, 1130–1200) opined 
that Liu Bei’s Shu had been the legitimate successor.17 Opinions about 
the legitimate successors following the fall of all three kingdoms were 
equally varied. 
During the late Ming dynasty (1368–1644), the legitimacy debate 
between Shu and Wei surfaced once more. In the 1520s the dynasty 
was shaken by what became known as the Great Rites Controversy. 
Th e power struggle between the Jiajing Emperor and the oﬃ  cialdom 
culminated in the question of the proper ritual treatment of the 
emperor’s deceased parents; the issue was tricky because the Jiajing 
Emperor was not the son of the former emperor. Th e opponents 
of the emperor, who formed the majority among the oﬃ  cialdom, 
used precedence from the Wei Kingdom to bolster their arguments. 
Th e supporters of the emperor challenged the precedence because 
they claimed that the Wei Kingdom had not been legitimate. Th e 
Jiajing Emperor got his way in the end by severely punishing the two 
hundred oﬃ  cials who had opposed him.18 
Sima Guang ’s legitimacy theory has inﬂ uenced the established 
view even among modern Chinese and Western historians. “Th e idea 
that a uniﬁ ed China is in some way more normal than a divided China 
has taken ﬁ rm root in Western sinology”, writes B. J. Mansvelt Beck.19
Th e criterion which has been used in modern times to establish a 
dynasty’s legitimacy is also the same as the one used by Sima Guang : 
whether the dynasty was able to rule ‘the whole of China’ or not.20 
Using this criterion has also made it possible to present the periods of 
rule by ‘non-Chinese’ conquerors, such as the Yuan of the Mongols 
(1271–1368) and the Qing of the Manchu (1644–1911), as legitimate
17 Ibid., 374–375.
18 Ibid., 375, fn. 145. Mote 2003, 663–666. 
19 Beck 1986, 375.
20 Beck 1986, 375–376.
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‘Chinese’ dynasties.21 Nevertheless, the transitional periods have 
always been diﬃ  cult. Anti-Mongol sentiments were strong during 
the early Yuan dynasty, as were anti-Manchu sentiments in early 
Qing, and again on the eve of the republican revolution. 
When the Republic of China deﬁ ned its borders at the beginning of 
the twentieth century, it was perhaps natural that it should take the 
borders under the preceding imperial dynasty, the Qing dynasty, as 
the basis. Th e leader of the nationalists during the civil war, Chiang 
Kai-shek, was very clear about the character of the areas around 
the Chinese heartland, ‘China Proper’: they were not parts of China 
as such but crucial buﬀ er zones. He called Manchuria, Inner and 
Outer Mongolia, Xinjiang, Tibet, Taiwan and the Ryūkyū Islands 
“each a fortress essential for the nation’s defence and security”.22 
Th e communists followed Chiang’s lead. China’s claim to the South 
China Sea is also based on similar thinking.23
Th e legitimacy of the Communist Party derived from its ability 
to restore peace and unity after the period of chaos and warfare 
which had prevailed since 1850. Unity had to apply to all China, 
‘China Proper’ as well as the surrounding buﬀ er zones. Otherwise 
it would have been diﬃ  cult to justify the claim to the ‘fortresses’ 
and to maintain harmony within the newly formed, multi-ethnic 
nation. Th is necessitated downplaying the fact that the Qing was 
the royal house of the Manchu, who had been designated the hated 
target of republican nationalism. Qing and, in its wake, all the other 
‘non-Chinese’ dynasties, had to be presented as legitimate, albeit 
feudalistic and reactionary, predecessors of the communist regime. 
21 In this paper, I use the term ‘Chinese’ (in single quotation marks) to refer to the dominant 
ethnic-cultural group populating ‘China Proper’, usually called Huaxia (华夏) when referring 
to the pre-imperial era and Han when referring to modern times. ‘China Proper’ refers to the 
fertile heartland on and around the Central Plain (today called North China Plain) which was 
the core region of all the ‘Chinese’ dynasties (see Figure 2). Th e Huaxia-Chinese and ‘China 
Proper’ are inseparable and interlinked concepts, as exempliﬁ ed by the words Zhongxia (中夏) 
or Zhonghua (中华), used during the imperial era. Th ey combine the Central Plain (zhong,中, 
means ‘centre’) with the Huaxia people and their culture and were used to refer interchangeably 
to both ‘China Proper’ and its population. Since the republican era, Zhonghua has been used to 
refer to all of China and the whole Chinese nation (including all ethnic groups).
22 Chiang Kai-shek 1947, 36.
23 See Kallio 1999, 11–12.
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Th us there was no departure from the logic which had prevailed 
during the imperial era in regard to deﬁ ning legitimacy. 
Today, China’s history is taught in Chinese schools and presented 
in Chinese museums in a way which emphasizes unity as an underlying 
common thread. Th e various ‘non-Chinese’ tribes and even states 
that have existed around the land inhabited by the ‘Chinese’ are 
depicted as members of the Chinese cultural sphere, thus making 
them ‘minority nationalities’ from the start. Academician Tan Qixiang 
(谭其骧, 1911–1992) wrote in the authoritative Zhongguo lishi dituji 
(中国历史地图集, 1982), “Historical Atlas of China”: 
When the Qing dynasty had succeeded in unifying the country 
by the 1750s … the historical development of several millennia 
towards establishing China’s territorial extent had been 
completed. All those nationalities which have lived within that 
territory are historically Chinese nationalities, and all the political 
entities established by these nationalities are historical parts of 
China.24 
Readers will thus be able to see, in the form of plane maps, the 
formation and growth a great, uniﬁ ed multi-ethnic nation has 
experienced, and to see how our ancestors of diﬀ erent nationalities 
lived as neighbours in human communities and, though there 
had been separations and unification of political jurisdiction, 
fared along a long and arduous course through mutual attraction, 
gradual interchange and amalgamation to ﬁ nally solidify into the 
substantiality of a country that has a well-deﬁ ned territory and 
ﬁ xed boundaries.25
This approach makes it possible to draw the historical outer 
boundaries of ‘China’ around all the contesting kingdoms, while 
encompassing many of the bordering ‘non-Chinese’ nations as well. 
Similarly, the periods of division are presented as divisions within 
China, not of China. All of this leads the Chinese population to believe 
that unity truly is the basis for the ruler’s legitimacy. 
24 Zhongguo lishi dituji, diyice (Vol. 1), “General Compiling Principles”. See also Ge Jianxiong 
2008, 240. – All translations from the Chinese are my own, unless otherwise indicated. 
25 Zhongguo lishi dituji, diyice (Vol. 1), “Foreword”. Translation by the publisher. 
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Finding ‘China Proper’
Th e prevailing Chinese historiographic interpretation can be justiﬁ ed 
by the traditionalist view, according to which China is a cultural 
formation. Ideally, the Chinese empire was considered to include all 
areas which acknowledged the superiority of the Chinese civilization 
and were subjected to paying ritualistic tribute to the one and only 
Emperor. Culturalistic China was not a state but ‘All-Under-Heaven’ 
(Tianxia, 天下). Several states would sometimes co-exist under the 
Heaven, but such ‘power-regimes’ were temporary, whereas the 
‘value-regime’ of All-Under-Heaven was permanent.26 Even during 
the periods of division it was the goal of every kingdom to become 
the next uniﬁ ed empire by subjugating all the others.27 According to 
this traditionalist view, the culturalistic era lasted through the entire 
imperial period, whereas today China is faced with the challenge 
of trying to combine culturalism with nationalism. Lucien Pye has 
argued that China is a civilization trying to squeeze itself into the 
form of a nation-state.28  
Admittedly, the ideal of a unified All-Under-Heaven and its 
moralistic connotations are primeval. However, we must ask, which 
is the cause and which is the consequence? Isn’t it possible that the 
traditionalist view of an inherently culturalistic China has remained 
strong due to the historiographical tradition, and not the other way 
around? As Alistair Iain Johnston has demonstrated, even the foreign 
26 Levenson 1965, vol. I, 98–103. Gu Yanwu (顾炎武, 1613–1682), a staunch Ming loyalist, 
criticized the Manchu rule precisely from a value-based position, saying that the Manchu 
were not legitimate holders of the Heavenly Mandate because of the harshness of their rule: 
“To change the ruling family and alter the name of the dynasty brings the kingdom to its end, 
but abandoning humanness and righteousness so that men begin hunting and devouring each 
other brings the Empire (and its Heavenly Mandate) to its end.” (Rizhilu XVII, Zheng shi.)
27 Th at Chinese strategic literature gives preference to deception over force (see Nojonen 2008) 
may perhaps be partially explained by culturalism. Ideally, All-Under-Heaven belongs to the 
ruler who is the strongest morally. Th erefore, it is better to subjugate other states by such 
means that create as little suﬀ ering and destruction as possible and thus win over the hearts 
of the conquered populations. From Mencius (Jin Xin 11, 14.13): “Th ere are those who have 
gained the possession of kingdoms without possessing the virtue of humanness, but such 
people have never been able to gain possession of All-Under-Heaven.”
28 Pye 1992, 235–236.
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relations of the Ming dynasty, conventionally seen as an embodiment 
of peaceful, culturalistic, Confucian foreign politics, were marked by 
constant warfare.29 
Few in China have questioned the prevailing historiographical 
tradition. However, there are some notable exceptions. Ge Jianxiong 
(葛剑雄), professor at Fudan University and member of the Chinese 
People’s Political Consultative Conference, has published the book 
Tongyi yu fenlie (统一与分裂, 1998, revised edition 2008, reprint 2009), 
“Unity and Division”, which paints a very controversial picture of 
China’s history. While Ge accepts, as a working hypothesis, that 
the unity of the whole of China forms the basis for legitimacy, he 
then asks how this ‘unity’ should be deﬁ ned. Obviously, ‘the whole 
of China’ is too vague a concept. Ge proposes that unity should be 
deﬁ ned by the dynasty’s ability to pacify the area of the former Qin 
dynasty with the North China Plain as the core. In practice, this area 
is the ‘historical China’: the area of all major ‘Chinese’ dynasties 
(Han, Tang, Song, and Ming), as well as the real extent of the rule 
of the Republic of China after the nominal reuniﬁ cation in 1928.30 In 
Western literature, that same area is usually called ‘China Proper’. 
Figure 2 shows the geographical area of ‘China Proper’ and the macro 
regions within it.
Ge does not explicitly refer to ‘China Proper’. The concept is 
heavily contested in China and linked to the Western colonialists’ or 
the Japanese aggressors’ desire to carve up China, starting with the 
territories outside ‘China Proper’.31 However, for the sake of simplicity, 
I use the term in this paper even when referring to Ge’s text.
Ge questions the view that the diﬀ erent nationalities that have 
lived outside ‘China Proper’ must be considered Chinese if they have 
ever lived within the Chinese cultural sphere (or simply within the 
29 Johnston 1998, 236–242. 
30 On Chinese maps, the areas of the dynasties mentioned are commonly drawn far larger than 
what they eﬀ ectively ruled. Th e Republic was plagued by warlordism and civil war practically 
from the outset, and the reuniﬁ cation in 1928 was both short-lived and nominal. As to the 
regions outside ‘China Proper’, Tibet proclaimed independence in 1912 and Mongolia in 1921, 
Xinjiang slipped into the Russian (Soviet) sphere of inﬂ uence in the late 1920s, while Japan 
occupied Taiwan in 1895 and Manchuria in 1931. 
31 See e.g. Zhang Zhirong 2006, 235, 246, and Ma Rong 2009. Apparently, there is no widely 
accepted corresponding term to ‘China Proper’ in the Mainland Chinese vocabulary.
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borders of contemporary China). According to Ge, such a view is 
ahistorical. He takes Tibet, Taiwan, Mongolia and Xinjiang as examples 
of territories which are customarily claimed to have been parts of 
China ‘since time immemorial’. Ge opposes that interpretation and 
notes that the same logic would dictate opposing the independence 
of North Korea or Vietnam, territories that at one time or another used 
to be integral parts of the Chinese empire.32 
32 Ge Jianxiong 2009, 241–243.
‘China Proper’ refers to the fertile heartland which was the core region of all 
Chinese dynasties, bordered by deserts, steppes, mountains and sea, and 
consisting of the (1) North China Plain in the north-east, (2) the Loess Plateau 
in the north-west, (3) the Sichuan Basin in the west, (4) the Yunnan-Guizhou 
Plateau in the south-west, (5) the Pearl River Delta Plain in the south, (6) the rainy 
hills and river plains in the south and south-east and (7) the Yangzi Plain in the 
east. Its surrounding areas include: (A) The Manchurian Plain, (B) the Mongolian-
Manchurian Steppe, (C) the Gobi Desert, (D) the Taklamakan Desert, (E) the vast 
Tibetan Plateau and (F) the Red River Delta.
Figure 2. China Proper
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Furthermore, Ge Jianxiong demonstrates that from the first 
uniﬁ cation in 221 BCE until the end of imperial rule in 1911, ‘China 
Proper’ was united for only 950 years. Th is accounts for 45% of 
China’s imperial era. Ge presents the following list of the periods of 
unity during China’s imperial era: 33 
221–209 BCE (during the Qin dynasty) 12 years
108 BCE–22 (during the Western Han dynasty) 130 years
50–184 (during the Eastern Han dynasty) 134 years
280–301 (during the Western Jin dynasty) 21 years
589–616 (during the Sui dynasty) 27 years
630–755 (during the Tang dynasty) 125 years
1279–1351 (during the Yuan dynasty) 72 years
1382–1644 (during the Ming dynasty) 262 years
1683–1850 (during the Qing dynasty) 167 years
Altogether 950 years
Ge further notes that greater China (the area encompassing not 
only ‘China Proper’ but also Tibet, Sinkiang and other border areas) 
became uniﬁ ed as late as 1759, and this period of unity lasted for 
only 81 years. Ge reminds his readers that much of this unity was 
achieved through coercion and that uniﬁ cation has never been a 
wholly peaceful process.34
Ge’s analysis demonstrates that the prevailing view of unity as 
the main trend in Chinese history is nothing more than a myth—in 
other words, pure politics. Th e dynastic history is conventionally 
presented in a manner whereby one dynasty is immediately followed 
by another without many lapses or overlaps. In reality, there were 
many periods of overlapping rule. Furthermore, as Ge shows, almost 
every dynasty had to struggle to gain unity at the beginning of their 
rule, and many had lost it towards the end of their rule. In addition, 
33 Ibid., 217–218. Ge’s calculation is much more detailed and analytical than the more 
conventional ones, e.g. by Diana Lary. Lary views the dynasties as indivisible blocks and 
then diﬀ erentiates between the united, partly united (“dynasties which ruled at least half of 
the land mass of China”) and divided dynasties. Th e results of Lary’s calculation is that China 
was united for 1,074 years, partly united for 626 years, and disunited for 432 years during the 
Imperial Era. (Lary 1997, 182.)
34 Ibid., 217–218, 229–230, 234.
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Table 1. Periods of unity of China Proper under ‘Chinese’ and ‘non-Chinese’ dynasties  
# Periods of 
unity
Reign (Era) Dynasty 
19 1683–1850 1644–1911 Qing (Manchu) 
17 1382–1644 1368–1644 Ming 
15 1279–1351 1271–1368 Yuan (Mongol) 
(1234–79) era of Mongol conquest Southern Song 
(1127–1279)1115–1234 Jīn 金 (Jürchen) Northern 
Song*** 
(960–1127)
13 979–1127 960–1279 Song Liao (Khitan, 
916–1125)
907–960 Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms
     (Chinese and non-Chinese)
11 630–755 618–907 Tang** (incl. Zhou interregnum 690–705)
9 589–616 581–618 Sui* (Tangut) 
420–581 Northern and Southern Dynasties Six Dynasties 
(Southern 
Dynasties, 
Eastern Jin, Wu 
of the Th ree 
Kingdoms; 
222–589)
265–420 Jin 晉 Sixteen 
Kingdoms 
(mostly 
non-Chinese, 
304–439)
7 280–301 Western Jin 
(265–315)
220–280 Th ree Kingdoms
5 50–184 206 BCE– 
220
Han Eastern Han (25–220)
3 108 BCE–22 Western Han (206 BCE–9 and Xin 
interregnum 9–23)
1 221–209 BCE 221–207 
BCE
Qin (culturally non-Chinese, ethnic origin unclear)
KEY
Chinese rule
Chinese dynasties during periods of unity
Non-Chinese rule
Non-Chinese dynasties during periods of unity
Numbers in the # column refer to the numbers in Figure 3.
‘Chinese’ here refers to the dominant ethnic-cultural group populating China Proper, usually 
called Huaxia when referring to the pre-imperial era and Han when referring to modern times. 
The years of unity are based on Ge Jianxiong 2008, 218 (with the exception of Northern Song 
which is not included on his list).
The interpretations regarding the Sui (listed as non-Chinese), the Tang (listed as Chinese) and 
the Northern Song (listed as a dynasty which achieved unity) in this table are debatable.
* The Sui emperors were Tangut. However, the second emperor (ruled 605–618) lost the 
support of the nomads due to his cultural Sinification initiatives. 
** The mothers of the first, second and third Tang emperor (ruled successively 618–683) were 
all non-Chinese (Tangut). Also many members of the aristocracy were non-Chinese. 
*** Northern Song failed to rule the northern-most parts of China Proper.
82 | Jyrki Kallio: Towards China’s Strategic Narrative
28     FIIA REPORT 27
the Chinese empire struggled to keep the (mostly northern, nomadic 
or semi-nomadic) neighbouring powers at bay for most of its history, 
and at least parts of its territory repeatedly fell under foreign rule. 
From a European perspective, it is only natural to differentiate 
between the ‘Chinese’ and ‘non-Chinese’ dynasties. Mongols were 
conquerors in Europe; why should one consider them diﬀ erently 
in China?35 Building on Ge’s analysis, I have further diﬀ erentiated 
between the periods of unity under ‘Chinese’ and ‘non-Chinese’ 
dynasties (I have also added Northern Song, which is not on Ge’s list). 
Th e result is shown in Table 1 (which also names some of the reigns 
during periods of division) and as a graph in Figure 3. 
According to my interpretation, the total number of years of unity 
during the imperial era is 1,098, accounting for 52% of the imperial 
era. Th e total number of years of unity under ‘Chinese’ dynasties is 
35 One could argue that this is a question of perception. Foreign royal houses have been 
common enough in Europe, and it is often impossible to diﬀ erentiate between the ‘European’ 
and ‘non-European’ state-formations (the Ottoman Empire is a case in point). However, 
religion provided a handy tool for dividing the world into the Christian ‘us’ and the non-
Christian ‘others’. Th us Europe (as Christendom) was able to achieve considerable unity in 
the face of the Ottoman or Mongol threat, for instance. 
 19 Qing
 1 Qin
 3 W Han
5 E Han
7 W Jin
9 Sui
11 Tang13 N Song
15 Yuan
17 Ming
KEY
Periods of unity under 
Chinese dynasties
Periods of unity under non-
Chinese dynasties
Periods of division
Numbers refer to the # column 
in Table 1.
Figure 3. Periods of unity and division of China Proper under ‘Chinese’ and ‘non-Chinese’ 
dynasties
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832 (39%). To put it plainly, China was a uniﬁ ed, ‘Chinese-ruled’ 
state for only two-ﬁ fths of the imperial era. 
Both China’s borders today and the idea of unity as the basis for 
legitimacy are, in fact, based on the rule of the Manchu Qing dynasty. 
As Ge Jianxiong has shown, the unity within the Qing dynasty borders 
lasted for less than a century. Whether such a weak precedent can 
withstand the pressures of the re-emerging Han nationalism or not 
is a crucial question. 
Conspicuously, the Chinese government is investing large sums 
in support of the Qing History Project, which aims to compile and 
publish a new, authoritative history of the Qing dynasty. Th e huge 
project is slated for completion in 2012. While Norman Ho writes 
that “it is too much to say that the Chinese government is looking 
at the Qing History Project as an instrument to reinforce its political 
legitimacy”36 it is in my opinion safe to say that the ‘correct’ 
interpretation of history, in particular in regard to the territory of 
the Qing dynasty, is far from insigniﬁ cant for the government.
A case in point: Th e Taiwan issue
Th e biggest remaining obstacle for greater China’s complete unity 
or ‘China’s reuniﬁ cation’ is the so-called Taiwan issue. Taiwan, 
under the rule of the government of the Republic of China, has been 
a separate entity from the People’s Republic of China ever since 1949, 
and the state of civil war between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait 
has not oﬃ  cially ceased. In practice, the economic, cultural and 
people-to-people relations between the two parties are thriving, 
but politically the two sides show little signs of détente. 
Th e main reason why the Taiwan issue is so politically sensitive 
for the communist regime on the Mainland is the belief that unity is 
the basis of the ruler’s legitimacy. As long as Taiwan is not an integral 
part of China, the legitimacy of the Communist Party is incomplete. 
Fortunately, rationality overrules the use of military means to 
reunite Taiwan with the Mainland. Unfortunately, the Taiwan issue 
is one where rationality may cease to prevail if the legitimacy of the 
Communist Party were to be put at stake. Some hawkish scholars even 
36 Ho 2009. 
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state that China’s inability to solve the Taiwan issue, which is due to 
foreign interference, stands in the way of China’s modernization.37 
According to oﬃ  cial Chinese history writing, Taiwan has been an 
integral part of China “since time immemorial”. It is conventionally 
held that the ﬁ rst recorded landing in Taiwan was made during the 
Th ree Kingdoms period, in 230. New expeditions supposedly took 
place during the Sui dynasty in the seventh century. In the mid-12th 
century, the Song dynasty may have established a garrison on the 
Penghu Islands oﬀ  the west coast of Taiwan, followed by the Yuan 
and Ming dynasties.38 In reality, however, Taiwan remained outside 
imperial Chinese jurisdiction until the Qing dynasty, even though 
Chinese people from the mainland started to immigrate to the island 
in large numbers in the 1600s. During the same time, the Dutch 
established extensive colonies on the island. It was not until 1683 
that parts of Taiwan were annexed into Fujian Province of the Great 
Qing Empire as a prefecture. 
In regard to the Taiwan issue, Ge Jianxiong again represents 
unorthodox views. He acknowledges that Taiwan cannot be 
considered to have been under the rule of any Chinese central 
government prior to 1683. Ge writes: “To regard [the expeditions 
during the Th ree Kingdoms period and the Sui Dynasty] as proof of 
‘Taiwan being a part of China since time immemorial’ is not only 
ludicrous but ignorant, and actually [the expeditions] prove quite the 
opposite.” If Taiwan had been an integral part of China, what would 
have been the use of such military operations, asks Ge rhetorically.39 
Ge maintains that reuniﬁ cation can be achieved only when the 
two parties view each other as equally legitimate heirs of One China.40 
Th is is clearly not the case today. Ge further warns that time may not 
be on the side of the reuniﬁ cationists: history teaches us that what 
was once one nation and one culture may split into two as time passes 
and people gradually grow apart.41 
37 See e.g. Liu Dongchao 2008, 83.
38 See e.g. Taiwan wenti yu Zhongguo tongyi – baipishu (“White Paper on the Taiwan Issue 
and the Chinese Reuniﬁ cation”), Taiwan Aﬀ airs Oﬃ  ce of the State Council, 1993 (http://www.
gwytb.gov.cn/bps/bps_zgty.htm, accessed 23 Apr 2010).
39 Ge Jianxiong 2008, 243.
40 Ibid., 251.  
41 Ibid.
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Th e Taiwan issue is just one of the challenges related to achieving, 
maintaining and deﬁ ning unity in China. It is perhaps the most 
explosive one, taking into account that the feud between Taiwan 
and the Mainland has the potential to escalate into an international 
military conﬂ ict between the major powers.  
Deﬁ ning ‘Chinese’ through the others
Th e question that the leadership of the People’s Republic need to ask 
themselves is whether the ongoing work to promote nation-building 
is actually bringing about the desired results. To an outside observer, 
the answer is clearly negative. Th e events in the troubled border 
areas of Tibet and Xinjiang indicate that the Chinese nation is not as 
harmonious as the central government would like it to be. Especially 
in regard to the Han, the attempts to emphasize national unity are 
backﬁ ring, and patriotism is turning into ethnic nationalism.
According to the oﬃ  cial rhetoric in the People’s Republic of China, 
China is home to the Chinese nation (Zhonghua minzu, 中华民族), a 
multi-ethnic family consisting of the dominant Han nationality and 
ﬁ fty-ﬁ ve minority nationalities. Both the invention of the Zhonghua 
nation and the classiﬁ cation of the Han as a distinct ethnic group are 
modern constructs, dating back to the revolutionaries of the late 19th 
century.42 
Once established in 1912, the Republic recognized ﬁ ve ethnic 
groups within China: the Han, Hui (i.e. Muslims), Mongols, Manchus, 
and Tibetans. In the People’s Republic, exempliﬁ ed by the Soviet-
inspired ethnic classiﬁ cations and ethnicity-based administrative 
divisions, the number was expanded to ﬁ fty-six.43 According to 
its constitution (Preamble), “[t]he People’s Republic of China is a 
unitary multi-national state built up jointly by the people of all its 
nationalities.” Although this formulation implies equality of the 
nationalities, all the non-Han nationalities are customarily called 
‘minority nationalities’ in semi-oﬃ  cial parlance. 
42 Zhang Haiyang 1997, PE74. Th e term Zhonghua minzu was coined by Liang Qichao (梁启超) 
in 1902. He used the term to refer to all the nationalities within China. (Li Xisuo, “Liang Qichao 
shi tichu ‘Zhonghua minzu’ chengwei de di’yi ren”, Renmin wang, 9 Feb 2006, at http://
theory.people.com.cn/BIG5/49157/49163/4089792.html#. Accessed 7 Apr 2010.) 
43 See Leibold 2010a, 5. 
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Professor Ma Rong (马戎, Department of Sociology, Peking 
University) states that “the ‘institutionalization of ethnic groups’ 
under Mao Zedong (毛泽东) promoted ethnic stratification and 
tension, and the preferential policies of the last three decades have 
created ‘tribal collectives’ (buzu jiheti 部族集合体), which form new 
barriers and obstacles to genuine equality and unity”.44 He warns 
that unless China can ﬁ nd a better way of dealing with the ethnic 
issues, the fate that befell Yugoslavia awaits China, and the enemies 
of the rise of China will be able to use the ethnic issues as a tool for 
criticizing the country.45 
As the oﬃ  cial interpretation of history projects the current borders 
of the People’s Republic into history and calls all those living within 
those borders members of the Zhonghua nation, it simultaneously 
also projects the existence of the Zhonghua nation into antiquity. 
Of course, this is a falsiﬁ cation, and no such ‘meta-identity’ has 
arguably ever existed. At most, ‘non-Chinese’ tribes submitted to 
the hegemony of the ‘Chinese’ state from time to time and became 
‘politically Chinese’.
Historically, the legitimacy of the ‘non-Chinese’ dynasties has 
usually been recognized by their successors. For instance, a dynastic 
history of the Yuan dynasty was written during the Ming dynasty, 
thus linking Yuan in the chain of legitimate ruling houses of China. 
Th is has been necessary in order to secure the basis for the legitimacy 
of the successors. In modern China, the ‘non-Chinese’ dynasties 
are presented with the ‘Chinese’ dynasties as equal components in 
making up China’s imperial heritage. Naturally, taking into account 
the multi-ethnic character of the People’s Republic, it would have 
been unwise to do otherwise. 
Lately, critique towards the legitimacy of the ‘non-Chinese’ 
dynasties has ﬂ ared up at grassroots level. Voices have emerged 
that wish to make a distinction between the ‘Chinese’ and ‘non-
Chinese’ dynasties in Chinese historiography.46 In particular, the 
‘Chineseness’ of the Mongol and Manchu dynasties is called into 
question in numerous internet debates. As one commentator put it: 
44 Leibold 2010a, 19. 
45 Ibid., 20. Ma Rong 2009. 
46 Often, ‘non-Chinese’ are referred to as yizu (异族) or ‘foreign race’ and ‘Chinese’ as bentu 
(本土) or ‘our country(men)’. Th e term bentu is also used to connote ‘China Proper’.
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During the era of the Mongol Yuan dynasty, China was enslaved 
and colonized by the Mongol Empire together with Persia, Koryo, 
the Rus’ and others. … Yet this kind of a regime is propagated to 
have been a “united, multi-ethnic state” by the oﬃ  cial education 
system, misleading many Chinese to even think that Genghis 
Khan was Chinese. How tragic!47 
This discourse is closely related to the search for ‘Chineseness’ 
as a new cultural identity. While the government is promoting 
‘Traditional Learning’ (Guoxue, 国学, sometimes translated more 
literally as ‘national learning’; see Chapter II) and hoping to make 
it the spiritual foundation of the ‘Chinese nation’, an average Han 
Chinese youth views Traditional Learning exclusively as his/her 
own heritage, and has found in its promotion a way to discover his/
her own cultural identity.48 Many minority nationalities have their 
distinctive, traditional costumes and festivals, but not the Han, whose 
culture and heroes have become indistinguishable from the all-
encompassing Zhonghua culture and heroes. Th us it is understandable 
how the government-promoted Zhonghua patriotism would have 
been transformed into Han nationalism as a counter-reaction or why 
the Han Chinese would have started searching for their identity in an 
attempt to acquire one of their own.49 
A prime example of this identity search is the movement to 
revitalize traditional Chinese clothing, dubbed hanfu (汉服) or 
Han clothing, and to give the pre-Qing-era clothing status as the 
Chinese national costume. Th e movement reached its heyday before 
the Beijing Olympics when one hundred scholars jointly suggested 
that hanfu should be designated the oﬃ  cial costume of the Chinese 
athletes in the Games.50 Th e movement still appears to be popular 
among younger generations especially in the cities in southern China, 
as well as in overseas Chinese communities. 
47 “Guanyu yizu zhengquan”, by an unidentiﬁ ed writer on 17 Jan 2008, at http://hi.baidu.
com/chosan/blog/item/afa785d1b524fd3c9b502734.html. Accessed 7 Apr 2010. 
48 See Zhang Min 2007, 166, and Ma Rong 2009.
49 Mikael Mattlin calls the phenomenon where a cultural group is mobilized to defend their 
identity against the threat of homogenization, ‘cultural fetishism’. (Mattlin 2001, 174.)
50 “Baiming xuezhe changyi hanfu wei Aoyunhui liyi fuzhuang”, at http://news.ifeng.com/
mainland/200704/0405_17_97909.shtml. Accessed 10 Aug 2009. Th e hanfu movement is well 
presented in Zhang Min 2007. See also Leibold 2010a, 11–14.
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Th e movement, and other similar examples of identity-building, 
are often associated with ethnicity-based Han nationalism or even its 
more extreme form, called Han chauvinism (da Hanzu zhuyi, 大汉族主
义) in Chinese parlance, which are by no means new phenomena.51 In 
1953, Chairman Mao warned of the dangers of Han chauvinism, in an 
internal party directive. According to the directive, Han chauvinism 
was lurking almost everywhere and was creating conﬂ icts in many 
minority regions. Mao labelled Han chauvinism as reactionary and 
reﬂ ective of the Guomindang (Nationalist Party) way of thinking.52 
Mao’s warning, however, seems to have gone largely unheeded. Han 
chauvinism has continued to be an undercurrent in the communist 
way of thinking as well. 
Among the Han Chinese population, the reasons for the rise of 
ethnic Han nationalism range from envy towards the special rights 
given to ethnic minorities with regard to university intake or birth 
control to racial mistrust fuelled, among other things, by the ‘war 
against terrorism’ targeting Muslim extremists, which also aﬀ ects 
China’s Xinjiang.53  
As is to be expected in today’s world, the main forum for grassroots 
nationalism is the internet. In China, the nationalist ﬂ agship website
51 Th e compilers of a famous prose anthology, Guwen guanzhi, produced at the beginning of 
the Qing dynasty, omitted all texts written during ‘non-Chinese’ dynasties. Th is may have 
subtly expressed their dissent towards the legitimacy of the Manchu rulers. (Kallio 2009.)
52 Mao Zedong 1977, 75–76. Th e rallying slogan of the founding fathers of Guomindang was 
“to expel the Tartar ﬁ ends (Dalu, 鞑虏) and to revive the Zhonghua nation”. Chiang Kai-shek 
wanted to downplay that idea, choosing instead to propagate the notion that the Manchu are 
just one ‘clan’ of the Chinese nation. (Chiang Kai-shek 1947, 30, 50). 
53 Common racist themes, such as the demise of ‘our race’, can also be found. A writer on 
www.sciencenet.cn calculates that by 2039, the number of minority nationality youth will 
exceed the number of Han youth, which as a consequence will turn the Han into a minority. 
(Wang Luoke, “Jihua shengyu zhengce dui weilai Zhongguo renkou minzu yu zongzu goucheng 
de yingxiang,” at www.sciencenet.cn/m/user_content.aspx?id=30596. Accessed 26 Mar 
2010.)
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is Hanwang.54 Hanwang’s goal is deﬁ ned as the rejuvenation of the 
Han civilization.55 According to Hanwang, the site aims to help the 
growth of an individual’s self-awareness and knowledge about the 
Han culture so that s/he may realize his/her ‘Hanishness’ (hanbenwei, 
汉本位). Th at is the “pure bloodline” and cultural heritage of the 
Huaxia ancestors.56 
One indicator of the rising Han nationalism is the discussion 
related to the book by writer Lü Jiamin (吕嘉民, writing under the 
pen name Jiang Rong, 姜戎), entitled Wolf Totem (Lang tuteng in the 
original, 狼图腾) and published in 2004.57 In the lengthy postscript to 
his book, written in the form of ‘lectures and discussions’, Lü argues 
that the Chinese civilization would not have been able to prosper 
without regular ‘blood transfusions’ from the nomads of the steppes, 
the Jürchen, Mongol and Manchu. “Objectively, the great dynasties 
of Sui and Tang would not have come into existence without the 
preceding long-term, wide blood transfusions.”58 “[E]specially the 
nearly century-long blood transfusion from the Mongols and the 
two-and-a-half- centuries-long blood transfusion from the Manchu 
made it possible for the Zhonghua nation to endure till modern times, 
preserving their land, language and race.”59 
54 Th e website was discontinued after the ethnic riots in the summer of 2009, but has reopened 
again at www.hanminzu.com. James Leibold discusses the role of Hanwang and other forms 
of Chinese grassroots ethnic nationalism in two recent articles (Leibold 2010a and 2010b). 
Th ere are also web posts which may be seen as a counter-reaction towards the Hanwang. For 
instance, one blog states that it aims to “help the Manchus ﬁ nd their place in the world and to 
introduce the Manchus to the world” (http://www.mmmca.com/blog_ak87/p/172108.html, 
accessed 26 Apr 2010). A post on that website argues that a pure Han nation has never existed, 
but the amalgamation of diﬀ erent ethnic groups has always taken place even on the Central 
Plain; “it would be best to admit that a Han nationality has never existed.” Th is argument is 
probably based on a fabricated news piece (see fn. 70). 
55 According to Hanwang, the success of the hanfu movement has been the ﬁ rst step in an 
overall rejuvenation. Many proponents of the hanfu movement have, however, distanced 
themselves from the Han chauvinist discourse. 
56 Information aimed at prospective site administrators from 3 April 2009 at http://www.
hanminzu.com/bbs/viewthread.php?tid=247912&extra=page%3D1. Accessed 26 Apr 2010.
57 Th e book is discussed in some detail in James Leibold 2010c.
58 Jiang Rong 2004, 382 (postscript).
59 Jiang Rong 2004, 395–396 (postscript).
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Lü compares the Han Chinese ‘sheep’ unfavourably with the 
dynamic, imaginative, free and even democratic ‘wolves’ of the 
steppes, whose way of life resembles that of real wolves. 
Th e free, independent, bold and indomitable character of the 
steppe wolves is based on their superior nature [in contrast to 
dogs, which cannot survive without protection from humans]. 
Th e same applies to humans: if a nation does not possess high 
capabilities or if its character is weak, it is futile for that nation 
to dream of achieving independence, freedom, democracy, 
prosperity or strength.60 
Confucianism and feudalistic autocracy castrated and suppressed 
man’s wolﬁ shness, thus making [the Zhonghua people] altogether 
sheepish, backward and weak, and led them into a blind alley. 
… Th e way out for the Zhonghua nation can only be found in 
properly releasing man’s wolfishness while simultaneously 
controlling and mastering it by the only possible means, namely 
real democracy and the rule of law, and discarding false rubber-
stamp democracy.61 
Th is ethos closely resembles the 1980’s television series River Elegy 
(Heshang, 河殇), which criticized the Chinese ‘inland’ and indrawn 
culture and extolled the Western ‘oceanic’ and enterprising 
societies.62 Lü’s alter ego in the Wolf Totem, Chen Zhen, says: 
When walking on the road of civilization, the westerners maintain 
the half-wildness of man, whereas the Huaxia people stick to 
the ‘un-wildness’ of man and walk on a ploughman’s road of 
civilization. Speaking metaphorically, the westerners walk on the 
road of ‘civilized wolves’ whereas the Huaxia people walk on the 
road of ‘civilized sheep’.63 
60 Jiang Rong 2004, Chapter 24, 241.  Th is excerpt is missing from the translation by Howard 
Goldblatt (Th e Penguin Press, New York 2008), which appears to be abridged. Th e postscript 
is also omitted from the translation. 
61 Jiang Rong 2004, 402 (postscript).
62 See e.g. Blum & Jensen 2002, 9. 
63 Jiang Rong 2004, 366 (postscript).
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Lü’s polemics aroused heated debate, which hasn’t subsided. Th e 
counter-argument, expressed in many blog posts, states that the 
‘non-Chinese’ conquerors are to blame for China’s gradual weakening 
after the prosperous Song dynasty and the eventual humiliation by 
the Western colonial powers. Th e Mongol and Manchu are accused 
of having massacred millions of Han Chinese.64 One Chinese blogger, 
writing in English, laments: 
With lots of massacres, Manchu controlled the south. … Nowadays 
many people think Qing’s rulers [sic] loved Han’s culture [sic] and 
kept ancient Chinese books, but in fact, they destroyed Han’s 
culture and distorted Chinese books and proprieties [sic], and 
they destroyed the soul of Chinese people. Age-old Central Nation 
was destroyed, Age-old Huaxia Civilization was destroyed. … And 
most horribly, the soul of Huaxia was destroyed.65 
Han nationalism as a phenomenon forces us to ask whether 
‘Hanishness’ is a primordial identity or an acquired identiﬁ cation.66 Th e 
culturalistic view of Chinese history implies that ‘non-Chinese’ may 
become ‘Chinese’ through cultural indoctrination.67 Th us, to speak 
the Han language and follow the Han customs would make one Han. 
However, the creation of the ethnic groupings in the Republic and 
the People’s Republic has made the Han an ethnic group. Th e jargon 
on Hanwang clearly implies that one can only be born Han. 
Th e situation is complex. While the Han are oﬃ  cially regarded as 
an ethnic group, the oﬃ  cial language of the People’s Republic is called 
64 See Leibold 2010c for a summary of two representative writings on the Hanwang portal.
65 Jiang Yike: “Th e Downfall of the Last Chinese Empire—Th e Loss of the Huaxia Civilization”, at 
http://www.ourorient.com/articles/relations/loss.htm. Accessed 26 Apr 2010. Similar texts 
in Chinese abound on diﬀ erent websites. Th ere are opposing views as well, which present the 
Yuan dynasty as the saviour of China’s territorial unity or the Qing dynasty as the greatest 
dynasty in Chinese history. 
66 Cf. Mattlin 2001, 171. 
67 Confucius is believed to have said: “When barbarians come to China, they must be sinicized.” 
Actually, this is a culturalist misinterpretation of a quotation in a writing by the great Tang 
dynasty scholar Han Yu (韩愈, 768–824). See Kallio 2005, 15.
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Hanyu, the language of the Han.68 In English, that language is called 
Chinese, but all the people living in China, Han or otherwise, may 
also be called Chinese by virtue of their being Chinese nationals.69 
According to Chinese geneticists, all Han Chinese today have a 
coherent genetic structure. Th is coherence is said to be the result of 
millennia of fusion, assimilation and migratory waves (from the north 
to the south).70 According to prominent anthropologist Fei Xiaotong 
(费孝通, 1910–2005), the Han population has always formed the core 
of the fusion process.71 Th is view is supported by the culturalistic 
explanation: the superiority of the civilization of the Central Plain—
the Huaxia or Zhongxia—has caused the other peoples to gravitate 
towards the centre. 
Despite the genetics, the view of the Han as an ethnic group has 
been questioned by Western scholars. Th e relative sizes of the Han 
population and the second biggest ethnic group are in a diﬀ erent 
league altogether. As Thomas S. Mullaney writes: “To compare 
Han to any given non-Han [ethnic group] is in certain respects 
akin to comparing a phylum to a class, a class with an order, or an 
order with a family—that is, across entirely diﬀ erent taxonomic 
68 In principle, Hanyu refers jointly to all Chinese regional variants (dialects, regionalects), 
including not only the most spoken variant, Mandarin, but also Cantonese, Shanghainese 
etc. In practice, however, Hanyu refers especially to standardized Mandarin (oﬃ  cially called 
Putonghua in the Mainland, Guoyu in Taiwan and Huayu in Singapore and among overseas 
Chinese). Th e term Hanyu is rarely used outside the People’s Republic. 
69 Th e terms used for the Chinese (people) in Chinese include Hanren (used in the PRC to refer 
to the Han Chinese), Huaren (used especially outside the PRC to refer to Han Chinese; also 
carries a culturalist connotation of Zhonghua or ‘all Chinese’) and Zhongguoren (principally 
a political term referring to Chinese nationals, but as Zhongguo originally referred to the 
‘Central Kingdoms’, i.e. the Huaxia states of the Central Plain, the term Zhongguoren carries 
such a strong cultural-ethnic undertone that not all minority people are willing to identify 
themselves as Zhongguoren). 
70 Bo Wen et al. 2004. Widely publicized news reports in February 2010 of a DNA study by the 
Chinese Academy of Sciences, which allegedly demonstrated that no ‘pure’ Han exist and 
that the whole concept of the Han as a genetically deﬁ ned ethnic group must thus be called 
into question, are apparently baseless. Th e researcher quoted in the news reports says no 
such study exists. (See http://www.tianya.cn/publicforum/content/worldlook/1/253431.
shtml. Accessed 20 Apr 2010.)
71 Leibold 2009.
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orders72.”Linguistically, the Han can be divided into speakers of 
several ‘regionalects’ (to use the term coined by John DeFrancis73), 
often misleadingly called dialects. Th ough language is not necessarily 
related to ethnicity, China is known to have been both ethnically and 
culturally diverse during the ﬁ rst uniﬁ cation and long thereafter. 
It is probably fair to say that although the ethnicity of the Han has 
a genetic basis, being conscious of one’s ‘Hanishness’ is an acquired 
identiﬁ cation more than a primordial identity. It has been possible 
to identify oneself ethnically as a Han for just over a century, but 
the ethnic divide is ﬁ rmly based on the culturalistic view, which 
made a distinction between the cultured ‘us’, the Huaxia of the 
Central Kingdom, on the one hand and the uncivilized ‘others’ of 
the surrounding areas on the other.74 Th is view dates back well over 
two millennia. As Lothar von Falkenhausen writes: 
One fundamental yet gradual tendency in social development 
during the Zhou period [ca. 1045–256 BCE] was the subsumption 
of the clans under a larger unit that we may somewhat 
anachronistically call the “Hua Xia nation,” and the exclusion 
of the “Barbarians” from that nation. … Th e emerging “Hua Xia” 
supra-clan entity was endogamous: marriage to unacculturated 
“Others”, though apparently not proscribed, was not 
encouraged.75
Naturally, the way history is presented is always a conscious choice. 
Although the Han is not explicitly a name for a race by any deﬁ nition, 
it implicitly becomes conceptualized as one due to the historiographic 
tradition which stresses the fundamental diﬀ erences between ‘us’ 
and ‘the others’. Calling all the non-Han nationalities collectively 
‘the minority nationalities’ further cements this age-old view. Th e 
72 Mullaney 2009.  
73 DeFrancis 1984, 57. 
74 From time immemorial, the Chinese have made a distinction between themselves and the 
‘barbarians’, i.e. between the Hua (or Xia) and the Yi (夷). 
75 Falkenhausen 2006, 167. 
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racial discourse has a long history in China.76 As elsewhere in the 
world, it has always included an element of racism, the belief that 
“racial diﬀ erences produce an inherent superiority of a particular 
race.”77 The racist undercurrent in Chinese society is especially 
prevalent in regard to black Africans.78
Today, the claims of superiority are most often heard on the part 
of the Han (which is not to say that all Han are racist nor that there 
are no racists among any of the other nationalities). Race is a social 
construct, and it is necessary to acknowledge the existence of the 
racist discourse in order to see the full scope of the sensitivities 
related to ethnic relations in China.79 
Unity versus pluralism
Professor Victoria Tin-bor Hui from the University of Notre Dame 
has written: 
76 According to Frank Dikötter (1992), the discourse on ‘race’ appeared in China at the end 
of the nineteenth century and dominated the nationalist ideology at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. Th e discourse was not so much centred on the Han versus the other 
nationalities as on the ‘yellow race’ (or the Han together with the ‘inner barbarians’) versus 
the ‘outer barbarians’ (the Westerners and Africans). 
77 Deﬁ nition from the Merriam Webster Online Dictionary (http://www.merriam-webster.
com/dictionary/racism, accessed 26 May 2010).
78 Th e racist riot targeting black students in Nanjing, in 1988, is perhaps the most striking 
recent example. It is notable that a person of (supposed) African origin is invariably called 
a ‘black’ (heiren, 黑人), which in the Chinese context is a derogatory expression. It is 
quite possible that the insistence among some Chinese scholars to regard Peking Man as an 
indigenous ancestor of the Chinese is due to the reluctance to accept an ‘African’ origin. (See 
Schmalzer 2008, 277.)
79 See López 2000, 165: “I deﬁ ne ‘race’ as a vast group of people loosely bound together by 
historically contingent, socially signiﬁ cant elements of their morphology and/or ancestry. I 
argue that race must be understood as a sui generis social phenomenon in which contested 
systems of meaning serve as the connections between physical features, faces, and personal 
characteristics. … Race is neither an essence nor an illusion, but rather an ongoing, 
contradictory, self-reinforcing, plastic process ….” 
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While a monolithic [Central Kingdom] tended to repress dissent, 
dominate its neighbors and hinder trade, a plural [Central 
Kingdom] was more likely to make concessions to society, develop 
international law and promote trade. … In sum, Chinese history 
is not unlike European history in experiencing both realpolitik 
and idealpolitik elements. While China has a long history of 
domination and coercion, it also has a deeply rooted liberal 
tradition. … Th is liberal tradition … includes not just classical 
Confucianism at the philosophical level but, far more importantly, 
state-society bargains, diplomatic relations and commercial 
activities on the ground.80 
Similar voices also emerge from within Chinese society. Related 
discussions are mushrooming. James Leibold maintains that there 
are “several latent ﬁ ssures in the very composition of the Chinese 
nation-state” and alternatives to “China as a ‘unitary, multi-ethnic 
state’” are being actively sought. “Th e Internet revolution and the 
dramatic changes unleashed in reform-era Chinese society have 
opened up new spaces—some elitist, some populist and some largely 
obscured—for the articulation of alternative national imaginaries, 
ensuring that the Party-state no longer holds a monopoly on the 
symbols, categories and meanings associated with being ‘Chinese’”, 
concludes Leibold.81
Ge Jianxiong writes very positively about the advantages of 
decentralization during the periods of division. According to him, 
periods of division opened up avenues for exploiting remote regions 
which remained neglected during the periods of unity due to their low 
importance, as seen from the capital, and to their physical distance 
from the heartland. Periods of division presented opportunities for 
the talented to ﬁ nd positions in the service of the regional rulers. 
Periods of division also witnessed great technological and intellectual 
advancements, whereas unity often equalled stagnation. New ideas 
flourished and new schools of thought were formed due to the 
80 Hui 2008, 53–65, 60, 63. By “a plural Central Kingdom” the author means that Zhongguo 
referred originally, before the ﬁ rst uniﬁ cation, to the ‘Central Kingdoms’ in the plural.
81 Leibold 2010a, 24.
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freedom made possible by the lack of a strong, ideologically unitarian 
government.82 
Ge is cautious enough not to sound like a ‘splittist’. Instead, 
he asserts that unity will prevail in China as long as the policies of 
reform and opening up continue. Ge emphasizes that he is not critical 
of unity, but of the excessive practices used to gain and maintain 
uniﬁ cation and centralized rule.83 According to him, today’s China 
is no longer uniﬁ ed under one ruler or one ruling family but under 
one nation. Th at means that unity is needed not because it is in 
the interests of the ruler but because it is in the interests of the 
people. Periods of division were natural in the old days, due to the 
coercive measures used to gain and maintain unity. In contrast, the 
positive values of the periods of division can today be found through 
increasing democracy and local autonomy, Ge concludes.84 
Diana Lary points out that one reason why the central government 
today is promoting “the credo of historical unity” is the regions’ 
desire for increased autonomy. While some provinces have become 
richer, they have also become more independent and unwilling to 
have the central government dictate that they must allocate part of 
their revenues to the poorer provinces. A “major recrudescence of 
regional power” is a fact in China today, and such development may 
become at odds with the aims of the central government.85
Ge Jianxiong is not alone in questioning unity as the one and only 
road to peace and prosperity. Dissident political scientist Yan Jiaqi 
(严家其, formerly at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences) 
advocates a federal-democratic model which would simultaneously 
increase local democracy and maintain national cohesion despite 
diﬀ erent disintegrating trends.86 
Confucian revivalist Lin Anwu (林安梧, Professor of Chinese 
Literature at the National Taiwan Normal University) claims that 
there is an important distinction between unity by force and unity 
by common will. Lin claims that the unity during the imperial era 
was (and in today’s People’s Republic is) carried out through force, 
82 Ge Jianxiong 2009, 171–172, 185–188.
83 Ibid., 189, 246.
84 Ibid., 246–249.
85 Lary 1997, 183.
86 Yan Jiaqi 1992. 
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whereas the original Confucian ideal is ‘pluralist unity’ which is 
based not on force but on virtue. In the best spirit of the traditional 
culturalism, Lin favours the latter and calls for the realization of 
‘Cultural China’, a meta-structure under which all Chinese political 
entities could coexist.87 Both Yan Jiaqi ’s federalist model and Lin 
Anwu’s Cultural China have been discussed as possible solutions to 
the Taiwan issue.88
A Hunan-based journalist, Xiao Jiansheng (肖建生), discusses why 
China’s politics have never undergone a transition from centralization 
to pluralism in his recent book, entitled Zhongguo wenming de fansi 
(中国文明的反思, 2007), “Reﬂ ecting on the Chinese Civilization”. Th e 
book is a compact political and social history of China from remote 
antiquity up to the republican revolution. 
Xiao maintains that the ‘Grand Unity’ (Da yitong) achieved by 
the First Emperor of Qin was by no means a positive historical 
achievement. On the contrary, sticking to the Grand Unity gave 
absolute power to the emperor which, in turn, gave way to absolute 
corruption. Under such rule, the people were treated as slaves and as 
beasts of burden. Furthermore, according to Xiao, the uniﬁ cation put 
an end to the tradition of sophisticated diplomatic relations which 
had existed prior to the uniﬁ cation. After the uniﬁ cation, China 
had no neighbours with whom to engage in diplomatic relations, 
and therefore the country’s image became one of a solitary centre 
of the world. China was seen to equate to All-Under-Heaven. Such 
subsequent dynasties during which China turned similarly inwards 
and saw no reason to trade or compete in development with any other 
power were consequently periods of backwardness, concludes Xiao.89 
Xiao uses the Song dynasty as an example of a period when the 
people were able to enjoy the beneﬁ ts of pluralism precisely because 
China was not uniﬁ ed. Xiao reminds his readers of how the Song 
dynasty is often looked down upon as a weak dynasty which barely 
survived under the pressures from its northern adversaries. It was 
because of the weakness of the Song dynasty that China eventually 
fell under Mongol rule, according to the conventional way of 
thinking. In contrast, Xiao uses the Song dynasty as an example of 
87 Lin Anwu 1994. 
88 See also Kallio & Mattlin 2004.
89 Xiao Jiansheng 2007, 54, 71–81, 84, 89.
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a time when China was ruled in a humane and just way. According 
to Xiao, Song China was a liberal, open and pluralistic society. Th ere 
were no demands for ideological unity or orthodoxy. Philosophy, 
science, arts and education ﬂ ourished in such an atmosphere. Trade 
also thrived and the society had an international ﬂ avour. Even a large 
number of Jews found a home in Song China at a time when they were 
not welcome in many other parts of the world, remarks Xiao.90 
Xiao steers clear of advocating that China should be turned into a 
Western style, multi-party democracy. Instead, he presents the Song 
dynasty as an important example of benevolent centralized rule. He 
claims that history indicates a way to make China’s political system 
more humane, while keeping the centralized rule of the Communist 
Party intact.91  
In the “Foreword” to his history book, Xiao Jiansheng questions 
the correctness of the conventional understanding of history:92 
Some people refuse to reﬂ ect thoroughly on their own history, and 
thus they remain unable to recognize correctly the achievements 
of the Chinese civilization and unable to absorb the truly useful 
lessons from history. … For example, the Confucians in ancient 
China … promoted such ideas as “the people are important, 
the ruler is unimportant”, “rule humanely, love the people” 
and “the people are the basis of the state”. Th ese, originally so 
good, thoughts and political ideals were negated for the longest 
time. Instead, people approved of and carried on the ideology of 
violence and autocracy and later followed the bad customs93 of 
the outlaws in the wild. 
90 Ibid., 2, 128–129, 165–166. A similar appraisal of the Song era can be found in Lary 1997, 181.
91 Xiao Jiansheng 2007, 5, 352. 
92 Th e following three fragments are translated from Xiao Jiansheng 2007, 1–6.
93 ‘Th e customs of the outlaws in the wild’ is jianghu xiqi (江湖习气) in the original, literally 
‘the spirit of the rivers and lakes (i.e. the way of life in the backwaters and wilderness). Th e 
phrase implies cunningness and sleekness and refers both to swindlers and charlatans as 
well as to the outlawed swordsmen who often feature in popular literature as Robin Hood-
esque people’s heroes. Here the phrase may refer to the jackal-like strategy of survival of the 
ﬁ ttest, which has marked the periods of rural unrest during the Imperial Era or the Cultural 
Revolution and appearances of unchecked capitalism in modern times. 
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Even today many people view the violent uniﬁ cation of [China] 
by the First Emperor of Qin and the consequent establishment 
of a tightly unified imperial autocracy as a great historical 
achievement. But have they not thought that if this really was 
such a grand achievement, then why has China not seen the 
emergence of such great thinkers as Laocius, Confucius or Mencius 
ever since Qin conquered [the rest of China]?  
Xiao then goes on to discuss the relation between Chinese and Western 
culture, and draws the conclusion that they are not necessarily far apart:
Everyone is today saying that we should revitalize the great 
Chinese culture, but have those who keep saying that really 
thought, what is this great Chinese culture? … I feel it is necessary 
to take democracy, the rule of law, liberty and human rights, 
among others, as criteria of modern civilization, in order to be able 
to reﬂ ect upon the history of China’s civilization in a systematic 
and thorough manner.
 One very practical question … is how to reform China’s 
political system so that it suits the rapidly developing economic 
situation in our country, that is, how to base our society on 
democracy, rule of law, equality, liberty and harmony? … One 
must frankly admit that there is no political system in the world 
which is all good and ﬂ awless. However, at least from today’s 
perspective, the Western democratic model is relatively advanced 
… and of universal value. …
Xiao ends the “Foreword” with careful formulations that aim at 
political correctness:
Th e problem is that in China, a country with a vast territory, a 
large population and thousands of years of history as an autocratic 
state, it would be unwise to rashly carry out reforms equalling 
a total westernization. … Therefore, in order to reform the 
political system in today’s China, we must draw experiences and 
lessons from the Chinese history. Only in that way may we ﬁ nd a 
successful political model which suits the national characteristics 
of China and the psyche of the Chinese people.
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It is a telling sign that Xiao’s book was banned immediately after its 
publication in 2007.94 Th e Party-state tries to defend its monopoly in 
deﬁ ning the meanings of history and ‘Chineseness’. Th e Communist 
Party is apparently acting upon the belief that whoever controls 
history, controls China. Th is indicates that the Party will continue 
to resort to coercive measures, and the space for pluralism and 
liberalism will remain limited.
94 “HK sells a book banned in China”, by Vaudine England, BBC News, Hong Kong, at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8278014.stm. Accessed 28 Sep 2009. Why Ge Jianxiong ’s book hasn’t 
met with a similar fate is anyone’s guess. Perhaps his established status both as an academic 
and as a politician helps. 
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Chapter II 
Th e revival of tradition
Introduction to Chapter II
This chapter presents the efforts by the Party-state to reinvent 
tradition. It aims to shed light on the ongoing dialogue between 
modernity and tradition, communism and Confucianism, internal 
and external orientation, ideology and practice. Th e focus is on the 
eﬀ orts of the Party-state to turn selected elements of the Chinese 
traditional schools of thought into a new synthesis, emphasizing 
harmony and patriotism, called Traditional Learning. Th is chapter 
also illustrates how Confucianism is deeply intertwined with both 
Traditional Learning and Chinese communism.
Tradition, especially Confucianism, which had been the school 
of thought favoured by the emperors and the ruling scholar-oﬃ  cial 
class, came under ﬁ erce attack in the early 20th century among the 
revolutionaries, who aimed to put an end to the imperial system and to 
“Save the Nation”. However, the relationship between Confucianism 
and communism has always been complex. Th e Chinese communists 
adopted the Confucian ideal society, called the Great Community, as 
the goal of the communist revolution. At the same time, Confucius 
was condemned as a feudal aristocrat and a reactionary. 
When communism in its fanatical, Maoist form started to fade 
away in the late 1970s and early 1980s, traditional values such as 
respect for education became fashionable again. It was concluded 
that the correct elements of Confucianism outweigh its incorrect 
elements. However, an outright, overall rehabilitation of Confucius 
was and still is impossible for the Communist Party, which sees itself 
as the direct descendant of the early anti-imperial movement. 
Alarmed by the city-dwellers going onto the streets demanding 
democracy at a time when communism was collapsing in Europe, 
the Communist Party began promoting traditional culture in order 
to steer the people away from Western liberalism. At the time, some 
other Asian states were similarly promoting so-called Asian values. 
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During the last two decades, the term Traditional Learning has 
established itself as the designation for the amalgamation of China’s 
traditional culture and philosophy and the counterpart of ‘Western 
learning’.
Th e prevailing slogan of the Chinese Communist Party is “building 
a Socialist Harmonious Society”. Th e concept of harmony is most 
often traced back to Confucian texts, and it is frequently said that 
building socialist harmony requires the fusion of Marxism and 
Traditional Learning. Th e Party-state is keen to present itself as 
the torch-bearer of Traditional Learning as it is a young ‘dynasty’ 
and needs to show itself as the inevitable pinnacle of historical 
development. Traditional Learning also oﬀ ers the means to move 
away from Maoist communism spiritually. 
Confucianism occupies a central position in Traditional Learning, 
and most of the manifestations of Traditional Learning are Confucian 
in nature, or at least in appearance. Th ere are Confucius Institutes all 
over the world and Confucius’s birthday is once again being observed. 
Th e most striking example is the plan to build a new ‘cultural capital’ 
for China at his birthplace. Interestingly, the project was conceived 
as a propaganda tool to win over the sympathies of Taiwanese 
compatriots. 
However, it would be an exaggeration to call every aspect 
of Chinese tradition or culture ‘Confucian’. On the other hand, 
although it can be argued that the revolutions in the 20th century 
have effectively broken the cultural continuum that Traditional 
Learning represents, it would be unfair to disregard all modern 
manifestations of Confucianism as Disney World-esque artiﬁ cialities. 
Its instrumental usefulness aside, the intriguing question is, how 
viable is Traditional Learning (with Confucianism at its heart): can 
it really ﬁ ll the ideological vacuum by virtue of its substance? In 
other words, can Traditional Learning become an engine of spiritual 
enlightenment?
From the point of view of intellectual history, it has been argued 
that China’s drive for modernization and Saving the Nation during the 
last century has suppressed everything that has not been instrumental 
to development, including societal ideals of enlightenment, such as 
freedom, democracy or tolerance. Today, it seems that the Party-state 
wishes to reinvent Chinese tradition as ‘harmony’, which is used 
merely as a euphemism for ‘stability’ and ‘unity’. 
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It is somehow expected of the Confucians that they should be 
enlightened individuals who work for the betterment of society and 
maintain their integrity even at the expense of their self-interests. 
Confucians should be ‘public intellectuals’. Such idealism seems at 
odds with the trends to make Confucianism—either by itself or as an 
element in Traditional Learning—into a religion of sorts, as advocated 
by some dissident thinkers, or a dogmatized ideology to be merged 
with communism.  
Th e failure of the revolutionaries to uproot Confucianism
As the school of thought favoured by the emperors and the ruling 
scholar-oﬃ  cial class, Confucianism stood for orthodoxy during the 
imperial era. For that reason, many early reformists and republicans in 
the late 19th and early 20th century attacked Confucianism mercilessly. 
Th e anti-Manchu activist Zhang Binglin (章炳麟, 1868–1936), 
whom the communists revere as an early revolutionary, stated in 1904 
that China’s lack of enterprise, which kept the country under the 
yoke of the Manchu and the colonial powers, was due to the Confucian 
emphasis on authority and conservatism.95 Zhang favoured other 
classical schools of thought, such as Mohism (the school of Mozi), and 
promoted Traditional Learning (Guoxue) instead, meaning traditional 
Chinese philosophies by and large as opposed to the ‘Western’ 
value system, as the way to save the nation.96 Saving the Nation, 
or National Salvation, jiu guo (救国)—defending (or redeﬁ ning) the 
national integrity and dignity—was the main goal of the reformists 
and revolutionaries in late 19th and early 20th century China. 
Th e mouthpiece of the New Culture Movement which ﬂ ourished 
during the ﬁ rst decade of the new republic, Xin shiji (“New Century”), 
published several articles attacking Confucianism. One from 1907 
stated: 
Confucius provided the foundations for autocratic government 
and bitterly poisoned our fellow countrymen for over two 
thousand years. … I say that if the people of the world want to 
95 Shimada 1990, 115.
96 Ibid., 14, 111.
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partake of happiness, they must ﬁ rst destroy superstition; and, if 
the Chinese people want to enjoy happiness, they must ﬁ rst carry 
out a [revolution overthrowing Confucianism].97 
Th is same spirit marked the culmination of the New Culture Movement, 
the May 4th Movement in 1919. It arose from disappointment towards 
the Versailles Treaty, which had awarded the German concessions 
on Shandong peninsula to Japan. China’s weakness and inability to 
claim her rights was attributed to traditional values, in particular 
Confucianism. Two western gentlemen, ‘Mr Science’ and ‘Mr 
Democracy’, were called in to overthrow Confucius. Nationalism, 
not based on the old culturalist values but seeking to make China a 
nation among nations, grew stronger. Th e founding mythology of the 
People’s Republic presents the May 4th Movement as a revolutionary, 
anti-imperialist and anti-feudal movement which laid the ideological 
foundation for the Chinese Communist Party.
Nevertheless, the relationship between Confucianism and 
revolution has always been complex. On the eve of the republican 
revolution, reformer and restorationist Kang Youwei (康有为, 1858–
1927) presented Confucius in a very positive light, quite unlike 
Zhang Binglin . According to Kang, Confucius was a democratic 
reformer and a prophet of the age of Great Community (or Universal 
Commonwealth, Datong, 大同), the third and final stage in the 
traditional view of historical progress.98 Kang described this utopia 
as an age when national frontiers and social classes disappear and 
universal peace prevails. 
Kang published his views in a book entitled Datong shu in 1917, 
which instantly became very inﬂ uential. Th e Chinese communists 
equated the Marxist utopia with the Great Community, and the young 
Mao Zedong (1896–1976) said in a private letter that achieving the 
Great Community was his target.99 In 1949, speaking as the leader 
97 Translated and quoted in ibid., 137–138.
98 Originally, Datong was a golden age which had presumably existed in the distant past and 
was then followed by worse times. Th e goal of Confucius was to show the way ‘back to the 
future’ and to help the people return to the golden age. 
99 “‘Datong’ lixiang yu Shehuizhuyi zai Zhongguo de chuanbo” by Wang Suli, Renminwang 
website, at http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/49157/49163/4466836.html. Accessed 30 Apr 
2010.
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of the Communist Party, he stated that the goal of communism in 
China was to eliminate class and to realize the Great Community. 
Mao also said that while Kang Youwei had not known how the Great 
Community could be reached, communism now provided the way.100
Despite the equation of the communist utopia and the Confucian 
ideal of the Great Community, there are good grounds to condemn 
Confucianism from the viewpoint of socialist ideology. Confucius 
himself was a reactionary figure if viewed through the lens of 
historical materialism. He advocated a return to Zhou rule which, 
according to Marxist historians, was a slave society, whereas the Qin 
dynasty, which followed the Warring States period when Confucius 
lived, was more advanced as a feudal society. 
An article by Dr Qian Mansu (钱满素) from the Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences, listing four major negative aspects of Confucianism, 
serves as a good example of the orthodox, Marxist view. According to 
her, (1) Confucianism formed the basis for a patriarchal clan system 
which prevented personal development, (2) Confucianism promotes 
rule by men but not rule by law, (3) the Confucian ideal that anyone 
can become a sage is both unhelpful and unrealistic, and (4) the study 
of Confucianism was subordinate to politics, prevented technological 
development, and failed to encourage intellectual curiosity. Qian 
said Confucianism is simply an obstacle to China’s development.101 
Th is is the stand that Mao Zedong also adopted as the leader 
of the Chinese Communists. In 1940, in an essay titled “On New 
Democracy”, he wrote: 
We must transform China, which is ruled by the Old Culture and 
thus ignorant and backward, into such a China which is ruled by 
the New Culture and thus civilized and advanced. … In China, 
we have an imperialist culture …. In China, we also have a half-
feudal culture which reﬂ ects half-feudal politics and half-feudal 
economics; people who advocate respect for Confucius and 
reading the Classics, advocate the old Confucian propriety code 
and other old ideas, and oppose the new ideas of the New Culture, 
are all representatives of the half-feudal culture. … [Th ese two old 
cultures] must be overthrown. If we don’t overthrow them, we 
100 “Lun renmin minzhu zhuanzheng”, in Mao Zedong 1966, 1405–1406, 1408. 
101 Quoted in Ling & Ma 2008, 265.
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won’t be able to establish any New Culture. … Th e battle between 
the cultures is a battle of life and death.102 
In 1953, Mao attacked the venerable philosopher Liang Shuming 
(梁漱溟, 1893–1988) in an essay titled “Criticizing Liang Shuming’s 
Reactionary Thought”.103 Mao’s attack was triggered by Liang’s 
criticism towards Mao’s agricultural policies.104 In point 12 of the 
lengthy essay Mao stated: 
As to the errors of Confucius, I see him as undemocratic and 
lacking the spirit of self-criticism, somewhat like Mr. Liang. [His 
ideas] have the air of evil hegemonism and the ﬂ avour of Fascism. 
I urge friends, in particular Mr Liang, not to study this set of ideas 
by Confucius. Th at would make me very happy.105 
During the chaotic ten-year period of 1966–1976, which started 
with the launch of the infamous Cultural Revolution and ended with 
Mao’s death, Confucianism came in for particularly ﬁ erce criticism. 
Confucianism was made the embodiment of all ‘feudalist rot’. 
However, it must be realized that the campaign to criticize Confucius 
and to “knock down the Confucian shop” was mostly motivated 
by the internal power struggle, and Confucius was just used as a 
scapegoat.
Similarly, history was instrumentalized for political purposes. 
Th e First Emperor of the Qin dynasty (221–207 BCE) was made a 
national hero as the ruler who ﬁ rst uniﬁ ed China, and Mao Zedong 
was presented as his only equal in history. Th is was also a direct 
jab at Confucianism, which was almost annihilated during the Qin 
dynasty. Th e Qin rulers favoured Legalism, Fajia (法家), known for 
its preference for rewards and especially punishments as the means 
to keep the people at bay, and its scorn for the ‘softy’ Confucians. 
Ironically, however, many of the ‘feudalist’ characteristics that 
102 Mao Zedong 1967, 624, 655.
103 Mao Zedong 1977, 107–115. Volume 5 of Mao Zedong’s Selected Works was published during 
the Cultural Revolution, whereas editions published before or thereafter only include volumes 
1–4. 
104 Lodén 2006, 170–171.
105 Mao Zedong 1977, 113.
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Confucianism was criticized for were actually more Legalist in nature. 
In fact, imperial Confucianism was just “Legalism with a Confucian 
façade” as the rulers realized that rewards and punishments 
are actually quite eﬀ ective.106 Th is led to a kind of ossiﬁ cation of 
Confucianism, such as the Th ree Cardinal Leads and Five Constants 
(see Chapter III, “What is Confucianism?”) which were used as prime 
examples of feudal backwardness.
Amidst the Cultural Revolution campaigns, even the famous 
philosopher Feng Youlan (冯友兰, 1895–1990) had to write a self-
criticism. In it, he confessed how his former defence of Confucianism 
had “served the big landlords, big bourgeoisie and Kuomintang 
reactionaries”. He wrote: 
[Th e means] advocated by Confucius were in every case intended 
to benumb and deceive the working people more and more so 
that they would neither want nor dare to resist. … [Confucius 
advocated] the all-round restoration of the old order of slave-
society. … I formerly interpreted Confucius’s ‘love for men’ to 
mean love for all men. … [His] love, in fact, was only for a handful 
of slave-owning aristocrats. … Confucius’s ideas were a reﬂ ection 
of [the] situation in the class struggle of that time. … Educated 
by the Cultural Revolution, I have gained a somewhat better 
understanding of Confucius.107 
In contrast to Feng Youlan , Liang Shuming never admitted to any 
errors in his thinking. In 1974, he wrote: “In regard to the popular 
opinions presented in the cause of the current Criticize Confucius 
campaign, I don’t agree with most of them.”108 “To hold to the current 
delusions—that ‘constraining oneself and keeping to propriety’109 
meant restoration of the Zhou dynasty or that the Zhou dynasty 
was a slave society or even that Confucius himself was a protector 
106 Hsiao 1977, 137. 
107 Feng Youlan 1974, 88, 92, 102–103, 105. 
108 Liang Shuming 2008, 164. 
109 ‘Constraining oneself and keeping to propriety’ is the phrase ke ji fu li (克己复礼) from the 
Analects, XII.1. During the Cultural Revolution, the latter part, ‘keeping to propriety’ (fu li), 
was read as ‘restoration of the old system’, something that Lin Biao (林彪, 1907–1971), who 
was criticized alongside Confucius, was accused of. 
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of slavery at the junction of a slave society and a feudal society—is 
to heap mistakes upon mistakes.”110 Liang urged his contemporaries 
to put things in their right historical perspective and not to resort to 
historical falsiﬁ cations. He points out that the Th ree Cardinal Leads 
and Five Constants were not invented by Confucius. “Just as Marx 
cannot be blamed for the mistakes of all those students of Marxism 
who have sunk into the pitfall of Marxist dogmatism, how then could 
we blame Confucius for the feudal ethic code which was formed by 
the later generations?”111 Th ough these words were not published at 
the time, one cannot but salute the intellectual integrity of Mr Liang. 
Attitudes towards Confucianism began to change soon after the 
Cultural Revolution. Th is followed in the wake of the eﬀ orts to revive 
formal education, which had been sorely neglected for a decade. It was 
acknowledged that economic development relied upon a professional 
workforce and management as well as scientiﬁ c research. Th e age-old 
maxim often associated with Confucianism, ‘respect teachers and 
value education’, was highlighted by the second paramount leader of 
the Chinese Communist Party, Deng Xiaoping (邓小平, 1904–1976), in 
a speech in August 1977.112 Universities resumed normal recruitment 
that same year. 
Deng Xiaoping launched the policies of reform and opening up 
in 1978. Two years later, he named Modest Welfare (Xiaokang, 小康) 
as the target of his reform policies. Xiaokang is the second stage in 
the traditional view of historical progress, the one preceding Datong. 
Th is signalled that while communism still remained the goal, it was 
put on hold for the foreseeable future, and China was to concentrate 
on economic growth. Modest Welfare has since remained the stated 
objective of the communist leadership. 
A conference on social science theories in late 1978 concluded 
that the negative and positive aspects of Confucianism should be 
distinguished from each other.113 In essence, this meant adherence 
to Mao’s words from 1940: Communist Party members must “discard 
110 Liang Shuming 2008, 170. From an essay entitled “Jintian women yingdang ruhe pingjia 
Kongzi”. 
111 Ibid., 171.
112 “Zun shi zhong jiao”, at http://www.moe.edu.cn/edoas/website18/63/
info1226904015050763.htm. Accessed 22 Apr 2010.
113 Ai 2008, 57–58.
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the feudalistic dross and keep the democratic essence” of ancient 
culture.114 
In the 1980s, further conferences on Confucianism were held. Th e 
Confucian emphasis on social harmony was well suited to downplay 
the importance of the class struggle, which had gone to extremes 
during the Cultural Revolution and was no longer wanted in the 
era of economic reform. Th e government even funded an academic 
project on New Confucianism (see Chapter III, “Th e emergence of 
New Confucianism”) which was undoubtedly aimed at strengthening 
the position of ‘socialist Confucianism’, that is, Confucianism which 
is compatible with the correct political doctrine. 
A representative example of opening the way for ‘socialist 
Confucianism’ is an article discussing what Confucianism has to 
oﬀ er for the Socialist Market Economy in China, by Professor Luo 
Guojie (罗国杰) from Renmin University (see also Chapter III, “What 
is Confucianism?”). Luo opines that while a market economy means 
increased competition, the Chinese should aim for “fair competition” 
and steer clear of the selfish profit-seeking of the ‘petty men’. 
Following propriety and justice, as advocated by Confucius, means 
collectivism. Luo condemns individualism as the major threat to 
socialism during this era of reform and opening up. China must stick 
to Marxism, follow the path leading to the good of the many instead 
of the few, and be extremely cautious of the corrupting inﬂ uence of 
Western ideologies and values. In the proper fashion, Luo concludes 
that one must put traditional Chinese culture under careful scrutiny 
in order to be able “to discard the dross and select the essence” which 
is useful in the present world.115 
Luo appears to have glossed over matters in regard to earlier 
communist views on Confucianism’s conservatism. While he admits 
that Confucianism in its time supported the cause of the slave-owning 
class, his message is that the correct elements of Confucianism 
outweigh its incorrect elements. It is also noteworthy that he places 
unity at the core of Confucian tradition. 
114 Mao Zedong 1967, 668. From the essay “Xin minzhuzhuyi”.
115 Luo Guojie 1999, 444.
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Th e project for replacing Confucianism with 
Traditional Learning 
Confucianism and other Chinese traditional schools of thought got 
another boost from the patriotic education campaign, launched in 
1991 in the aftermath of the Tian’anmen events in 1989. According 
to Wang Zheng’s study, “a patriotic narrative replaced the old 
class-struggle narrative” in the new school textbooks, produced 
during the campaign. In addition, the textbooks presented “a new 
‘victimization narrative’, which blames the ‘West’ for China’s 
suﬀ ering.” ‘Rejuvenating China’ was a popular political slogan.116 Th e 
idea of Chinese traditional learning, presented at least as equivalent to 
the Western philosophical and scientiﬁ c tradition, ﬁ tted this patriotic 
narrative well. 
Th e third generation leader Jiang Zemin (江泽民, b. 1926) said in 
a speech in 1991: “With regard to the rich cultural legacies left over 
from China’s history of several thousand years, we should select 
the essence and discard the dross therefrom, and carry forward and 
develop them in line with the spirit of the times in order to make 
the past serve the present.”117 Th is statement was related to the ﬁ ght 
against ‘bourgeois liberalization’ by the neo-conservative wing of the 
Chinese Communist Party, led by Jiang. In 1986, the Party had started 
promoting the building of a ‘Socialist Spiritual Civilization’. It was an 
eﬀ ort to steer the Chinese people away from worshipping the Western 
values which had started seeping into the country, partly introduced 
through the think-tanks118 of Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang , which 
inﬂ uenced the liberalist movements in the late 1980s, including the 
Tian’anmen demonstrations. 
In 1994, traditional culture was placed in a central position in the 
Patriotic Education campaign. In 1995, the Central Party School and 
the China Confucius Foundation (established in 1984 by the central 
government to promote research on Confucianism in order to advance 
Socialist Spiritual Civilization) organized an academic symposium on 
116 Wang 2008, 784, 794. 
117 The complete transcript of Jiang’s speech in English, Xinhuawang, at http://news.
xinhuanet.com/english/20010726/433649.htm. Accessed 29 Apr 2010.
118  Li 2009.
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Marxism and Confucianism. As was to be expected, the symposium 
exposed the prevailing distrust towards the ‘feudalist character’ of 
Confucianism, though some argued that in order to survive, Marxism 
must be sinicized, and in order for this to happen, it must absorb 
elements of China’s traditional culture.119 Although China’s national 
media reported in 1993 on the emergence of a ‘traditional learning 
fever’, interest in traditional learning was more of a fabrication than 
a real, nation-wide fad at that time.120 
Th e 1990s also saw the emergence of ‘Asian values’. Th e latter 
can be seen as a counter-reaction to the prevalence of the views of 
Max Weber (1864–1920), who attributed China’s failure to develop 
capitalism to the Confucian mentality which, according to his 
analysis, favoured the status quo and preferred adjusting to the world 
rather than attempting to change it. In the views of Singaporean 
leaders Lee Kuan Yew (李光耀) and Goh Chok Tong (吴作栋), Confucian 
virtues such as respect for education, loyalty to both the extended 
family and the state, preference for social harmony, and collectivism, 
had formed the spiritual basis for the rise of the ‘East Asian Tigers’, 
South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong.121 Later, other 
Asian leaders, such as Mahathir bin Mohamad of Malaysia, Suharto 
of Indonesia and Jiang Zemin of China, also expressed their support 
for countering the Western emphasis on human rights and democracy 
with Asian values centring instead on the right of development.122
Not altogether groundlessly, the Chinese government’s interest 
towards tradition and ‘Asian values’ was criticized by Taiwanese 
Confucians as a ‘United Front gimmick’123, that is, as an attempt to 
elicit the sympathies of overseas Chinese and Taiwanese through 
Confucian rhetoric. Th e Taiwanese must have looked askance at 
119  Makeham 2008, 65–66, 239–241. Th e new emphasis on traditional learning also provoked 
criticism from those who feared that it would deviate China from its course of modernization 
(Ai 2008, 63).
120 Ibid., 68, 70 fn. 35.
121 See Ai 2008, 44–45.
122 See Kraft 2001.
123 Ai 2008, 51. See Makeham 2008, 197. ‘United Front’ refers to the periods of cooperation 
between the Communist Party and the National Party before and during the Chinese Civil 
War. In 1981, the Communists made a plea to the Nationalists in Taiwan to form a new united 
front for the reuniﬁ cation of China. 
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communist China joining hands with the South East Asian countries 
by playing the Confucian card, which had previously been Taiwan’s 
trump.
Following the worldwide collapse of the communist ideology, 
and in the wake of the Chinese Communist Party’s positive attitude 
towards classical schools of thought, even liberal and anti-Marxist 
views of Confucianism began to emerge. Some liberal thinkers went 
as far as to say that Marxism was not compatible with modernization 
and should therefore be replaced by Confucianism. Some scholars 
sought to use Confucian concepts to ﬁ ll the spiritual void, which 
they claimed was a result of the opportunism and nihilism of the 
Cultural Revolution, or even the anti-traditionalism of the May 4th 
Movement.124 
Th is highlighted the need for the Communist Party to distance 
itself from Confucianism again. After all, the Communist Party sees its 
foundation as resting on the legacy of the May 4th Movement, which 
is conventionally perceived as anti-Confucian. Consequently, a new 
appraisal of the relationship between communism and tradition 
began to gain prevalence. Professor Yan Jiayan (严家炎) from Peking 
University opined that while the Cultural Revolution had resulted 
in an ideological crisis and smashed tradition, the same wasn’t 
true for the May 4th Movement. While the latter had attacked the 
Th ree Cardinal Leads, this did not constitute an overall negation 
of Confucianism. Yan pointed out that imperial Confucianism also 
had unorthodox branches. He furthermore emphasized that China’s 
traditional culture was more than just Confucianism.125 
As a consequence, the government started promoting Traditional 
Learning, Guoxue, following the idea of Zhang Binglin , mentioned 
above. In 2004, at the fourth plenum of the Sixteenth Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China, it was aﬃ  rmed that 
“China’s advanced socialist culture” needs to be constructed on the 
basis of 5,000 years of traditional culture.126
What is Traditional Learning then? Historian Mao Peiqi (毛佩琦) 
from Renmin University expresses it this way: 
124 See Song Xianlin 2003, 91, 94. Ai 2008, 41, 52.
125 Quoted in Ling & Ma 2008, 272.
126 Makeham 2008, 318.
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Put simply, it is the learning that makes the Chinese Chinese. … Put 
more elaborately, the objects of the study of traditional learning not 
only include literature but also substantial things; they not only 
include material artefacts but also immaterial cultural heritage; they 
include, among others, buildings, clothing, food, music, paintings, 
medicine and the theatre of all our nationalities. … China’s traditional 
learning has never rejected the intake of foreign elements: when 
Buddhism was introduced into China, it went through changes and 
became uniquely Chinese Buddhism …. Th erefore, the studying and 
revitalising of traditional learning today does not mean retreating 
into antiquity or ossiﬁ cation. … Nevertheless, China’s traditional 
learning is clearly diﬀ erent from Western learning. China’s traditional 
learning is our counterpart of Western learning and both represent 
totally diﬀ erent scientiﬁ c systems.127 
What is the use of Traditional Learning? According to Mao Peiqi , 
the continuity of China’s culture was broken in the revolutionary 
era. After the establishment of New China, “at the time when total 
westernization was the target of all-round critique, China actually 
moved towards total westernization. Only after the reform and 
opening up period had lasted for 30 years did the prospering Chinese 
awake, and the protection and revitalization of traditional learning 
become part of the national consciousness.”128 He continues: 
As a strong, independent nation among nations, China must have 
a correspondingly strong and independent national culture. … 
China does not need to absorb the wisdom of her traditional 
culture only in order to fulﬁ l the needs of her own reconstruction 
and development, but China also faces an opportunity and the 
responsibility to contribute her wisdom for the beneﬁ t of the 
whole of humanity.129 
However, even if the Communist Party is reluctant to oﬃ  cially endorse 
Confucianism, it has not been possible to keep Confucius away from 
127 Mao Peiqi ’s “Foreword” in Shisan Jing jie du (2008). Cf. Zhang Dainian, quoted in Makeham 
2008, 67.
128 Mao Peiqi ’s “Foreword” in Shisan Jing jie du (2008).
129 Ibid.
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Traditional Learning. In practice many, if not most, of the concrete 
manifestations of Traditional Learning are related to Confucianism. 
As Liang Qichao (梁启超, 1873–1929) wrote: “Confucian philosophy 
does not equate with the whole of Chinese culture, but if you take 
Confucianism away, I am afraid not much else will remain.”130 
Three traditional festivals—Qingming (Tomb Sweeping Day), 
Duanwu (the Dragon Boat Festival) and Zhongqiu (the Moon Festival)—
were made oﬃ  cial holidays in 2007.131 Although these festivals are 
not Confucian in origin, the folklore attached to them has a strong 
Confucian flavour. For instance, both Qingming and Duanwu are 
related to the remembrance of certain righteous and virtuous scholar-
oﬃ  cials who lived during the Eastern Zhou period (770–256 BCE). 
Confucius’s birthday is once again observed with lavish ceremonies 
every September.132 
Institutes of Traditional Learning have been established in 
universities, and Confucianism has a central position on their 
curricula. A statue of Confucius was erected to mark the establishment 
of the School of Chinese Classics at Renmin University in 2005. Th e 
Research Centre for China’s Traditional Culture at Renmin University 
convened an editorial meeting in 2004 for the book series “Recitation 
Texts to Be Used in Promoting Confucianism to the Masses”. In the 
same year, a series of primary school textbooks on Confucianism 
were published under the endorsement of China’s Ministry of 
Education. Th e academic year in many schools begins with a quasi-
Confucian ceremony where the students wear ancient-style robes 
and headgear (often to the dislike of hanfu purists). Weekend classes 
in Confucianism for school children and even pre-school children 
have become popular.133 One may also note that Article 21 in China’s 
130 Quoted in Shisan Jing jie du (2008), “Editors’ Foreword”.
131 “Chinese mark 1st ‘oﬃ  cial’ Qingming with visits to deceased”, by Xinhua, Beijing, in 
China Daily Online, 4 Apr 2008, at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-04/04/
content_6592879.htm. Accessed 16 Sep 2009.
132 Confucius’s birthday was celebrated on the Mainland for the ﬁ rst time in 1989 (Ai 2008, 
31). Prior to that, only the anniversary of Confucius’s death was observed on October 1st (also 
the national day of the PRC). Traditionally (and all along in Taiwan), the birthday is observed 
by Confucians. 
133 Ai 2008, 55. Makeham 2008, 318–319, 322. Ho 2009. “China’s thriving Confucian schools,” 
by Jill McGivering, BBC News, 3 Jan 2008, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-paciﬁ c/7169814.
stm. Accessed 28 Sep 2009. See also Li Xiangping & Shi Dajian 2009, 74.
Original Publications | 115
FIIA REPORT  27    61
Marriage Law, which stipulates that adult children have the duty to 
support their elderly parents, is inherently Confucian. 
Confucius is also the spearhead of the Ministry of Education-
led drive to introduce Chinese culture to the world. Modelled after 
the Goethe-Institut, Alliance Française and other such institutions, 
there are to date some 300 Confucius Institutes in various parts of the 
world. Approximately one third of these are in European countries, 
including one in Finland at the University of Helsinki.134 Th e goal is 
set at 500 institutes.135
It would be tempting to hypothesize that the establishment 
of the Confucius Institutes is a conscious eﬀ ort to bolster China’s 
peaceful rise, but the fact remains that the Ministry of Education 
ranks relatively low in the Chinese organizational hierarchy, and it 
is therefore improbable that it should have been entrusted with a 
major role in Chinese foreign policy implementation. Besides, the 
Confucius Institutes are under Chinese control to varying degrees. 
Some, like the Confucius Institute in Stockholm, are tightly overseen 
by their home institutions, which leaves little room for potential 
Chinese propaganda purposes.136 Th e phenomenon of the spread of 
the Confucius Institutes is nevertheless worth keeping a close eye on.
A Harmonious Society
In the wake of the side eﬀ ects of the otherwise successful economic 
policies, especially the growing inequality, the Communist Party had 
to acknowledge that “social equity and justice is a basic condition of 
social harmony”.137 In order to create a new moral focus which would 
balance the brutal competition over economic growth, the fourth 
134 Exact numbers as of October 2009 are available on the website of the Oﬃ  ce of Chinese 
Language Council International, or Hanban for short (http://english.hanban.edu.cn/kzxy.
php, accessed 29 Apr 2010).
135 Li Xiangping & Shi Dajian 2009, 74.
136 In 2007, a member of the Swedish Parliament expressed concern that the Confucius 
Institute in Stockholm would provide a bridgehead for Chinese government propaganda and 
even espionage (http://www.riksdagen.se/Webbnav/index.aspx?nid=101&bet=2007/08:46, 
accessed 29 Apr 2010). 
137 Ai 2008, 32. Bell 2008, 9. Shambaugh 2008, 115. 
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generation leader Hu Jintao (胡锦涛, b. 1942) initiated the concept 
of a ‘Socialist Harmonious Society’ in 2005. Whereas the concrete 
content in building the harmonious society must come through social 
and economic policies, conceptually harmony is central to Chinese 
traditional thought in general, and to Confucianism in particular. 
However, in the oﬃ  cial Party documents discussing the Socialist 
Harmonious Society, Confucianism is not mentioned, although Hu 
Jintao himself has made references to Confucius in his speeches.138 
At the 17th Party Congress, the word ‘harmonious’ was added to 
the CCP Constitution.139 Hu Jintao had this to say about the Socialist 
Harmonious Society:
Building a harmonious socialist society is a historical mission 
throughout the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics…. 
It is through development that we will increase the material 
wealth of society and constantly improve people’s lives, and 
it is again through development that we will guarantee social 
equity and justice and constantly promote social harmony. … In 
accordance with the general requirements for democracy and 
the rule of law, equity and justice, honesty and fraternity, vigor 
and vitality, stability and order, and harmony between man and 
nature and the principle of all the people building and sharing a 
harmonious socialist society, we will spare no eﬀ ort to solve the 
most speciﬁ c problems of the utmost and immediate concern to 
the people and strive to create a situation in which all people do 
their best, ﬁ nd their proper places in society and live together 
in harmony, so as to provide a favorable social environment for 
development.140 
Modest Welfare has also been given concrete criteria in terms of 
national income. Both the timetable and the criteria have been 
modiﬁ ed several times. Reaﬃ  rming Deng Xiaoping ’s goal-setting 
from 1980, Hu stated that the society should enter the Xiaokang level 
138 See Bell 2008, 9.
139 Th e amended text is available e.g. at http://www.china.org.cn/english/congress/229722.
htm. Accessed 19 Aug 2010.
140 Complete text of Hu’s report at the 17th Party Congress in English at http://news.xinhuanet.
com/english/2007-10/24/content_6938749_2.htm. Accessed 26 Apr 2010.
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of overall welfare (“moderately prosperous society” in the oﬃ  cial 
translation) by 2020.141 Furthermore, Hu outlined the meaning of 
Modest Welfare in this way:
When the goal of building a moderately prosperous society 
in all respects is attained by 2020, China, a large developing 
socialist country with an ancient civilization, will have basically 
accomplished industrialization, with its overall strength 
signiﬁ cantly increased and its domestic market ranking as one 
of the largest in the world. It will be a country whose people are 
better oﬀ  and enjoy markedly improved quality of life and a good 
environment. Its citizens will have more extensive democratic 
rights, show higher ethical standards and look forward to greater 
cultural achievements. China will have better institutions in all 
areas and Chinese society will have greater vitality coupled with 
stability and unity. 142 
Hu Jintao also emphasized the need to “promote Chinese culture and 
build a common spiritual home for the Chinese nation”. 
Chinese culture has been an unfailing driving force for the Chinese 
nation to keep its unity and make progress from generation to 
generation. We must have a comprehensive understanding of 
traditional Chinese culture, keep its essence and discard its dross 
to enable it to ﬁ t in with present-day society, stay in harmony 
with modern civilization, keep its national character and reﬂ ect 
changes of the times. … Th e great rejuvenation of the Chinese 
nation will deﬁ nitely be accompanied by the thriving of Chinese 
culture.143 
141 Speech at the 17th Party Congress at http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2007-10/24/
content_6938568_3.htm. Accessed 26 Apr 2010. 
142 Complete text of Hu’s report at the 17th Party Congress in English at http://news.xinhuanet.
com/english/2007-10/24/content_6938749_3.htm. Accessed 26 Apr 2010.
143 Speech at the 17th Party Congress at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-10/24/
content_6938749_6.htm. Accessed 26 Apr 2010.
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Th e concept of harmony, he (和) or hexie (和谐), has its roots in 
Confucianism.144 Fan Zhongyan ’s (范仲淹, 989–1052) famous essay 
“Inscription at Yueyang Tower” contains the phrase: zheng tong ren 
he (政通人和), “the state was administered smoothly and the people 
lived in harmony with each other”. ‘Harmony’ is often defined 
through this quote by Confucius: “Th e gentleman acts in harmony 
with others but is no conformist. Th e petty man is conformist but 
does not act in harmony with others.”145 Senior editor of the People’s 
Daily, Lin Zhibo, explained the meaning of this Confucian maxim for 
the realization of the Socialist Harmonious Society in this way: 
‘Harmony’ is harmonious and uniﬁ ed, ‘conformity’ is similar 
and unanimous; ‘harmony’ is abstract and internal, ‘conformity’ 
is concrete and external. … ‘To act in harmony but not to 
be conformist’ is the only way to common prosperity and 
development in the multi-cultural world. … ‘Not to be conformist’ 
means that one does not strive for similarity nor aim to duplicate 
what others have done. As long as one’s big goals are not in conﬂ ict 
with those of the others, one should recognize the diﬀ erences, 
tolerate the diﬀ erences and even respect the diﬀ erences. In this 
way, the contradictions may be dissolved and all can coexist and 
prosper together. … It is only through integration146 that we may 
smoothly take the step from economic globalization to a culturally 
pluralist unity … and ﬁ nally reach the realm of Great Community 
144 Th e character he (和) was recently chosen “the most ‘Chinese’ Chinese character” by the 
monthly Zhonghua yichan (“‘Harmony’ voted No. 1 character” by Liu Chang, Global Times, 
18 Oct 2010, at http://china.globaltimes.cn/society/2010-10/582905.html, accessed 19 Oct. 
2010). 
145 Analects XIII.23. In this quotation, the character used for ‘harmony’ is actually 合 (a 
synonym and in modern Chinese also a character similar in sound to 和). Th e ﬁ rst sentence of 
this quotation is displayed in the short ﬁ lm Hexie Zhongguo (“Harmonious China”), which was 
shown to visitors at the China Pavilion in the Shanghai Expo 2010, together with “(although) 
I follow my heart’s desires I shall not cross the bounds (of propriety)” from Analects II.4. 
146 Th e somewhat unusual expression that Lin Zhibo uses for ‘integration’, mohe (磨合), refers 
literally to grinding oﬀ  sharp edges in order to make people concordant.
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in the world. Such Great Community would mean internal 
harmony and unity but not external similarity and unanimity ….147 
Today, the diﬀ erences between Asian values, traditional studies, 
Confucianism and socialist harmony are being purposefully 
blurred, which is in accordance with both the interests of the 
Party, not wanting to see an overemphasis on Confucianism, and 
of the people, for whom the traditional culture is a living and ever-
changing organism and who have no need to diﬀ erentiate between 
Confucianism and other elements of Chinese culture.148
Workers Daily published a commentary in 2006 which discussed 
the image of Traditional Learning among the population. According 
to the commentary, people understand Traditional Learning to 
mean the Confucian classics, classical poetry and arts as well as 
traditional customs. Th e commentary saw this as a narrow view but 
expressed hope that the values that people identify with Traditional 
Learning could strengthen a common identity and the cohesion of the 
nation. According to the commentary, these values include fraternal 
love, collectiveness, harmony without conformity, the oneness 
of humanity, patriotism, people forming the basis of the state, 
consideration for others, perseverance and diligence, thriftiness in 
running a household, and respect for education. Th e author, politics 
editor Liu Wenning (刘文宁), warns against absorbing inﬂ uences 
which are incompatible with modernization, especially in terms of 
education.149
A similar sentiment is shared in a commentary published recently 
in the People’s Daily. Th e author, writer and columnist Wang Meng 
(王蒙), criticizes the craze for reintroducing classical primers to school 
children. “It is all right and necessary that Chinese children today are 
taught to obey rules, talk politely, respect their teachers and venerate 
the leaders”, the author writes, but notes that such traditional values 
must be subject to the principles of modern society, such as equality 
before the law, and must not hinder creativity, imagination and 
147  “‘Junzi he er bu tong’ de jiedu”, Renmin luntan, vol. 4, 2005, at www.people.com.cn/GB/
paper85/14577/1295896.html. Accessed 27 Apr 2010. 
148 See Allen 1999.
149 “Pinglun: You guan ‘guoxuere’ de ruogan sikao”, by Liu Wenning, Xinhuawang, at news.
xinhuanet.com/politics/2006-08/17/content_4971071.htm. Accessed 27 Apr 2010. 
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readiness to debate. Children must also be encouraged to engage 
in physical activities and play, things neglected in the classical 
primers.150
Outside China, the end of the Asian economic miracle has recently 
embarrassed the advocates of Asian values.151 Even Lee Kuan Yew 
has said that respect for elders does perhaps not meet the demands 
of modernity and that loyalty to family has often led to family 
cronyism.152 
Inside China, the discourse on Asian values is still very much 
alive. Vice-Minister in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, He Yafei 
(何亚非), claimed recently that in the minds of many Chinese, the 
Asian values, or Confucian thought, are just as important as universal 
human rights standards. He said in an interview that while China 
recognizes the universality of human rights, it also acknowledges 
that diﬀ erent societies may employ diﬀ erent methods in promoting 
and protecting human rights due to their diﬀ erent cultural, societal 
and historical backgrounds. Therefore, human rights and Asian 
values or Confucianism are not dialectically opposite but mutually 
complementary value systems, concluded He.153 
A case in point: Th e Zhonghua Culture Symbolic City 
Traditional studies are self-evidently meant to promote a positive 
image of China to the Chinese ‘diaspora’ (the overseas Chinese of 
both recent and earlier eras), as well as the Taiwanese and the world 
at large. It is not misleading to talk of ‘United Front Gimmicks’. Th e 
meaning of these eﬀ orts for the ‘peaceful rise of China’ and ‘China’s 
soft power’ will be a phenomenon to follow closely. Here I introduce 
two examples of such ‘gimmicks’. 
Th e ﬁ rst example has been discussed in some detail by James 
Leibold in Th e China Journal, namely the Humanistic Olympic Studies 
150 “Cong redu ‘Dizi gui’ shuoqi”, by Wang Meng, Renmin ribao (Haiwaiban), 12 Jan 2010, p. 1.
151 Ai 2008, 46–47.
152 Newsweek interview in 2001, at http://www.singapore-window.org/sw01/010128nw.
htm. Accessed 28 Apr 2010. 
153 “He Yafei : Rujia sixiang gen renquan biaozhun tongdeng zhongyao,” by Xinhua, 19 March 
2010, at http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2010-03-19/024017238601s.shtml. Accessed 28 Apr 2010.
Original Publications | 121
FIIA REPORT  27    67
Center which was established in Beijing ahead of the Beijing Olympics 
in 2008. According to Leibold, the concept of “Humanistic Olympics” 
was “originally intended as a foil for Western critics of China’s 
human rights record.” Th e Humanistic Olympic Studies Center was 
established in order to ﬂ esh out the concept with Confucian meaning, 
so the “Great Community (Datong) of the world” and “harmony 
between man and nature” (Tian ren heyi, 天人合一) were linked with 
the Olympian ideals by the scholars participating in the project. Th e 
same thought was put in concrete form in the opening ceremony 
of the Olympics where the world was given “an exquisite cultural 
banquet” of the “profound poetry” of Chinese culture, adapted to 
suit foreign palates.154
An even more concrete example is the “Zhonghua Culture Symbolic 
City” (Zhonghua wenhua biaozhi cheng, 中华文化标志城) project which 
aims to build an entire city to symbolize China’s cultural heritage. Th e 
project was conceived as early as 1995, when President Jiang Zemin 
issued an eight-point proposal for the development of the relations 
between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. Th e sixth point states 
that the 5,000-year-old culture forms a spiritual link which binds 
all the sons and daughters of all the ethnic groups of the Zhonghua 
nation together. 
Jiang Zemin elaborated the theme in 1997 in a speech at Harvard 
University where he said that culture also advances the cause of 
China’s reuniﬁ cation. In 1998, the “Huaxia Cultural Links Project” 
(Huaxia wenhua niudai gongcheng, 华夏文化纽带工程) was launched 
jointly by the Taiwan Aﬀ airs Oﬃ  ce under the State Council and other 
bodies dealing with propaganda work and overseas Chinese relations. 
In 2004, Jiang’s successor, Hu Jintao, emphasized the great historical 
signiﬁ cance of the project, alluding to the historical task of China’s 
reuniﬁ cation.155 
The “Huaxia Cultural Links Project” has promoted different 
activities, such as the launching of campaigns promoting classical 
literature and philosophy. Th e most ambitious endeavour which 
the Project has conceived is the building of the “Zhonghua Culture 
154 Leibold 2010a , 20–23
155 Information on the Zhonghua Culture Symbolic City website at www.ccsc.gov.cn. Accessed 
15 Jan 2010.
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Symbolic City”. President Hu Jintao and the Ministry of Culture gave 
the idea their blessing in 2001.156 
Th e “Zhonghua Culture Symbolic City” is to be built in Jining City in 
Shandong Province. Th e city is set to span over 300 square kilometres, 
combining the ancient home of Confucius in Qufu and the ancient 
home of Mencius in Zoucheng into one tourism site, complete with 
a range of new buildings. Th e stated cost of the project is 30 billion 
renminbi yuan (EUR 3 billion). According to some proponents of the 
project, the cultural sites of the new city would provide the venue 
for all national commemorative events in the future. It is to become 
China’s “Holy Land” or at least China’s “Cultural Capital”. Th e plans 
include erecting a 168-metre-high statue of Confucius.157 
Th e construction supposedly got underway in 2010. According to 
the plans, ﬁ rst to be built are a new Confucius Museum and a youth 
centre which will form part of a Confucian academy. Part of a World 
Bank loan granted to China for the protection of cultural heritage 
during 2010–12 is targeted for the project, and a World Bank appraisal 
team visited the site in early 2010.158
Naturally, the strongest lobbyists for the project come from the 
region. For any province, a project of this magnitude is most welcome. 
However, the plans have also evoked strong opposition. Th e project 
is seen by many as obscenely expensive and megalomaniac. Many 
critics claim that the cost will exceed the estimated 30 billion yuan 
manifold, while even that amount of money would be enough to build 
60,000 new village schools. It is also feared that the new buildings 
and roads will destroy the old cultural landscape. Th e project is said 
to disregard nationalities other than the Han and schools of thought 
other than Confucianism. In addition, it is accused of overlooking the 
156 Ibid.
157 “Zhuanjia cheng Jining jiang chengwei woguo wenhua fudu,” Diyi Caijing Ribao through 
Sina.com news, 3 March 2008, at http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2008-03-03/045615061062.
shtml. Accessed 15 Jan 2010. Blog post by Tao Dongfeng (陶东风) on 19 March 2008, at http://
blog.sina.com.cn/taodongfeng. Accessed 15 Jan 2010. Th e chosen height represents low-brow 
numerology as ‘168’ is pronounced somewhat similarly to ‘may your way be prosperous’.
158 Information on the Zhonghua Culture Symbolic City website, www.ccsc.gov.cn. Accessed 
25 Feb 2010. List of the projects at http://www.qddpc.gov.cn/uploadﬁ le/200997101619497.
pdf. Accessed 18 Aug 2010.
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achievements of New China. Some have even contemptuously dubbed 
the project an attempt to create a “Chinese Jerusalem”.159 
It is true that the word Huaxia in the name of the framework 
project is problematic. Th e word refers speciﬁ cally to the forefathers 
of the Han Chinese who inhabited the central, ‘cultured’ states 
during the pre-imperial era. Th ere is perhaps reason to believe that 
the “Zhonghua Culture Symbolic City” is being used to promote Han 
nationalism. One of the chief advisors on the project is Professor 
Ge Jianxiong , an avid commentator on contemporary aﬀ airs.160 His 
involvement in the highly political, government-supported project 
is at ﬁ rst sight surprising. Th e general ethos of Ge’s book Tongyi yu 
fenlie (discussed in Chapter I) underrates unity as the main tradition 
in Chinese history and thus goes very much against the oﬃ  cial view. 
In his role as advisor on the “Zhonghua Culture Symbolic City” 
project, Ge has said: 
Chinese culture must be considered to include the cultures of all 
nationalities living in China. Chinese culture is pluralistic and 
not just the culture of the Han nationality (the Huaxia culture). 
Even if we were to regard it only as the culture of the Han nation, 
it is not based solely on Confucianism or the school of Confucius 
and Mencius. … Jining City (composed of Qufu and Zoucheng) 
has certain advantages, being situated in the cradle of traditional 
culture … but it is not the only such place.161 
Ge explained that he is not seeking the creation of a “holy site” 
(for the Huaxia nation or Confucianism), but a “cultural secondary 
capital” which would ease the burden of Beijing by becoming the 
venue for certain national festivities. First and foremost, “the entire 
project must be undertaken in a way which is in accordance with 
159 Blog post by Tao Dongfeng (陶东风) on 19 March 2008, at http://blog.sina.com.cn/
taodongfeng. Accessed 15 Jan 2010. Xin shiji zhoukan through Baidu kongjian, 21 March 
2008, at http://hi.baidu.com/56cun/blog/item/53a179c4769a97ad8326acfa.html. Accessed 
15 Jan 2010.
160 “Ge Jianxiong tan Zhonghua wenhua biaozhi cheng jianshe wenti,” Xinjingbao through 
Sina.com news, 12 March 2008, at http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2008-03-12/021515126572.
shtml. Accessed 15 Jan 2010.
161 Ibid.
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the Constitution and other laws, and which protects the unity of the 
state, the union of the nationalities, territorial integrity and societal 
harmony.”162 
What does Ge Jianxiong mean by all this? One clue can be found 
in an interview he gave to the New York Times in 2004. Referring to 
the omissions and alterations in Chinese history books used in high 
schools he said: “In China, history is still used as a political tool, and 
at the high school level, we still must follow the doctrine.”163 So I 
wonder if Ge is just paying lip service to the oﬃ  cial view on China’s 
unity, while he really believes that history will repeat itself and China 
will once again become divided. Besides, it would be easy to believe 
that Ge would see such a division as beneﬁ ting the Chinese people, 
considering the way he extols the virtues of non-centralized rule 
in his book. I also wonder if Ge isn’t just paying lip service to the 
“union of nationalities”, while he is really advocating the creation of 
the “cultural capital” as a way to bolster the cultural identity of the 
descendants of the Huaxia, the Han Chinese. Such an identity would 
be needed, were China to become divided again. 
Saving the Nation with political religion
Judging by the combination of “building a Socialist Harmonious 
Society” and the promotion of Traditional Learning, it seems that 
the Party-state wishes to reinvent Chinese tradition as ‘harmony’. 
On the basis of the internal situation in China and the legitimization 
needs of the Party, it also seems likely that ‘harmony’ is used as a 
euphemism for ‘stability’ and ‘unity’. In the light of contemporary 
Chinese history, this would represent a link in a long, unbroken 
continuum. 
Th e history of twentieth-century China has been described as a 
duel between National Salvation and Enlightenment (qimeng, 启蒙). 
National Salvation is often accused of having suppressed the 
enlightenment of the societal sphere in China. During the republican 
162 Ibid.
163 “China’s Textbooks Twist and Omit History”, by Howard W. French, New York Times, 6 
December 2004, at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/06/international/asia/06textbook.
html?pagewanted=print&position=. Accessed 15 Feb 2010.  
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revolution in the early 20th century, slogans promoting science led 
to the development of a scientiﬁ c world view, whereas slogans for 
democracy were transformed into ‘democratic centralism’ (i.e. one-
party rule) by the Mao Zedong -led communists, maintains Li Zehou 
(李泽厚), a prominent, critical-Marxist philosopher. He particularly 
blames the militarization within the Communist Party during the war 
in the 1930s and 40s.164 
Saving the Nation is invariably presented as modernization: 
shedding the old shackles that kept economic, scientific and 
military development at bay. Although China is often presented as 
the longest surviving culture in the world, it can also be argued that 
the cultural continuum has been completely and irrevocably severed 
by the revolutions of the 20th century: the republican revolution, 
the communist revolution, and the so-called Cultural Revolution. 
According to the latter view, tradition (especially in the form of 
Confucianism) has no place other than in the museums of intellectual 
history.
Joseph R. Levenson wrote in 1965: “By making their own museum-
like approach to traditional Chinese culture, the Chinese kept their 
continuity without precluding change.”165 Some twelve years later, 
Th omas A. Metzger argued instead that Chinese thinkers today are 
still captives of their cultural traditions, shaped by Confucianism, but 
with an optimistic outlook. Th e predicament of the Confucians in the 
imperial era was related to the diﬃ  culty of transforming one’s inner 
moral nature (becoming a ‘sage’) into external instrumentalities, but 
Marxism at least partially solved the problem, “especially through 
[Mao’s] equation of practical, selﬂ ess work devoted to ‘the people’ 
and the inner dignity of the individual.”166 
In the view of Li Zehou , the traditional calling of the Chinese 
intelligentsia was no diﬀ erent from that of those religious believers 
who wish to “save man from ﬂ oods and ﬂ ames”.167 Th e goal of the 
Confucians has always been equally the salvation of the soul and the 
salvation of society, or to use the traditional Confucian concepts, ‘Inner 
Sageliness’ (neisheng, 内圣) and ‘Outer Kingliness’ (waiwang, 外王). 
164 Li Zehou 1994, 157–158. 
165 Levenson 1965, vol. III, 124.
166 Metzger 1977, 233.
167 Li Zehou 1994, 154. Th e quotation is from Mencius, “Teng Wen Gong II”.
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Th is means that a Confucian is supposed to ﬁ rst become sage-like in 
knowledge, wisdom and morals through self-cultivation, and then 
turn that enlightened state into enlightened action for the betterment 
of society like a sage king of yore. Looking at many of those who today 
identify themselves as followers of Confucianism (see next chapter) 
it becomes evident that their predicament is still the same as during 
the imperial era, but at least the tradition is living outside museums. 
Calling Confucius a “prophet” and using concepts such as “holy 
site” in connection with Confucianism is liable to make Confucianism 
seem like a religion. In China, there was an attempt to make 
Confucianism a religion during the early republican era. Kang Youwei 
published a petition to specify in the constitution that Confucianism 
is the “natural religion” of China. Zhang Binglin was annoyed by 
these attempts and reminded people that Confucius was never the 
object of lavish worship and was honoured only as a progenitor of 
their profession by students and scholars.168
It is indeed possible to classify Confucianism as a religion because 
there are so many diﬀ erent deﬁ nitions of religion. According to 
some scholars, Confucianism is a religion because it “oﬀ ers a total, 
or holistic, perspective on the human condition” and a philosophy 
of life with eternal, even divine, precepts.169 It is similarly debatable 
whether Confucianism is a philosophy; the answer depends on the 
deﬁ nition of philosophy. 
Th e main argument against the classiﬁ cation of Confucianism as a 
religion is the lack of belief in a personal god as well as strict doctrines 
or rituals.170 Th ere is also no Confucian concept of an afterlife. Besides, 
the presentation of Confucianism as a religion or even as an ideology 
is probably a late, and ultimately Western, invention. Professor Lionel 
M. Jensen from the University of Colorado at Denver claims that it 
was the Jesuit missionaries who, in the late 16th century, “recast” 
Confucianism as a religion with Confucius as the Christ-like central 
ﬁ gure. According to Jensen, before the Jesuits there was no such 
168 Shimada 1990, 124, 125–126, 166 (fn. 55). Li Ling 2007, 383. According to the petitioners, 
Mongolia and Tibet could keep their freedom to practise Buddhism. In regard to other parts of 
the country, Kang Youwei was probably advocating the destruction of Buddhist monasteries 
and Taoist temples to some extent. (Shimada 1990, 167, fns. 61 and 63.) Cf. fn. 299.
169 Lodén 2006, 3–4.
170 See e.g. Li Zehou 1994, 153.
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thing as ‘Confucianism’ but instead, only the ethical and spiritual 
traditions of the scholarly class claiming to carry on the teachings 
of Confucius.171 
It needs to be pointed out here that in view of the anachronistic 
character of the term Confucianism, discussed above, it is becoming 
customary to use the Chinese term Ru even in English-language texts 
when referring to Confucians and their school of thought. Originally, 
Ru (儒) referred to experts of rites and propriety, and came to be used 
as the word referring to the followers of the teachings of Confucius 
probably only after the death of the man himself.172 In this paper, 
however, I have chosen to use the conventional ‘Confucianism’, even 
when translating the term Ru from the Chinese.
As will be discussed in Chapter III, there are those in China 
today who are again calling for the establishment of Confucianism 
as a religion and making it the leading moral guideline—a national 
religion—of China. Th ere are also other eﬀ orts in China today, both 
within and without the government, to consciously ﬁ ll the spiritual 
vacuum, caused by the lack of ideological content in China’s current 
form of ‘communism’. From the point of view of political science 
these eﬀ orts are akin to the creation of a ‘civil’ or ‘political religion’. 
Both terms refer to a political ideology which has sociological and 
ideological similarities and may fulﬁ l similar cultural and political 
functions to a religion.
Mika Aaltola describes one type of politico-religious role which is 
central in today’s world politics as follows: 
Th ey oﬀ er a hope of restoration and of a return to fundamental 
values. Th ey do this by applying culturally embedded visions of 
right and wrong. Th ese visions are often overtly religious in tone. 
… Th e captivating and enigmatic mythological gallery of historical 
171 Allen 1999. According to Jensen, the Jesuits invented the Latinized name “Confucius”, 
which is based on a very rare, honoriﬁ c appellation Kongfuzi (孔夫子), ‘Grand Master Kong’. 
Th e usual Chinese appellation is Kongzi, ‘Master Kong’. Perhaps the Jesuits felt that the usual 
appellation would not set Confucius apart from all the other ‘Masters’, such as Laocius (Laozi) 
or Mencius (Mengzi). 
172 Ru (儒) is a cognate of words referring to ‘weak, pliant’ which were pronounced similarly 
and are written with characters having the same phonetic element (e.g. 臑, 懦). As such, Ru 
may have been a derogatory term used by the non-Ru. See Waley 1989, 118, fn. 3.
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ﬁ gures provides a rich source of authority and charisma for the 
custodians of principle.173 
Today, there are many political actors in China behaving as such 
“custodians of principle”. Many of them, both on the side of the 
establishment and of the dissidents, use Traditional Learning, or more 
speciﬁ cally, Confucianism, as their source of authority. Whether we 
label them promoters of civil or political religion depends on our 
angle of vision. 
As Aaltola points out, civil religion is associated with pluralism, 
voluntarism and individualism, whereas political religion is often 
equated with coercive totalitarian systems. Political religion is often 
connected with Islam in particular.174 “Th e distinction between civil 
religion and the more conservative formulation of political religion 
partially overlaps the distinction between society-centric and state-
centric approaches to the problem of international order”, writes 
Aaltola.175 
Intriguingly, in China today we see processes furthering both civil 
and political religion at the same time, and those promoting a political 
religion-like ideology do not always represent the establishment. 
To an extent, the diﬀ erence between Enlightenment and National 
Salvation is similar to the duality of civil and political religion; the 
former is more inward-oriented and the latter is more outward-
oriented. Idealistically, Confucianism would belong ﬁ rmly on the side 
of Enlightenment (or civil religion), but as noted above, in reality, 
Confucianism has often been used just as a sanctimonious façade. 
173 Aaltola 2008, 17. 
174 Aaltola 2008, 28–29.
175 Ibid.
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Chapter III 
Confucianism old and new
Introduction to Chapter III
Th is chapter takes a closer look at Confucianism and how it has been 
reinterpreted and even reinvented by diﬀ erent actors. Earlier in 
this paper, Confucianism was discussed in relation to Traditional 
Learning. As has been pointed out, Confucianism does not equate 
with Traditional Learning, but the former unquestionably holds a 
central position as the core of the latter. In order to be able to discuss 
the role of Confucianism in Chinese society in a more nuanced 
manner, it is necessary to become acquainted with the basic concepts 
of Confucianism, and in particular, with how Confucianism is 
interpreted in China today. 
Although the Party-state may wish to reinvent Chinese tradition 
as ‘harmony’ and present harmony as the essence of Confucianism, 
there are many dissenting views. Th is chapter focuses on the debate 
over the historical roots of contemporary Confucianism in China. 
It highlights the problems in constructing such interpretations of 
Confucianism or Traditional Learning which could not be contested. 
It demonstrates how diﬀ erent actors are able to ﬁ nd justiﬁ cation for 
widely diﬀ ering views even when they are supposedly based on the 
very same roots. 
According to the interpretation by the politically correct, 
Confucianism is collectivist and, as such, promotes a strong central 
authority to maintain social stability for the beneﬁ t of all the members 
of the collective. Th e ancient spirit of self-sacriﬁ ce forms the basis 
of modern patriotism. Confucius’s call for economic equality is well 
suited to the building of Modest Welfare. While early Confucian 
thinkers stated that people form the basis of the state, they said 
nothing about people being the masters of the state, which is in 
accordance with the communist ‘democratic centralism’. 
Looking at the historical development of Confucianism provides 
a more polychromatic image. Confucianism has never been a 
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monolithic school of thought. One may roughly identify several stages 
of development during the imperial era, but the development was by 
no means rectilinear. Even very early on, the authenticity of certain 
Confucian scriptures was contested. In the 19th-century contestation 
between different groups of reformists and conservatives, the 
exegetics helped to form the front lines. 
As noted in Chapter II, Confucianism as a living tradition came 
close to extinction following the nationalist revolution and then 
the victory of the communists in the civil war. Consequently, there 
were attempts to revive Confucianism throughout the 20th century. 
After the establishment of the People’s Republic, the revivalist 
movement had better chances of success outside China. Th ere it 
developed into so-called New Confucianism. When the Party-state’s 
attitude towards Confucianism began to change in the 1980s, the 
New Confucian movement gained ground back in China as well. 
Th e most important task for the New Confucians has been to build a 
genealogical tree of ideas, which connects them back to the ‘original’ 
Confucians. Th e diﬃ  culty lies in deﬁ ning what was ‘original’. Th is has 
made the exegetics important once again.
As a result, it is possible to identify different generations of 
New Confucians, and furthermore, at least four diﬀ erent groupings 
within them that are active in China. Th e main branch, which may be 
regarded as the orthodox New Confucianism, is related to ‘subjective’ 
Confucianism from the 1500s, which emphasized the importance of 
innate moral awakening. Today, the proponents of the main branch 
call for replacing Marxism with Confucianism as an ideology. Th at 
is the goal of another branch as well, but its proponents are more 
militant and aim at establishing Confucianism as the national religion. 
While neither of these branches is likely to gain a larger foothold in 
China, the so-called Socialist Confucians who mix Marxism with 
Confucianism enjoy the support of the establishment. Th e middle 
ground is held by those few who believe that Traditional Learning 
may provide the basis for gradual political reform in the future. 
One of most exciting elements in the debate related to history 
and tradition in China is the heated discussion taking place, not 
only among the academia but also the general public, about the 
nature of certain recently unearthed Confucian texts. During the 
early 2000s, the texts were published as ‘layperson editions’ and 
are consequently available to anyone interested in such matters. Th e 
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focus of the discussion is on whether the texts can shed light on the 
‘original’ character of Confucianism, and if so, what that character 
might have been like. 
Th is chapter introduces two diﬀ erent answers to the latter question 
by two scholars. Both see Confucius as an enlightened revolutionary, 
diﬀ ering only in their views on whether the revolutionary ideals were 
democratic or proto-communist in nature. Interestingly enough, 
both of these views originate from the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences, arguably the most inﬂ uential academic institution in the 
ﬁ eld of social sciences and philosophy in China. 
What is Confucianism?
Th e description of Confucianism by Luo Guojie serves well as a concise 
introduction to the basic concepts and the character of Confucianism 
for the purposes of this paper. It is furthermore interesting how Luo 
Guojie justiﬁ ed the return to Confucian values in a book published 
by the Central Party School in 1998.176 
Luo sees the special value of Confucianism over other philosophical 
schools in China in its emphasis on morality as the basis for the 
stability of the country, harmony among the population, quality 
(suzhi, 素质) of the citizens and the betterment of  human society 
as a whole. Although Mohism, which stresses the wellbeing of the 
people and the equality of all, used to be the favourite traditional 
philosophy of the Chinese communists, Luo disregards its ideals as 
too unrealistic. It is as if he is saying that the time for communism 
has not yet come. 
Whereas Mohism has a certain revolutionary character, 
Confucianism has, in Luo’s opinion, always been favoured by the 
rulers in times of relative stability and peaceful development. Th at 
is because Confucianism ties politics with ethics: Th e most desirable 
176 Zhang Kemin (ed.) 1999. Th e title of the book translated into English is “Historical Questions 
from China and Abroad Discussed by Eight Scholars”. Th e following paragraphs are based on 
Luo Guojie 1999, 405–441, except where otherwise indicated.
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quality of the ruler (or any man) is ren (仁), or ‘humaneness’,177 which 
is also the main concept of Confucianism. To act according to ren is 
dependant on one’s ability to discard such erroneous ways which do 
not agree with li (礼), or ‘propriety’. Li is the other main concept of 
Confucianism and originally referred to ‘rites’ or ‘rituals’. Th us all 
action should have an ethical basis.178 It illustrates the importance 
of li that Li Zehou , among others, has said that ‘the religion of rites’ 
(lijiao, 礼教) is the Chinese religion.179
Luo breaks the core of Confucianism down into ﬁ ve components. 
First is ren which, from the point of view of rulers, means that they 
must love and protect their people, see to the needs of the people, 
and put the people before themselves in every respect. If that is not 
done, the people will rise against the rulers. Furthermore, the Neo-
Confucians of the Song and Ming dynasties extended this love to 
encompass the whole world; humans and animals alike are all of the 
same origin. Luo quotes Zhang Zai (张载, 1020–1077): “Heaven is 
called Father, Earth is called Mother. … People are my ﬂ esh, animals 
are my kind.” 
Second, Luo sees Confucianism as inherently collectivist. 
According to Confucius, the only condition for attaining ren is to 
“constrain oneself and keep to li”.180 One must not see, hear, say or do 
anything that is not in accordance with li. Luo deﬁ nes li, or propriety, 
as the requirements of the political system, the restraints of the law, 
and ethical rules. Th erefore, says Luo, li is equal to the interests of 
the state, society, and the collective. Luo quotes Zuo zhuan: “Li is 
what draws the borders, sets the governments and deﬁ nes the classes 
for the beneﬁ t of our heirs”. And: “If li is not followed, the division 
between the upper and lower classes will become muddled, and how 
could the dynasty survive over generations then?” 
177 Th e translations of the Confucian philosophical concepts are continuously contested. Here 
it suﬃ  ces to say that ren, often translated as ‘humaneness’, is the guiding principle of good 
human relations. By extension, ren also carried the meaning of ‘fraternity’ and other virtues 
beﬁ tting an upper-class knight, such as manliness and chivalry.
178 On the relationship between ren and li, see Shun 2002.
179 Li Zehou 2008, 343. Li Zehou maintains that Confucianism is not a philosophy in the Western 
sense and although it contains elements of a religion, it is not a true religion either. Instead, 
Confucianism is half-religion, half-philosophy, according to Li (Li Zehou 1994, 153).
180 On the translation of the quotation, see Shun 2002, 61 and 71, fn. 19. See also fn. 109 above.
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Li is also linked to yi (义), or ‘justice’, and ‘just’ is deﬁ ned through 
the good of society. What diﬀ erentiates the ‘gentlemen’, or those 
who adhere to ren and li, from the ‘petty men’, is that the former 
aim at beneﬁ ting the public, whereas the latter are driven only by 
self-interest. 
Luo sees a link between Confucian collectivism and the age-old 
ideal of unity. According to Luo, Confucius was strongly against any 
insurgent activities by the vassal states, which together formed the 
united empire under the rule of one hegemon. Th e biggest danger, in 
Confucius’s thinking, was chaos and instability, which could threaten 
the unity of the empire. Confucius said: “When the Way prevails 
under Heaven, ritual music and campaigns of war all originate from 
the Son of Heaven; when the Way does not prevail under Heaven, 
ritual music and campaigns of war originate from the vassal lords”—
which must not be. Th e mandate of the ruler is dependent on his 
ability to have his orders obeyed through the empire. In Luo’s 
interpretation, Confucius stressed that the authority of the central 
government is fundamental in safeguarding social stability and order. 
According to Luo, this fundament is even more valid today than it 
was in Confucius’s days. Whereas the centralized state power in the 
imperial era stood for the oppressor class, today the state represents 
the people. Th erefore, being on the side of centralized rule means 
promoting the wellbeing of the people as well as stability and unity.
Th ird, Luo stresses the connection between Confucian family 
values and the qualiﬁ cations for civil servants. Th ese family values 
predate Confucius and are usually presented as Five Constants (wu 
chang, 五常):181 father is to be just, mother is to be caring, elder 
brother is to be supportive, younger brother is to be respectful, son 
is to be ﬁ lial. To act according to these ﬁ ve teachings is to adhere to li. 
Yanzi, one of Confucius’s contemporaries, said, recorded in Chunqiu: 
“Th e ruler commands and the ministers revere, the father is caring 
and the sons are ﬁ lial, the elder brother is loving and the younger 
brother is respectful, the husband is gentle and the wife is agreeable, 
the mother-in-law is caring and the daughter-in-law is amenable; 
181 Luo uses the term Five Teachings (wu jiao, 五教). Th e term Five Constants may also refer 
to the ﬁ ve cardinal virtues of Confucianism (which have been deﬁ ned diﬀ erently in diﬀ erent 
times). 
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thus is li.” Confucius said plainly: “Th e ruler shall rule, the minister 
shall administer, the father shall be fatherly, the ﬁ lius shall be ﬁ lial.” 
Luo asks, how can one be expected to love one’s country and one’s 
nation if one doesn’t love one’s parents. Th erefore, concludes Luo, 
the old Confucian maxim of “seeking for loyal ministers at the homes 
of ﬁ lial sons” is still valid today. 
Fourth, Luo commends Confucian idealism; how the early 
Confucians toiled for their own spiritual betterment even in dismal 
economic conditions. Such a spirit of self-sacriﬁ ce may, according to 
Luo, serve as the basis for patriotism and love for one’s nation. Th ough 
Luo doesn’t explicitly say so, the ethos of striving for spiritual instead 
of material wealth is well-suited to the realities of a developing 
country. Luo quotes Mencius: “Th ere are those ennobled by Heaven 
and those ennobled by men. Th ose who are chivalrous (ren), just, 
loyal, trustworthy and who untiringly rejoice in the good, they are 
the ones ennobled by Heaven. Th e dukes, lords and councillors, they 
are the ones ennobled by men.” Luo gives Confucianism credit for 
advocating ennoblement by Heaven, interpreting it in the modern 
world as recognition through one’s morally exemplary conduct 
among the masses. 
Fifth, Confucianism puts great emphasis on one’s self-cultivation. 
In Song-era Neo-Confucianism, the correct method (gongfu, 功夫) 
of self-cultivation became a value in itself due to the inﬂ uence of 
Buddhist meditation practices. However, as Luo points out, in early 
Confucianism what mattered was the result of self-cultivation: it 
was the basis for keeping one’s family in order, ruling the country 
and pacifying All-Under-Heaven. In order to keep his people content 
and peaceful, the ruler must ﬁ rst cultivate himself. Similarly, for 
the wellbeing and stability of the nation, the moral education of the 
entire population is crucial. 
All in all, Luo describes Confucianism as a tool for ruling the 
country, pacifying the population, stabilizing society, harmonizing 
the relations between people and raising the moral standards of the 
citizens. On the one hand, a Confucian government will proﬁ t, enrich 
and protect people, and on the other, educate, mould and guide 
people. While the government should help the population to prosper, 
it must also prevent mutually disruptive competition. Luo reminds 
people that Confucius urged his followers not to worry about poverty 
but about inequality, equality being crucial for social stability. For the 
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Confucians, it is only the ‘petty men’ who strive for personal gain. 
According to Luo, the political content of Confucianism is embodied 
in the principle of disregarding small gains in order not to lose sight 
of great accomplishments. 
Luo sees the relevance of Confucianism for government in other 
spheres as well. According to Confucius, it is more eﬀ ective to use 
education than punishment to get the people to follow the conventions 
of society: punishment does not develop a sense of shame in people, 
whereas governance based on virtue (de, 德) does. Confucian rulers 
must follow the ‘Kingly Way’ based on virtue instead of the way of the 
hegemon based on might. Luo quotes Jia Yi (贾谊, 200–168 BCE), noting 
that even Chairman Mao praised this text highly: 
When the ruler cultivates punishment, people turn their backs 
on him with resentment, but when the ruler cultivates propriety, 
people cling to him. … To guide the people with virtuous teachings 
will make virtue and respect widespread and the spirits of the 
people will be joyful; whereas to drive the people with laws and 
orders will only increase the number of laws and orders while the 
minds of the people will be gloomy. Th e common feelings of joy and 
gloom are the reasons for the calamity or prosperity of the state. 
Similarly, continues Luo, the reason for the demise of the Qin dynasty, 
the ﬁ rst dynasty ever to unify all China, was the tyrannical nature of 
its rule. However, Luo notes that even according to Confucius, the 
rulers must use both soft and hard measures, in a balanced manner. 
For Confucians, the rulers are praiseworthy due to their exemplary 
behaviour. Th e virtue of the ruler is like the wind, which makes the 
grass lean in a certain direction. Luo quotes Zhuge Liang (诸葛亮, 
181–234): 
Th e Lord of the People shall ﬁ rst straighten his character and only 
then issue orders. If the character of the ruler is not straight, the 
orders will not be followed. If the Lord’s orders are not followed, 
chaos will emerge. 
Luo notes that for the Confucians, the principle of ruling the country 
is the idea of people forming the basis of the state. Th e Book of History 
states: “Th e people (min, 民) are the sole root (ben, 本) of the state” 
136 | Jyrki Kallio: Towards China’s Strategic Narrative
82     FIIA REPORT 27
and “Heaven must act according to the wishes of the people”, 
suggesting that the Mandate of Heaven which the Emperor should 
have is dependent on the ability of the ruler to safeguard the wellbeing 
of his subjects. Mencius said, “the people are most valuable, the state 
comes second, and the ruler is the least important”. Xunzi, another 
developer of early Confucianism, compared the ruler to a boat and the 
people to water: water supports the boat but may also capsize it. It is 
worthwhile mentioning here that in Chinese, the principle of people 
as the basis (minben, 民本) is semantically diﬀ erent from democracy 
which, in Chinese, refers to “people as the masters” (minzhu, 民主). 
Th erefore, the Communist Party may safely promote minben as it has 
no direct linkage with democracy. 
Lastly, Luo praises the Confucian emphasis on personal virtue 
as the sole criterion for selecting people for oﬃ  ce. One’s birth is of 
no signiﬁ cance. Th is ideal prevailed throughout the entire imperial 
era, when the principal way into oﬃ  ce was the examination system, 
a ladder of successive examinations whereby the identity of the 
candidates was hidden from the evaluators of the examination 
essays. However, it must be pointed out that the system had its 
loopholes,182 exceptions were regularly made, and since success in 
the examinations required years of concentrated study, the ladder 
was within reach of the oﬀ spring of rich families only. 
Naturally, Luo points to the negative elements of Confucianism as 
well. Th e fact that Confucianism does not question the class-society 
is something to be condemned. Th e Neo-Confucianism that became 
prevalent during the Song era over-emphasized ﬁ liality (xiao, 孝), 
and the Th ree Cardinal Leads (san gang, 三纲)—ruler leads subject, 
father leads son, husbands leads wife—were used just to protect the 
feudal rule. In the words of Luo, Neo-Confucianism went astray in its 
demand for “fallacious loyalty and fallacious ﬁ liality”. However, Luo 
warns against too one-sided criticism. It is only natural that children 
should respect their parents. Confucianism also puts the good of the 
state before that of the ruling class. 
182 See e.g. the vivid account in Spence 2007, 54–57.
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Confucianism in the late imperial era 
Confucianism today is not a monolithic school of thought, nor has 
it ever been. Like any tradition with a long history, it has gone 
through various transformations and restorations. In order to 
properly understand the discussion related to Traditional Learning 
and Confucianism today, it is necessary to take a look at Confucianism 
as a phenomenon in intellectual history. 
Historically, Confucianism during the imperial era may be divided 
into three stages of development. (1) After the time of Confucius and 
his personal disciples, his thinking was further developed by Mencius 
(Mengzi, 孟子, ca. 371–ca. 289 BCE) and a contemporary of the latter, 
Xunzi (荀子). During the rise of the Qin Kingdom, which favoured 
Legalism over other schools of thought, and the consequent Qin 
dynasty (221–207 BCE) under which China became a uniﬁ ed empire 
for the ﬁ rst time in history, Confucianism was almost eradicated. 
(2) The Han dynasty (206 BCE–220) marked a revival of 
Confucianism, which then replaced Legalism, associated with the 
oppressiveness of the Qin rule, as the oﬃ  cial ideology in the empire. 
During the centuries of disintegration and war which followed the 
fall of the Han dynasty, Buddhism and Taoism gained ground at the 
expense of Confucianism. 
(3) Confucianism underwent a revival first during the Tang 
dynasty (618–907), thanks to the rectification efforts of Han Yu 
(韩愈, 768–824), and then an actual rebirth in the Song dynasty (960–
1127), resulting in the rise of Neo-Confucianism (Xin Ruxue, 新儒学). 
One of the branches of Neo-Confucianism, based on the teachings of 
Cheng Yi (程颐, 1033–1107) and Zhu Xi , became the orthodox form of 
Confucianism for the remaining imperial era. 
During the Qing dynasty (1644–1911), further branches of Neo-
Confucianism emerged. The so-called School of Song Learning 
continued the Neo-Confucian orthodoxy, while the so-called 
Empirical Research School (also known as the School of Evidential 
Learning) called for discovering ‘the truth through the facts’, 
especially in the works preceding Neo-Confucianism. Th e historical 
roots of both Contemporary New Confucianism and Traditional 
Learning can be found in the same source, namely the Empirical 
Research School of the Qing dynasty. 
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Song-dynasty Neo-Confucianism, which had originally risen as 
a counter-reaction to the rise of Buddhism and had aimed to re-
establish the central role of Confucianism in China, was split into two 
opposing poles as early as the Song dynasty. Th e oﬃ  cial orthodoxy 
during the Qing era, the School of Song Learning, was based on the 
teachings of Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi . Its central concept was li (理) or 
the ‘rational principle’. Li exists ‘above form’ (xing’ershang, 形而上); 
expressed in modern terms, it is a metaphysical concept. Th rough 
personal cultivation a person could make his nature accord with the 
Heavenly li.183 
The opponents of the Cheng-Zhu orthodoxy followed the 
teachings of Lu Jiuyuan (陆九渊, 1139–1192) and Wang Yangming 
(王阳明, 1472–1528).184 They urged scholars to shun the ‘idle 
theorizing’ of the rationalists and stated that “[the] mind, when 
properly trained and cultivated” would serve as an adequate “guide 
for statecraft policy”.185 Their central concept was xin (心), or 
mind (often translated as ‘heart-mind’), which referred to Wang 
Yangming’s idea that everyone possessed ‘innate knowledge’ (liang 
zhi, 良知), a moral consciousness that came intuitively to a person 
through self-cultivation.186 This idea was not devoid of Chan-
Buddhist inﬂ uences. Th e academics in the communist era classiﬁ ed 
the Cheng-Zhu school as objective idealism and the Lu-Wang school 
as subjective idealism, ‘idealism’ being used as a derogatory label. 
Although some scholars during the early Qing dynasty regarded 
Cheng-Zhu learning “as the basis for keeping Ming loyalism alive”, 
through the influence of the Tongcheng School, personified in 
Yao Nai (姚鼐, 1731–1815), Cheng-Zhu learning gradually became 
the orthodoxy favoured by the Manchu rulers. The civil service 
examinations were based on Cheng-Zhu learning, the Kangxi 
Emperor (ruled 1661–1722) ordered the installation of Zhu Xi in 
183 Lodén 2006, 112, 115.
184 Mou Zongsan calls the conventional dichotomy Zhu Xi –Wang Yangming oversimpliﬁ ed 
and notes that there were altogether nine leading personalities during the Song and Ming 
dynasties, and three (not two) major schools developed as a consequence. Professor Chen Lai 
from Peking University identiﬁ es four schools (Bresciani 2001, 366, 436).
185 Elman 1991, 76, 81, 84–85.
186 Th e guiding principle of Wang Yangming ’s thought was uniting knowledge with action: 
“Knowledge is the beginning of action, action is the result of knowledge” (Chuanxilu I.28). 
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the Confucian temple, and an imperial edition of the Four Books 
(considered the core of Confucius’s teachings) was completed during 
the reign of the Yongzheng Emperor (ruled 1722–1735).187 
Th e proponents of ‘empirical research’ (kaozheng, 考证) favoured 
textual study and were against the metaphysical character of Song 
Learning. Th ey became collectively known as the Empirical Research 
School or the School of Han Learning, as opposed to the School of Song 
Learning. Th ey wished to purify the classics of heterodox elements, 
such as Buddhism, and restore their textual integrity. Such a jumble 
of interpretations had accumulated since the Song era that it was 
impossible to see the real core of Confucius’s teachings. Propriety, 
li (礼), had to be returned to the central position in Confucianism 
again.188 To some degree, the empirical research scholars resembled 
those Christians who, during the Reformation, started questioning 
the sacrosanctity of the Latin version of the Bible on the basis of Greek 
and Hebrew linguistics. 
For instance, Gu Yanwu (顾炎武 , 1613–82) attacked Neo-
Confucianist (especially Wang Yangming ’s) ‘speculation’ and 
wished to promote such solid scholarship as had been practised by 
the ancient text school of the Han dynasty.189 Gu opined that the 
scholars needed to return to the roots and sweep aside the jungle 
of later interpretations. At ﬁ rst, no impiety towards Cheng-Zhu 
learning was intended on the part of the empirical research scholars, 
but by the 1750s, their school had become a serious challenger to the 
orthodoxy.190 
Th e Empirical Research School evolved into diﬀ erent branches. 
Th e split had its roots in the division between the scholars involved 
in the ‘exegetical studies’ (jingxue, 经学) during the Han dynasty—
the Ancient Text School and the New Text School—but the divisive 
lines were somewhat diﬀ erent. Th e infamous ﬁ rst emperor of Qin had 
ordered all Confucian texts to be burned, and thus Confucianism was 
ﬁ rst revived on the basis of oral tradition, and was written down only 
after the fall of the Qin dynasty, during the Western Han Dynasty. 
187  Chow 1994b, 185, 190, 193.
188 Chow 1994a, 181.
189 According to Torbjörn Lodén (2006, 138), we must thank the School of Han Learning for 
establishing the scientiﬁ c foundation for classical sinology, aptly called hanxue in Chinese.
190 Chow 1994b, 190–191.
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Th ese came to be called ‘new texts’ (jinwen, 今文) when a selection 
of pre-Qin texts, ‘ancient texts’ (guwen, 古文), were found during 
the Eastern Han dynasty.191 Th ere was much debate on the value of 
the new discoveries, but ﬁ nally, during the Tang dynasty, an oﬃ  cial 
edition of the Classics was produced which consisted mainly of the 
ancient texts.192 Although the Ancient Text School thus gained the 
upper hand, later studies have shown that many of the ancient texts 
were, in actual fact, forgeries. 
During the late Qing dynasty, the old exegetical debate between 
the Ancient Text School and the New Text School surfaced again. As 
Torbjörn Lodén has noted, it was probably natural that the focus of 
the empirical research scholars would shift from an exclusive study 
of pre-Qin era ‘ancient texts’ to include the Han-era ‘new texts’ as 
well.193 A branch split oﬀ  the Empirical Research School and became 
known as the New Text School. 
191  Th e schools were not just interested in the authenticity of the texts, but also got involved 
in the politics of their time. Th e guwen school sided with the ‘usurper’ Wang Mang, who 
established the short-lived New Dynasty (9–25) (Gernet 1985, 164). In turn, Dong Zhongshu 
(董仲舒, 179–104 BCE) of the New Text School rallied support for the uniﬁ ed, central rule of the 
Han dynasty. With that aim, he promoted the idea of the Heavenly Mandate being dependent 
on the wellbeing of the people: Th e ruler receives his mandate to rule from Heaven. If the ruler 
harms his people, Heaven will take the mandate away. Th us unity is preserved only through 
stability. Dong Zhongshu also formulated the Th ree Cardinal Leads. Dong Zhongshu’s ideas 
are perhaps the most lasting philosophical heritage of the two schools. During the continued 
rivalry of the school after the fall of the Han dynasty, the jinwen school reﬂ ected a ‘cabbalistic’ 
tradition which tended to look at the texts as a collection of prophesies, whereas the guwen 
school was characterized by a rationalist, but also moralizing and ritualistic approach. Dong 
Zhongshu also presented Confucius as a mythical, supernatural being (Shimada 1990, 127).
192 Song Zhiming 2009, 266.
193 Lodén 2006, 152–153. Th e usage of the term guwen meaning ‘ancient texts’ must not be 
confused with the other usage meaning ‘ancient style’. Under the inﬂ uence of the Tongcheng 
School, so-called ‘eight-legged essays’ were the required form of essays in the civil service 
examinations, while the ‘ancient prose’ of the Tang and Song masters was seen as the stylistic 
basis for the eight-legged essays. In contrast, some proponents of the School of Han Learning 
maintained that so-called ‘parallel prose’ was closer to the style used in the days of Confucius. 
When the Movement for Ancient Prose rose during the Tang dynasty, it was directed against 
parallel prose, which was considered artiﬁ cial and unnatural. So paradoxically, the School of 
Han Learning was in favour of guwen, meaning ‘ancient texts’, but not necessarily of guwen 
meaning ‘ancient style’. 
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Scholastically, the New Text School doubted not only the Song-
era interpretations of the ancient texts but the actual authenticity 
of the texts themselves; they criticized the “‘false Classics’ in 
order to peel down to the ‘true Classics’ of timeless transcendent 
importance”.194 Th ey wished to analyze the Confucian texts against 
the historical background, the Former Han era, during which the 
Confucian state orthodoxy was ﬁ rst formed. Th ey showed that Zuo 
zhuan, a collection of historical accounts and one of the ancient 
texts, was not a commentary on the Chunqiu annals (the “Spring and 
Autumn Annals”, a record of historical events included among the 
Six Classics, namely the holiest books in the Confucian canon, and 
traditionally accredited to Confucius), but was fabricated to seem so 
during the Western Han era.195 Instead, they turned their attention 
to Gongyang zhuan, which really was a commentary on the Chunqiu 
annals, and thus the New Text School also became known as the 
Gongyang School. 
Some proponents of the new texts used their studies to advocate 
some reformist, anti-authoritarian ideas. Th e Gongyang zhuan puts 
emphasis on the Heavenly Mandate of the ruler and states that 
without the mandate, a ruler is a usurper. It is in the New Text 
School edition from Later Han where history is described as the 
three-stage process from the Age of Chaos to that of Modest Welfare 
(Xiaokang) and ﬁ nally to the age of Great Community (Datong). As 
noted in Chapter II, Kang Youwei presented Confucius as a prophet 
of the Great Community, a utopia without national frontiers and 
social classes and where universal peace prevails. He stated that the 
West, with its modern values, was already on its way towards the 
utopia. Kang Youwei subscribed to Western values but found them 
within Confucianism, in contrast with many other reformists who 
saw Western values only as a tool (yong, 用) for strengthening the 
Chinese essence (ti, 体).196 
Interestingly, in view of its anti-authoritarianism and 
eschatological tendencies, the Gongyang School bore some 
194 Levenson 1965, vol. I, 94.
195 Lodén 2006, 153, 155. Levenson 1965, vol. I, 81–82.
196 Lodén 2006, 154. Song Zhiming 2009, 256. Levenson 1965, vol. I, 77, 81. Gernet 1985, 594. 
Th e ti-yong dichotomy was central to the philosophical debate of 19th- and early 20th-century 
China, in particular among the statecraft-oriented empirical research scholars (see below).
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resemblance to the Lu-Wang School. Even the attitude towards 
‘understanding’ Confucianism was similar. Kang Youwei opined that 
the followers of the Empirical Research School “read the classics, but 
not the spirit contained therein”,197 thus echoing Wang Yangming ’s 
famous words: “Th e learned men of our time do not understand that 
they should look for the essence of the Six Classics in their hearts but 
instead search in vain for shadows and echoes and get stuck in the 
jumble of semantics in their empty-headed belief that they may so 
ﬁ nd the true meaning of the scriptures”.198 On the other hand, while 
the Lu-Wang school can be described as ‘spiritual localism’,199 the 
Gongyang School followed a more conventional, Confucian approach 
and “virtually took unity to be the sole manifestation of the Tao/
Way”.200  
‘Ancient texts’ became in turn a rallying cry for those among 
the main branch empirical research scholars, hereafter collectively 
referred to as the School of Han Learning, who wanted to preserve the 
Chinese tradition intact and guard it against foreign, ﬁ rst Manchu and 
then Western, inﬂ uences. Gu Yanwu was a staunch Ming loyalist who 
advocated the ancient ideal of regional rule or ‘divided enoﬀ ment’ 
(fengjian, 封建) instead of central government.201 He saw the 
“introverted tendency of Neo-Confucianism”, especially Lu-Wang 
learning, as the cause of the scholars’ “unwillingness to oppose the 
new rulers openly”. Another opponent of the Cheng-Zhu orthodoxy 
was Wang Fuzhi (王夫之, 1619–93), who attacked the Manchu rule on 
the basis of their ethnicity, “thereby deviating from the culturalism 
that we may identify as part of mainstream Confucianism” as Lodén 
writes.202 
197 Shimada 1990, 59.
198 From “Inscription at Pavilion for Revering the Scriptures”. Translated into Finnish in Kallio 
2008, 165–170.
199 Kallio 2009, “Conclusions”.
200 Li 1999, 178.
201 See de Bary & Lufrano 2000, 39, for a translation (by William Rowe) of a related essay by 
Gu Yanwu . Zeng Jing (曾静, 1679–1736) explained fengjian being similar to the ‘subsidiarity 
principle’ of the European Union: “Th ough the Son of Heaven presided …, the job of nurturing 
the people and the responsibility for governing them devolved on the enoﬀ ed rulers of each 
smaller region.” (Spence 2001, 166.) 
202 Lodén 2006, 133, 136–137.
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Th e School of Han Learning evolved still further. By looking at 
the historical context in which the earliest Confucian writings were 
born, the scholars came to put emphasis on the other philosophical 
schools of the pre-Qin era as well. Most signiﬁ cantly, some scholars 
raised Mohism above Confucianism as the most worthwhile ancient 
tradition. Mozi, the founder of Mohism, had preached ‘reciprocal love’ 
(jian’ai, 兼爱; often translated somewhat misleadingly as ‘universal 
love’203), which was seen as a more positive concept than the Confucian 
‘fraternal love’ (bo’ai, 博爱). Th e latter, in its emphasis on family 
and friends (that is, the likes of oneself), was deemed narrow and 
conservative. Xunzi also enjoyed a renaissance, with some scholars 
placing him on an equal footing with Confucius (see below). Th ese 
scholars became known as the School of the Multiple Masters (zhuzi, 
诸子).204 In regard to the development of Confucianism, this school was 
the beginning of what I venture to call ‘modern’ exegetical studies. 
In the latter half of the 19th century, intellectual orthodoxy in 
the form of the Cheng-Zhu School of Neo-Confucianism regained 
ground. The Empirical Research School and exegetical studies, 
especially the New Text School, were accused of making the spiritual 
basis of society vulnerable in the face of foreign invasions and rural 
unrest. Th e central ﬁ gure in this was Zeng Guofan (曾国藩, 1811–
1872), an eminent civil and military oﬃ  cial who became famous for 
suppressing the Taiping Rebellion in 1864. Zeng was a follower of Yao 
Nai and wanted to revitalize the Tongcheng School.205 Th is current 
of orthodox Confucianism sowed the seeds of its own destruction. 
Ironically, the writings of Zeng Guofan had an impact on the rise 
of the anti-Confucian New Culture Movement in the ﬁ rst decades 
of the 20th century. Zeng stated that ancient learning must be of 
practical use to the present society (jing shi zhi yong, 经世致用). Th is 
slogan was often repeated by Chiang Kai-shek, but Mao Zedong, who 
was heavily inﬂ uenced by the New Culture Movement in his youth, 
also quoted Zeng Guofan frequently in his writings.206 
Zeng’s slogan had initially been invented by Gu Yanwu . While 
promoting exegetical studies, Gu had emphasized that the aims of 
203 I have brieﬂ y discussed the translation of these terms in Kallio 2007, 121 fn. 7.
204 Makeham 2009.
205 Gernet 1985, 592.
206 Meisner 2007, 5. 
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such studies should not be academic, but practical.207 Th is approach, 
revitalized by Zeng Guofan and others, gave impetus to the New 
Text School and further to ‘modern’ exegetical studies. Its followers 
accused Neo-Confucianism of being impractical and subjective. 
Instead, they championed a pragmatic approach to resolving China’s 
dilemmas.208 
Zhang Binglin took empirical research and ‘modern’ exegetical 
studies to a new level. He saw Confucius as a founder of only one of 
China’s traditional schools of thought. Zhang was most critical of 
the Neo-Confucian orthodoxy, which he considered ‘religion’, and 
promoted Traditional Learning instead, meaning traditional Chinese 
philosophies by and large as opposed to the ‘Western’ value system. 
Zhang continued the nationalist ethos of the School of Han Learning 
and wrote critically about the kedi (客帝) or ‘foreign emperors’ in 
Chinese history, referring also to the Qing dynasty.209 
One might cursorily say that the example of Zeng Guofan , among 
others, triggered a further modernization of the exegetical studies 
by shifting their focus to statecraft, and Zhang Binglin helped to 
transform them, especially the tradition of the School of Han 
Learning, into Traditional Learning. Together with the nationalist 
revolution, this signified the end of Confucianism as a national 
ideology. 
Th e emergence of New Confucianism
Following the nationalist revolution and the communist victory, 
Confucianism as a living tradition was practically eradicated in 
Mainland China. It was not faring much better elsewhere either. 
Th ough Confucianism has been accepted and even promoted in the 
Republic of China on Taiwan, one could argue that it has survived 
there only as ceremonial and instrumental vulgar Confucianism 
(see Lin Anwu ’s critique of the Nationalists’ Confucianism below). 
Consequently, there was a need to reinvent it.
207 See e.g. de Bary & Lufrano 2000, 35–36.
208 See e.g. Gernet 1985, 592–595; and Mote 2003, 929–933.
209 Shimada 1990, 10–11, 111–115.
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In the ﬁ rst half of the 20th century, scholars like Liang Shuming 
and Feng Youlan attempted to re-create Confucianism through the 
introduction of Western philosophical and scientiﬁ c concepts into 
the traditional discourse. In 1958, a group of scholars published 
a declaration in two Hong Kong journals, entitled in English 
“Declaration on Behalf of Chinese Culture Respectfully Announced 
to the People of the World”.210 It is an “emotionally charged apologetic 
for traditional Chinese culture” which “rejects the positivist paradigm 
ushered in by modernity and Westernization and demands a place for 
Chinese cultural values on the world stage”, writes John Makeham.211 
Th e term ‘Contemporary New Confucianism’ (xiandai/dangdai Xin 
Ruxue/Rujia, 现代/当代新儒学/儒家) was not commonly used until 
the popularization of the writings by Du Weiming (杜维明, name also 
transcribed as Tu Wei-ming, b. 1940) in the late 1980s.212 Du has lived 
most of his life outside Mainland China, ﬁ rst in Taiwan and then in 
the United States, but he frequently lectured on the Mainland in the 
early 1980s. His selected writings were published on the Mainland in 
1992 together with a foreword by Fang Keli (方克力, then Professor 
of Philosophy at Nankai University, b. 1938). Du presents New 
Confucianism as the third stage of Confucianism which follows the 
ﬁ rst stage of ‘classical’ Confucianism, which lasted until the end of 
the Han dynasty, and the second stage of Neo-Confucianism during 
the Song, Yuan and Ming dynasties.213 
According to John Makeham, the single most immediate factor for 
the ﬂ ourishing of New Confucianism in the 1980s was the Chinese 
government’s decision to nominate it as the subject of one of the 
key research projects under the 7th ﬁ ve-year plan in 1986. Th e project 
210 Makeham 2003, 27–28. Song Zhiming 2009, 297.
211 Makeham 2003, 28. John Makeham argues (ibid., 27–28) that the declaration was merely 
another manifestation of Confucian revivalism. He opines that the tendency to retrospectively 
treat the declaration as the beginning of New Confucianism is somewhat artiﬁ cial.
212 Du Weiming 1993, Fang Keli ’s “Foreword”, 1–2. Du is commonly known in the media as 
the “foremost New Confucian thinker” though Makeham questions whether he is a Confucian 
in the ﬁ rst place (see Makeham 2003, 41). Nanfang renwu zhoukan listed Du among the top 
ﬁ fty public intellectuals (gonggong zhishifenzi, 公共知识分子) in China in 2004. Th e only 
other person on that list who is also mentioned in this paper is Qin Hui , a well-known blogger 
(see below). (Http://business.sohu.com/s2004/zhishifenzi50.shtml. Accessed 29 Oct 2010.)
213  Ibid., 267.
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was directed by Fang Keli .214 Since then, it has become an important 
part of the New Confucian discourse to identify the lineage of New 
Confucianism and thus tie it together with the longer Confucian 
tradition. Naturally, the question of lineage is a question of identity. 
It is also a way to create a distinction between “us, the orthodox” and 
“they, the heterodox”. Th ere are two traditions for establishing the 
lineage of the (Confucian) Way, the daotong (道统).215 During the Han 
and Tang dynasties, emphasis was on the concrete teacher–student 
continuum whereas the Song dynasty Neo-Confucians stressed 
ideology and the interpretation of Confucianism. Th e New Confucians 
have followed the Neo-Confucian practice, which is only natural in a 
situation where the tradition has eﬀ ectively been severed.  
Most contemporary New Confucians would probably agree that 
New Confucianism follows the lineage of historical Confucianism 
which was connected to the New Text School and the Gongyang 
School on the one hand, and the ‘subjective’ Neo-Confucianism of 
Lu Jiuyuan and Wang Yangming on the other. For the majority of 
New Confucians, this is the ‘true’ lineage, in contrast to the Qing-era 
orthodoxy centred upon the ‘objective’ Neo-Confucianism of Cheng 
Yi and Zhu Xi and plagued by the exegetical studies (especially the 
School of Han Learning). Some would even identify Kang Youwei and 
Liang Qichao as the ﬁ rst New Confucians.216 
The New Confucians are customarily divided into different 
‘generations’. Naturally, diﬀ erences exist when it comes to naming 
the ‘members’ of any given generation in diﬀ erent sources. Th e 
genealogy has been extensively discussed by Umberto Bresciani 
(2001) and John Makeham (2008). Makeham warns against seeing 
214 Makeham 2008, 34. Makeham 2003, 71.
215 Zheng Jiadong 1994, 184. In Chinese, the concept of daotong carries a deeper meaning than 
just ‘lineage’. Th e concept also implies ‘the right, constant tradition’. Many a ruler aspired 
to have the image of the real follower or protector of daotong in order to boost his political 
legitimacy (zhengtong, 正统, originally meaning ‘proper succession’). One should realize 
that in China, religion and politics were never separated in a similar manner to Europe. Th e 
‘worldly’ ruler was always the ‘spiritual’ ruler as well (Zheng Jiadong 1994, 185). Th is aspect 
is equally important in today’s China. 
216 Makeham 2008, 37–38.
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a linear line of transmission and notes that there may be Confucian 
revivalists other than those who may be labelled as New Confucians.217 
In the following general overview, I introduce the main progenitors 
of New Confucianism, based mainly on an article by Zheng Jiadong 
(郑家栋, b. 1956, formerly at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences), 
dubbed the ‘grandmaster’ of Chinese Confucians.218 The article was 
published in the ﬁ rst volume of the book series entitled Yuan Dao (原道), 
“Th e Original Way”, by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in 
1994. Th e series was meant to probe the question of the ‘Way’ (Tao) 
of Chinese traditional culture: where is it coming from and where is it 
leading to? Zheng’s article discusses the lineage of New Confucianism. 
Th e ﬁ rst generation (the 1930s) is usually said to include Liang 
Shuming , Xiong Shili (熊十力, 1885–1968), Zhang Junmai (张君劢, 
also known as Carsun Chang, 1886–1969), Qian Mu (钱穆, 1895–1990) 
and sometimes even Feng Youlan . Th ey were active in Mainland China 
mainly before the establishment of the People’s Republic. 
Zheng Jiadong labels Liang Shuming a “practical Confucian” who 
regarded as central one’s ability to turn Inner Sageliness (neisheng) 
into Outer Kingliness (waiwang). Liang Shuming believed the Chinese 
culture (Confucian tradition) dictates that China cannot enter 
democracy. He himself was not interested in the lineages; on the 
contrary, he regarded himself ﬁ rst and foremost as a Buddhist.219 
Nevertheless, he holds a very important position among the Mainland 
New Confucians. As mentioned above, he was severely criticized by 
Mao Zedong . 
Xiong Shili was very much a follower of the exegetical studies 
(jingxue) in that he saw Confucianism as not at odds with the scientiﬁ c 
method. Xiong maintained that ‘objective’ Neo-Confucianism 
naturally leads one to look for the reason (li) in nature and therefore 
it has the potential to engender scientiﬁ c methods. In contrast to 
Liang Shuming , Xiong believed that Confucius’s practical orientation 
(waiwang) included sympathy for the working people, communality, 
equality and democracy. Xiong saw Confucius as the creator of 
Confucianism who established ren (humaneness) as its central 
217 Ibid., 44.
218 I have also taken note of the genealogies presented in Liu Shuxian 2008, 169–171; Makeham 
2003, 34–44; and Solé-Farras 2008, 15–16. 
219 Zheng Jiadong 1994, 164. Li 2009, 172, 181. Lodén 2006, 171.
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concept. In comparison with the traditional Neo-Confucians (Zhu 
Xi had stressed Confucius’s role as a transmitter), this constituted a 
paradigm shift. Xiong regarded both Mencius and Xunzi as less worth 
following than Confucius.220 
Xiong Shili’s take on Confucianism has been dubbed dangdai Xin 
Rujia (当代新儒家), a term meaning literally ‘contemporary Neo-
Confucianism’. Th is term, favoured by the New Confucians outside 
Mainland China, implies a connection with the Song-Ming Neo-
Confucianism. In contrast, the term used on the Mainland, xiandai Xin 
Ruxue (现代新儒学), ‘modern New Confucian learning’, emphasizes 
the ‘modernity’ (post-May 4th origin) of the thought.221 
Feng Youlan promoted ‘New Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucianism’ (Xin 
Lixue, 新理学). Feng professed the Cheng-Zhu orthodoxy and wished 
to create a ‘new metaphysics’ centring on li (the rational principle).222 
However, “one of the most intensely debated issues in New Confucian 
studies is whether Feng Youlan is a New Confucian.”223 Some Chinese 
scholars have opined that instead of continuing the tradition of Neo-
Confucianism, Feng merely duplicated it.224 Liu Shuxian (刘述先, see 
below) says that Feng “was incapable of displaying the strength of 
character of a traditional scholar”.225 
Th e second generation (the 1960s) consists of three followers of 
Xiong Shili who were signatories of the 1958 Declaration and mainly 
active outside Mainland China, namely Mou Zongsan (牟宗三, 
1909–1995), Xu Fuguan (徐复观, 1903–1982) and Tang Junyi (唐君毅, 
1909–1978). Zheng Jiadong stresses the importance of Mou Zongsan, 
whose disciple he professes himself to be. 
Like Xiong Shili , Mou Zongsan recognized Confucius as the creator 
of Confucianism. In particular, Mou saw Confucius as the ﬁ rst to 
introduce Inner Sageliness or self-cultivation (neisheng) to balance 
Outer Kingliness or practical orientation (waiwang).226 Unlike Xiong, 
Mou was not a proponent of the exegetical studies and believed that 
220 Zheng Jiadong 1994, 163. Makeham 2008, 158. Liang Tao 2009.
221 See Makeham 2003, 18 fn. 7.
222 Song Zhiming 2009, 297.
223 Makeham 2003, 35.
224 Bresciani 2001, 209. 
225 Quoted in Song Zhiming 2009, 297.
226 Liang Tao 2009.
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the real meaning of Confucius cannot be found in the Six Classics. 
Instead, Mou maintained that the essence of Confucianism exists 
independent of whether the Classics actually record the words of 
Confucius or not.227
Mou was very critical of the Song and Ming dynasty ‘rationalist’ 
Neo-Confucians of the Cheng-Zhu school who had emphasized 
argumentation (ﬁ nding justiﬁ cation, yi, and rational principle, li) 
over moral self-cultivation. In particular, Mou criticized Zhu Xi for 
replacing the Five Classics with the Four Books (see “Th e early lineage 
of Confucianism”, below) and for basing their teachings on Daxue, 
“Th e Great Learning”, instead of the Analects or Mencius.228 Daxue was 
originally a chapter of Liji, “Th e Book of Rites”, and was probably 
written as a guide for the ruling elite, teaching them to make their 
personal lives and families examples of tranquillity and order so that 
the state would also become well governed. 
Mou objected to the ethos present in Daxue, namely that one’s 
‘sincerity of thought’ or morality is dependent on the ‘investigation 
of things’, or empirical knowledge. Mou did not see such rationalism 
and instrumentalism as the way to real ‘autonomous morality’. Mou 
himself opined that the teachings of Confucius and Mencius are 
ultimately like the Kantian ‘metaphysics of morals’ which argues for 
an a priori basis for morality. In the Chinese context, this means the 
unity and oneness of the mind, nature and Heaven. Zhu Xi and Wang 
Yangming had mutually opposing views on the relation between 
these.229 
Mou’s approach is a continuation of the ‘subjective’ Neo-
Confucianism of Wang Yangming . Th is tendency is also reﬂ ected 
in the 1958 Declaration (Chapter 6), which calls for innate moral 
227 Zheng Jiadong 1994, 166–170, 186–187. Liang Tao 2009.
228 Zheng Jiadong 1994, 174–175.
229 Ibid., 175–178. Th e Doctrine of the Mean states: “One’s nature is destined by Heaven” (天命
之谓性). Zhu Xi paraphrased this by saying: “Heaven bestows on the beings their destiny and 
what the beings receive is their nature” (天所赋为命, 物所受为性). Diametrically contrasting 
Zhu Xi, Wang Yangming wrote: “Th e constant Way is encapsulated in the Six Classics. Th e 
Way appears as destiny in Heaven, as nature in man, and as heart (mind) in one’s body. Th e 
heart (mind), nature and destiny are all one and the same.” Th e word translated as ‘destiny’ 
or ‘to destine’ is ming (命), which in Wang Yangming’s interpretation refers to ‘the meaning 
of life’ rather than ‘something preordained’ (Kallio 2008, 171–172, fn. 1). 
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awakening.230 Th e Declaration also accuses the Qing-era Empirical 
Research School of making people lose sight of the ‘real’ tradition. 
Xu Fuguan ’s approach diﬀ ered signiﬁ cantly from that of Mou 
Zongsan . Whereas Mou saw Confucianism as a philosophical 
system with a metaphysical core, Xu paid attention to the practical 
orientation (waiwang) of Confucianism and its relation to statecraft. 
While Xu regarded the minben ideal (men are the basis of the state) as 
resembling democracy in principle, he lamented that the Confucians 
became the rulers’ puppets even during the Han dynasty.231 
Th e third generation (the 1980s) may be said to include at least Du 
Weiming (b. 1940), Yu Yingshi (余英时, b. 1930) and Liu Shuxian (b. 
1934). Du and Yu have mostly worked in the United States and Liu 
in Hong Kong. According to Bresciani, their common feature is that 
they all condemn political Marxism but value Marxism as a historical 
theory and social science. Th eir Confucian awakening was linked to 
the demise of the Weberian theory of Confucianism.232 
Today, Du Weiming is also classified as one of the ‘Boston 
Confucians’ together with Professor Robert C. Neville (b. 1939). 
Neville’s ﬁ eld of research is comparative theology, and his aim is to 
show that Confucianism does not have “limited East Asian ethnic 
application” but is actually a “portable tradition” like Christianity.233 
John Makeham sees Liu Shuxian as the most prominent successor 
of Mou Zongsan . Liu campaigns for “spiritual Confucianism” (as 
opposed to Du Weiming ’s “Confucian capitalism”) and calls for 
“honouring the moral nature” instead of “following the path of 
inquiry and study”.234 Th e latter phrase refers to the ‘rationalist’ Neo-
Confucians. 
Liu Shuxian acknowledges that because the Chinese tradition 
emphasizes the Grand Unity (Da yitong) as a value in itself, democracy 
with its notion of pluralism is not compatible with Confucianism. 
230 Zheng Jiadong 1994, 175. John Makeham disputes (2008, 162) this interpretation of the 
Declaration by Zheng Jiadong.  
231 Makeham 2003, 204. Lodén 2006, 178.
232 Bresciani 2001, 389–391. Solé-Farràs 2008, 15. 
233 Neville 2000, 1–2.
234 Makeham 2008, 71–72.
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However, Liu says, the values of liberty and equality may be implanted 
into Confucianism.235 
Th e fourth generation (late 1990s) entered the stage after the 
death of Mou Zongsan . John Makeham sees Professor Lin Anwu 
(b. 1957, National Taiwan Normal University) as a central ﬁ gure in 
that group. Lin Anwu may perhaps be seen as a successor to Xu 
Fuguan . Liu Shuxian has expressed his opposition to Lin’s “critical 
Confucianism”, and Lin has criticized the “dogmatization” of Mou 
Zongsan’s teachings.236 
Lin Anwu asserts that although Xiong Shili and Mou Zongsan 
were gravely concerned about the loss of meaning experienced by 
the Chinese nation, their newly built metaphysics did very little to 
advance democracy, science or modern ethics. Since the late 1990s, 
the most burning issue for the New Confucians has been to select 
content from the ancient classics which would contribute to the 
discussion within the emerging civil society. Lin reiterates this claim 
by saying that the Neo-Confucians should no longer be asking “how to 
move from neisheng to waiwang” but instead, “how to adjust neisheng 
to ﬁ t waiwang”. According to Lin, ‘Old Confucianism’ was rooted in 
an autocratic, shamanistic clan society. ‘New Confucianism’ should 
be rooted in deal-based, open civil society, but the Contemporary 
Neo-Confucians never got further than groping their way towards 
such a society; they recognized the need to modernize but did not 
know how.237 
Lin has coined the term Hou Xin Rujia (后新儒家), ‘Post-New 
Confucianism’, to describe his blueprint for ‘critical Confucianism’, 
which would lead Confucianism away from “excessive emphasis on 
inner moral cultivation at the expense of practice”. In contrast to ‘old’ 
and ‘new’ Confucianism, ‘Post-New Confucianism’ is to be rooted 
in a post-modern, free ‘human society’. ‘Post-New Confucianism’ 
should not follow ‘New Confucianism’ but must replace it. ‘Post-
New Confucianism’ must purge away shamanism, autocracy and 
other vestiges of ‘old Confucianism’. Lin also deplores the continuing 
inﬂ uence of “imperial-style Confucianism”. He draws a structural 
parallel between autocratic monarchy and the kind of ‘subjective’ 
235 Li 1999, 185.
236 Makeham 2008, 71, 171.
237 Lin Anwu 2005, “Foreword”.
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Confucianism as promoted by Wang Yangming and Mou Zongsan . 
According to Lin, innate moral knowledge (liangzhi) and autocracy 
are similarly absolute. “Innate moral consciousness gives priority to 
the ontological mind … as the highest absolute, whereas autocracy 
gives priority to the ruler.”238 
Lin not only criticizes Mou Zongsan ’s Contemporary New 
Confucianism but also the Confucianism promoted by the Nationalists 
in Taiwan. He calls it “a new form of imperial style Confucianism”. 
Lin states that in Taiwan, the self-proclaimed masters of the ‘true 
political tradition’ (zhengtong, 政统) declared themselves to be 
the protectors of the ‘true cultural tradition’ (daotong), although 
in theory, daotong should override zhengtong, and ‘cultural China’ 
should take precedence over ‘political China’ and ‘economic China’. 
Th is is a point where many of the New Confucians are in agreement: 
the goal of reviving Confucianism is to build a new moral and cultural 
basis for political rule, in Mainland China and Taiwan alike.239 
Lin proposes broader engagement with different Confucian 
thinkers and other schools of thought, including Marxism, liberalism 
and even scholastic philosophy.240 He states that the primary concept 
of genuine Confucianism is neither ‘heart-mind’ (xin) nor ‘rational 
principle’ (li) but qi (气). Qi is a notoriously vague concept and may 
refer, for instance, to energy, ether, or spirit. It is a central concept 
in Taoism. For Zhu Xi , qi meant the life-force of the observable 
world (xing’erxia, 形而下), which could obscure the perfect li.241 Lin 
deﬁ nes qi as something that interconnects the metaphysical and the 
physical. “[T]he concept of qi emphasizes the genuine interactivity 
and resonance in the overall interconnectedness of history and 
society.”242 Lin’s deﬁ nition seems related to the one by Zhu Xi and 
238 Makeham 2008, 42, 171, 173–176. See also Lin Anwu 2005, “Foreword”. Makeham sees a 
parallel between Lin’s wish to eliminate magic and Weber’s Entzäuberung; “Weber regarded 
the Protestant Reformation as having played a key role in paving the way for modernity 
through its criticism of magic” (Makeham 2008, 175). 
239 Makeham 2008, 202–203.
240 Ibid., 171.
241 According to Zhu Xi , a person could clear his/her qi through self-cultivation (see Lodén 
2006, 115).
242 Makeham 2008, 181.
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is probably aimed at reducing the role of the heart-mind as a subject 
of the metaphysical realm.243
John Makeham remains sceptical of the ‘Post-New Confucianism’. 
He questions whether Lin Anwu really has been able to create 
anything “genuinely innovative, creative and inﬂ uential”. Other 
critics have similarly written oﬀ  Lin Anwu’s thinking as “shouting 
slogans” against Mou Zongsan without the ability to match the latter 
as a thinker.244 
Th e third and fourth generation New Confucians in 
Mainland China
Researchers have identiﬁ ed several groups which may be labelled as 
representatives of the 3rd or 4th generation active on the Mainland. 
Among these are the followers of Mou Zongsan , dubbed ‘apologetics’ 
by Jesús Solé-Farràs (2008). Th eir most prominent ﬁ gure is Luo Yijun 
(罗义俊, b. 1944, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences), a major 
supporter of the 1958 Manifesto. From 1986, he was a member of 
the Fang Keli -led research project. In 1992, he publicly identiﬁ ed 
himself as a Confucian instead of just a researcher of Confucianism. 
Luo has called for Confucianism to be revived in order for it to replace 
Marxism as the ideology which would guide China in the 21st century. 
He continues to frequently publish articles related to Confucianism. 
Zheng Jiadong also seems to regard himself as a successor to Mou 
Zongsan’s tradition, although he is critical towards ‘subjective’ 
Confucianism and calls for combining metaphysically oriented 
Confucian learning with real-life oriented action (see below).245 
A second group are the ‘militants’, spearheaded by Jiang Qing (江庆, 
b. 1953, formerly at the Shenzhen Administrative College), who is 
243 Lin’s ‘Critical Confucianism’ bears a close resemblance to ‘Critical Buddhism’ by Hakayama 
Noriaki (see Hakayama 1997). See Lin Anwu 2005, “Foreword”. – Zeng Guofan also regarded 
qi as the central concept because he felt that neither li (the rational principle) nor xin (the 
heart-mind) were suﬃ  ciently ‘Chinese’ but could be found in Christianity as well (Feng 
Youlan 1995, 80).
244 Makeham 2008, 347, fn 29.
245 Solé-Farràs 2008, 153–154, 252–254. Ai 2008, 37. Bresciani 2001, 440.
154 | Jyrki Kallio: Towards China’s Strategic Narrative
100     FIIA REPORT 27
perhaps currently the best known of the Mainland New Confucians 
besides Luo Yijun . Jiang is critical towards Mou Zongsan ’s tradition, 
yet cannot be seen as a follower of Xu Fuguan . Instead, he is calling 
for the establishment of Confucianism as a religion (Rujiao, 儒教) so 
that it would replace Marxism-Leninism as the ‘national doctrine’ 
(guojiao, 国教). Inﬂ uenced by Du Weiming , Jiang Qing also believes 
that Confucianism is one of the world religions.246 I will discuss Jiang’s 
thinking further in Chapter IV. 
There are proponents of the Confucian religion representing 
a younger generation, too. One of these is Professor Chen Ming 
(陈明, b. 1962, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Institute 
of World Religions), who rather pragmatically courts ‘New 
Authoritarianism’—a political theory which became popular in China 
in the late 1980s and which emphasized the importance of a strong 
central government for economic development—in order to rally 
support for his cause.247 Another is Professor Peng Guoxiang (彭国翔, 
b. 1969) at the Philosophy Department of Tsinghua University. He has 
published several articles discussing Wang Yangming’s thought and 
translated many works by Du Weiming into Chinese. Peng believes 
that by using a broad deﬁ nition of religion, Confucianism can be 
classiﬁ ed as a religion. Unlike Jiang Qing , Peng doesn’t believe that 
Confucianism can oﬀ er answers to all worldly matters, but must 
be considered a religious system of values only.248 Kang Xiaoguang 
(康晓光, b. 1963), Professor of Regional Economics and Politics at 
Renmin University, has also authored several essays advocating the 
establishment of Confucianism as the state religion.
Th en there are the ‘Socialists’, an instrumentalist grouping more 
Marxist than Confucian. Th eir leading ﬁ gure is Fang Keli, who is very 
critical towards both Luo Yijun and Jiang Qing . Th is is the kind of 
New Confucianism that the Communist Party wishes to utilize in 
order to build up the Socialist Harmonious Society and to strengthen 
its legitimacy.249 While this group may prove influential in the 
governmental eﬀ orts to build Traditional Learning, it is in my opinion 
246 Makeham 2008, 263. Bresciani 2001, 429.
247 Makeham 2008, 197.
248 Peng Guoxiang 2002. Wang Zhicheng 2009.
249 See Ai 2008, 38–40.
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doubtful whether Marxism-Leninism-Maoism can really be merged 
with Confucianism. 
Th ere has also been a grouping labelled the ‘liberals’, who promote 
gradual political reform which would lead to a ‘Chinese Confucian 
democracy’. Th ey argued that while Marxism is not compatible with 
China’s modernization, Western liberal democracy is also not suited 
to China’s cultural tradition. Confucianism, on the other hand, 
would be compatible with democracy.250 Th e liberals were linked 
with the Chinese Cultural College (Zhongguo wenhua shuyuan, 中国文
化书院), established in 1984 by several prominent scholars at Peking 
University, including Feng Youlan and Liang Shuming . 
While the Chinese Cultural College still exists, it seems to have 
become an organ supporting the Socialist Confucians. One of the 
founders who is still alive, Tang Yijie (汤一介, b. 1927), maintains that 
Taoism, Confucianism and Buddhism are all equally important for 
China’s national revival, and his recently published thoughts seem to 
chime well with the promotion of Traditional Learning and building 
the Socialist Harmonious Society.251 
The preceding overview, together with an outline of the 
genealogical tree of Confucianism since the Han dynasty, is presented 
in the form of a diagram in Figure 4.252 
Because Zheng Jiadong , once the ‘grandmaster’ of Chinese 
Confucians, appears to have been seriously discredited by a scandal,253 
the question remains, is there anyone in Mainland China (besides Luo 
Yijun, who is already past retirement age) who is able and willing to 
carry on Mou Zongsan ’s line? As Fang Keli has noted, New Confucians in 
250 Ai 2008, 40–41.
251 See e.g. Tang Yijie 2006a and 2006b.
252 Cf. Bresciani’s chart of the New Confucian movement (Bresciani 2001, 35). 
253 Zheng Jiadong was detained in the summer of 2005 on charges of having smuggled six women 
into the United States. One year later he was convicted and sentenced to prison for 2½ years. On 
the internet, the aﬀ air stirred up heated discussion on whether it had anything to do with the 
nature of Confucianism, either with the hollowness of Confucian virtue or, more apologetically, 
the unrealistic expectations placed on Confucian self-cultivation (e.g. “Zheng Jiadong shijian yu 
Xiandai Xin Rujia de kunjing”, by Guyun, in Nanfang Zhoumo, 15 July 2005, available at http://
news.sina.com.cn/c/2005-07-15/11487232558.shtml, accessed 19 May 2010). Cf. Qian Mansu ’s 
view that the idea of anyone being able to become a sage is both unhelpful and unrealistic, in 
Chapter II, “Th e failure of the revolutionaries to uproot Confucianism”.
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Mainland China are at least “theoretically speaking” outlawed because 
their stand negates historical materialism, dialectical materialism and 
hence Marxism.254 Furthermore, ‘militant’ Confucianism is clearly too 
extremist to lead anywhere, ‘socialist’ Confucianism is Confucian in 
name only, and ‘liberal’ Confucianism appears to have faded away, 
making the future of New Confucianism seem bleak. 
We may see from the above that the relation between the Outer 
Kingliness (waiwang) and the Inner Sageliness (neisheng) is central to 
deﬁ ning the proper lineage of Confucianism (daotong). Another issue 
is the diﬀ erence between Confucianism (Rujia, 儒家) and Confucian 
learning (Ruxue, 儒学). Zheng Jiadong predicts that handling the 
254 Guo 2004, 75.
KEY
 direct influence or descendence
 indirect or weak influence
 opposition
 identification
 non -Confucian school
 
From left to right, top to bottom:
Han dynasty 1  New Text (今文) School 
  2  Ancient Text (古文) School
Tang dynasty 3  Han Yu (韩愈)
Song and Ming dynasty 4  Song Learning (宋学) i.e. Neo-Confucianism (新儒学)
  5  Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucianism (理学)
  6  Lu-Wang Neo-Confucianism (心学)
Qing dynasty 7  Tongcheng (桐城) School i.e. School of Song Learning
  8  School of Han Learning (汉学 or 新汉学) i.e. Empirical  
   Research (考证) School 
  9  Gongyang (公羊) School i.e. New Text (今文) School
  10  ‘Modern’ exegetical studies (经学) 
1st gen of New 11  Xiong Shili (熊十力)
Confucians 12  New Neo-Confucianism (新理学) by Feng Youlan (冯友兰)
 
2nd gen of New 13  Xu Fuguan (徐复观)
Confucians 14  Mou Zongsan (牟宗三)
3rd and 4th gen 15  Post-New Confucianism (后新儒学) by Lin Anwu (林安梧) 
  16  Confucian religion (儒教) by Jiang Qing (江庆) et al. 
  17  Apologetic Confucianism (卫道儒)
  18  Marxist-Leninist ‘Confucianism’ (马列儒)
  19  Traditional Learning (国学)
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division between the intellectual, ontological Ruxue, based on 
knowledge, and the Rujia based on moral action which results from 
personal cultivation, will be crucial for the future development of 
Confucianism.255 
Zheng is in favour of combining Rujia and Ruxue into “learning 
concerned with life”: Academic systems of knowledge (xuetong, 学统) 
can function as the premise for subjective experience or the Rujia 
spirit of practice and social concern.256 When referring to the “spirit of 
practice” Zheng quotes Fan Zhongyan ’s essay entitled “Inscription at 
Yueyang Tower” about the sages of the past: “Th ey must have said, let 
us be the ﬁ rst to concern ourselves with the concerns of All-Under-
Heaven and the last to enjoy the joys of All-Under-Heaven! Alas! Who 
am I to follow when such men are among us no more.”257 
Zheng also proposes a “broad deﬁ nition of daotong”. According to 
him, a broadly deﬁ ned daotong is not only a genealogical model but 
a kind of “cultural consciousness”. As Makeham concludes, Zheng’s 
“broad daotong” leads into cultural nationalism where the Rujia are 
both the inheritors and participants of the Chinese culture.258 
Just who it is that represents the newest generation of New 
Confucians on the Mainland is a question for further research. Some 
proponents of the Confucian religion were mentioned above, but at 
this stage I am unable to assess how representative their views are 
among the ‘younger’ Confucians. I would argue that for a possible 
ﬁ fth generation (consisting of people born mainly in the 1970s) to be 
successful, it would have to follow either the ‘critical Confucianism’ 
sketched by Lin Anwu or the ‘learning concerned with life’ approach 
outlined by Zheng Jiadong . Th e other avenues seem to be dead ends. 
Or perhaps the answer lies in abandoning the genealogical 
thinking and returning to the roots. Discussion about the origins 
and the ‘true’ nature of Confucianism has indeed begun, following 
some recent archaeological ﬁ nds. 
255 Makeham 2008, 142.
256 Ibid., 143, 165. Th is reminds us of the thought of Gu Yanwu, who promoted the study of 
everything, not just the Classics, and “argued that broad studies should be combined with a 
sense of shame over the remaining injustices in the world” (Lodén 2006, 133; see Gu Yanwu 
2000, 175–178).
257 For a translation of the whole essay in Finnish, see Kallio 2008, 31–33.
258 Zheng Jiadong 1994, 190. Makeham 2008, 140–141, 157–160.
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Th e early lineage of Confucianism 
Archaeology and linguistics have come to the aid of those who 
wish to make new interpretations about Traditional Learning and 
Confucianism. Th e unearthing of several previously unknown texts, 
preserved on bamboo slips, from a tomb in a village called Guodian in 
Hubei Province in the early 1990s, has been particularly inspirational. 
Several of the texts have been classiﬁ ed as belonging to the Confucian 
school of thought.259 Th e Guodian tomb dates back to approximately 
300 BCE, and it is possible that the unearthed texts were produced just 
decades after Confucius’s death in 479 BCE, and thus predate Mencius, 
the ﬁ rst major developer of Confucianism after Confucius himself. 
As discussed above, deﬁ ning the daotong is of great importance to 
the self-legitimization of the contemporary Confucians. Th e Guodian 
ﬁ nd is naturally relevant to the discussion concerning the early 
lineage of Confucianism. Th e established view on the early lineage 
was formulated by the Song dynasty Neo Confucians, especially Zhu 
Xi . According to this view, Confucius passed his school of thought on 
to Zengzi (曾子, a disciple of Confucius), who then passed it on to Zisi 
(子思, allegedly a grandson of Confucius), who then passed it on to 
Mencius. Th e younger contemporary of Mencius, Xunzi, is depicted 
as a heterodox, and he thus falls outside the lineage.260 
259 Kenneth W. Holloway cautions against classifying the Guodian texts according to the 
diﬀ erent schools, i.e. Confucianism and Taoism, and notes that the division into diﬀ erent 
schools could be artiﬁ cial and may not have taken place before the Han dynasty (Holloway 
2009, 6, 41).
260 Makeham 2008, 222–223. Han Yu , the ﬁ rst to outline a Confucian genealogy, said of Xunzi 
that he “picked up pieces of Confucius’s learning but failed to grasp its essence” (“Yuan Dao”, 
translated in Kallio 2007, 112–119). Th e discussion on Xunzi revolves around his view on Heaven 
and nature, Tian and xing. Both Mencius and the Doctrine of the Mean represent the view 
that “one’s nature is destined by Heaven”; therefore, Heaven and Man are one. In contrast, 
Xunzi did not see Heaven as the ruler of one’s destiny; to use modern concepts, he equated 
Heaven with impersonal natural forces which are separate from Man. Xunzi considered man’s 
‘nature’ (xing, 性) to include just the ‘animal instincts’, to use modern analogies again. More 
important in Xunzi’s view was man’s ‘artiﬁ ce’ (wei, 伪), what one has learned and how one 
controls one’s instincts. Xunzi also emphasized ‘propriety’ (li) and ‘justice’ (yi), in contrast 
to Mencius, who put the highest value on ‘benevolence’ (ren) (Robins 2007; Goldin 2000).
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From early on, the lineage has been called into question. In 
particular, the role of Xunzi has been viewed in various ways. For 
instance, Sun Fu (孙复, 992–1057) maintained that Confucius revived 
the Confucian Way after the disintegration of the Zhou Dynasty, 
Mencius revived it when the death of Confucius had given way to the 
heresies of Yang Zhu and Mozi, and Xunzi revived it after it had been 
disrupted by the chaos of the Warring States period. “Mencius often 
spoke about humaneness (ren) and seldom about propriety (li), while 
Xunzi often spoke about propriety (li) and seldom about humaneness 
(ren)”, noted Kang Youwei . Both poles, ren and li, are necessary for 
the Kingly Way (Wang Dao, 王道), Sun Fu and others have argued, 
while the orthodoxy has sided with ren.261 
The orthodox view on the lineage has been endorsed by the 
majority of contemporary New Confucians, including Mou Zongsan .262 
Why the New Confucians have stressed Mencian ‘idealism’ and the 
subjective Inner Sageliness stems from embarrassment over the 
fact that Confucius himself never reached an oﬃ  cial position, let 
alone the throne (though his later biographies often contain such 
fabrications).263 Mencius set out to create an image of Confucius as a 
Sage whose real achievements had to do with his spiritual growth. As 
Professor Qin Hui (秦晖) from Tsinghua University has pointed out, 
Confucians prior to the Han dynasty looked towards the legendary 
Th ree Emperors and the Kings of Zhou as their idols and it was not 
until the Song dynasty that Confucius’s Analects attained the highest 
position in the Confucian canon.264 Confucius himself said that he 
“didn’t create but only transmitted”. 
Traditionally, the authoritative texts had included the so-called 
Five Classics: the Classic of Changes, the Classic of History, the Classic of 
261  Liang Tao 2009.
262 Th is discussion is still very much alive. Th e new translation of the Analects by Brooks & 
Brooks (1998) aims to prove that ren is the central concept in original Confucianism. 
263 See Waley 1989 13–14, and Li Ling 2009, 13. 
264 Qin Hui 2009. Th e Analects was studied as early as the Han dynasty, when it was ﬁ rst 
regarded as Confucius’s own commentary on the Five Classics and later as one of the Seven 
Classics (i.e. the Five Classics, the Analects and the Classic of Filial Piety). Schoolchildren 
typically studied the Analects as an elementary textbook prior to embarking on the more 
diﬃ  cult Five Classics (Gardner 2003, 7–8).
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Poetry, the Spring and Autumn Annals and the Book of Rites265 (originally, 
there had been six classics, but the Classic of Music had been lost). 
It was thanks to Zhu Xi that the Five Classics were superseded in 
importance by the Four Books: the Analects, the Mencius, the Great 
Learning and the Doctrine of the Mean. Zhu Xi maintained that “the 
Four Books revealed Confucian truths more clearly and eﬀ ectively and 
should thus take precedence over all other writings in the canon”. In 
1313, the Four Books, with Zhu Xi’s commentary, were declared the 
basis of the civil service examinations.266 It was only the Gongyang 
School and later the New Confucians who put Confucius on a pedestal 
as the originator of Confucianism. 
Th e Guodian texts have been keenly exploited to either defend, 
modify or attack the established view on the early lineage of 
Confucianism. One group uses the Guodian find to support the 
existence of the Zisi–Mencius connection and thus the ﬁ nd is taken 
as further proof of the established, and New Confucian, view. It is 
perhaps no accident that one of the major proponents of overseas New 
Confucianism, Du Weiming , is also one of the most eager researchers 
into the Guodian texts.267 
Another group uses the Guodian ﬁ nd to promote the idea of the 
antiquity of the Chinese culture. Th is is related to the state-sponsored 
Th ree Dynasties (Xia–Shang–Zhou) Chronology Project, which was 
one of the key projects under the Ninth Five-Year Plan in 1996–2000. 
Th e project aimed at establishing a scientiﬁ c foundation for the 
traditional belief that the Chinese civilization really is 5,000 years 
old with an unbroken, homogeneous dynastic history (see “A case 
in point: Th e Zhonghua Culture Symbolic City” above). Th is belief is 
heavily contested by the scientiﬁ c consensus, according to which 
265 According to Torbjörn Lodén, the original, pre-Qin Book of Rites (Lijing) was probably very 
diﬀ erent from the later version (Liji), compiled during the Han dynasty (Lodén 2006, 10).
266 Gardner 2003, 2–3. All in all, the Confucian canon during the Song dynasty comprised 
thirteen books: the Five Classics, the Four Books, and certain other works. Th e other works 
were the Classic of Filial Piety; three accompanying works to the Spring and Autumn Annals, 
Zuo zhuan, Guliangzhuan and Gongyangzhuan; the Erya dictionary; and two books on rituals 
in addition to the Book of Rites, Zhouli and Yili. Because Zuo zhuan was considered part of 
the Spring and Autumn Annals and because the Great Learning and the Doctrine of the Mean 
were parts of the Book of Rites, the total number came to thirteen. 
267 Makeham 2008, 216–233, and Liang Tao 2009.
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the Zhou dynasty (its latter part, 841–256 BCE) certainly is historical 
but there is no archaeological evidence for the existence of the Xia 
dynasty (allegedly 2070–1600 BCE). In contrast, the Chronology 
Project presents Xia as a powerful state formation.268 
Yet another group maintains that the Guodian ﬁ nd exposes ﬂ aws in 
the established lineage by showing that Xunzi’s thinking was important 
for the development of later Confucianism alongside Mencius’s 
thinking. Th is seems plausible indeed, and Paul Rakita Goldin argues 
convincingly that many aspects of Xunzi’s thinking are present, at least 
in a raw form, in the Confucian texts found in Guodian.269 
Nevertheless, even this interpretation of the Guodian texts isn’t 
value-free. Some, like Li Zehou , may favour this approach because 
it counters the New Confucian view of the lineage.270 Th ere is also a 
connection to the ideal of the Socialist Harmonious Society. According 
to Yuan Tengfei (袁腾飞), the author of an extremely popular textbook 
on Chinese history, a harmonious society needs both ren and li. Ren 
means that people care for each other. For the ruler to love his people 
and to be loved by them requires li: people need to act according to 
their position and be content with their lot.271 
A case in point: Reinterpretations of Confucius 
Th e Guodian texts provide material for purposes other than simply 
analyzing the lineage of Confucianism. Many expect that it is possible 
to ﬁ nd traces of original Confucianism in the texts because they are so 
very old. Th e studies on the nature of ‘true’ Confucianism bear direct 
relevance to the debate on the role of tradition in today’s China, but 
268 See Makeham 2008, 231.
269 Goldin 2000. Most signiﬁ cantly, Goldin shows that the interpretation of xing or ‘nature’ 
in both the Guodian texts and in Xunzi’s thought (and possibly Gaozi’s) diﬀ ers from the view 
presented by Mencius. Mencius believed that it is the inherent goodness of the xing of human 
beings that distinguishes them from animals. According to the Guodian texts, all members of 
a certain species are born with the same, morally indeterminate xing and people can make 
themselves good through self-cultivation. 
270 See Makeham 2008, 225. 
271 Yuan Tengfei 2009, 31–32. Th is resembles the way Yu Dan presents Confucianism in her 
recent bestseller, Confucius from the Heart (see below). 
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it is not always easy to decipher what the pundits are actually saying 
amid all the linguistic and philosophical jargon. 
Two views, both originating from the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences, serve as good examples of the heated debate related to 
the Guodian texts. Approaching the subject from diﬀ erent angles, 
and arriving at somewhat diﬀ erent conclusions, both nevertheless 
praise the texts as a source of a new understanding of ‘original’ 
Confucianism. Both underline the ‘revolutionary’ and ‘political’ spirit 
of early Confucianism. 
Liang Tao (梁涛, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, History 
Institute) wishes to bolster his original view of the democratic spirit 
of Confucius, and with that aim in mind he—arguably rather freely—
attributes a great many Guodian texts to Zisi, whom he takes to be 
the grandson of Confucius.272 
According to Liang Tao , early Confucianism had two mutually 
complementary trends. Mencius promoted “benevolent (ren) rule” 
and Zisi stood for “All-Under-Heaven is one community” (Tianxia 
wei gong, 天下为公). Mencius also taught that the people are the 
basis of the state, and Liang maintains that Zisi meant that political 
power belongs to all people. Th us, argues Liang, the two trends 
together form an indigenous, Chinese basis for democracy.273 Liang 
deplores the fact that only the Mencian trend has continued while 
the rest became diluted into the principle that an unworthy ruler 
272 Makeham 2008, 225. Liang Tao 2009. Some texts found in Guodian are widely believed to 
be parts of the now lost Zisizi, the collected writings of Zisi. A received text in the Book of 
Rites entitled “Ziyi”, which is traditionally attributed to Zisi, has its counterpart among the 
Guodian texts. One of the Guodian texts is entitled “Duke Mu of Lu questions Zisi” and is 
unquestionably related to Zisi. (See Henricks 2000, 5.) In contrast, Paul Rakita Goldin (2000, 
115) strongly criticizes “the emerging trend to associate the Guodian manuscripts with Zisi” 
and argues, instead, that the manuscripts show a connection to Xunzi. Brooks & Brooks (1998, 
285, 287) challenge the view that Zisi was a grandson of Confucius.
273 Holloway (2009, 22) suggests that (at least some) Guodian texts describe an ideal society 
“where individual egalitarianism is balanced with communitarian connectedness to create 
a harmony between the priorities of the majority and minority groups in our society”. 
Holloway’s discussion of the Guodian texts is interesting, but his analysis is marred by 
the fact that he translates the key concepts following the customary, Confucian tradition. 
Especially problematic are ren and de: translating them as ‘humaneness, humanity’ and 
‘virtue’, respectively, seems forced. 
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must abdicate.274 In Liang’s words, ‘common world’ became just 
‘one family’; and in a ‘common world’, all are equal, whereas in 
‘one family’ somebody is the head of the family. Furthermore, the 
exegetical studies (jingxue) of the Ancient Text School and the New 
Text School petriﬁ ed Confucianism as they helped to cement the 
Confucian canon, based on the Mencian tradition. Th ey also replaced 
the focus on propriety and justice with the cultivation of one’s inner 
ren, and replaced politics with mere academic study.275 
Liang Tao discusses the meaning of the ren concept in the light of 
the Guodian texts. In the latter, ren is most often written with a variant 
of the graph 忎 (which is an ancient form of the standard graph 仁). Th e 
Guodian variant has 身 as the phonetic component, meaning ‘self’. 
Liang Tao sees this as a concrete example of Confucius’s interpretation 
of ren: originally, the concept not only implied ‘loving one’s fellow 
men’, as Mencius claimed, but also ‘overcoming one’s selﬁ sh desires’ 
and ‘cultivating oneself’.276 Furthermore, ren as ‘loving one’s fellow 
men’ is not entirely diﬀ erent from loving oneself, because in Confucius’s 
thinking, ren starts from the relations to one’s blood relatives and is 
therefore related to the concept of ﬁ lial, or brotherly, piety.277 
274 Holloway (2009, 17–20) claims that the Guodian texts, and “Tang Yu zhi dao” in particular, 
endorse neither abdication (in favour of a virtuous and capable person, instead of one’s 
son) nor hereditary succession, but promote a balanced view between the two. My own 
interpretation of “Tang Yu zhi dao” is quite diﬀ erent, and I read the text as an instrumentalist 
endorsement of abdication only (Cf. Pines 2009, 63–65).
275 Liang Tao 2009. Th is resembles the lamentation of Gu Yanwu , expressed in his Rizhilu 
(chapter “Fuzi zhi yan xing yu Tiandao”): “People today do not study the content of the Six 
Classics … and talk idly about ‘clearing one’s mind in order to ﬁ nd one’s nature’ and use this 
to replace the practical studies oriented at self-cultivation and the administration of people.” 
(不习六艺之文 … 以明心见性之空言代修己治人之实学。)
276 Liang Tao refers to the phrase 克己 from the Analects XII.1. As Edward Slingerland (2003, 
125) points out, the meaning and translation of the passage have been debated continuously 
over the centuries. My translation here, ‘overcoming one’s selﬁ sh desires’, is based on the 
context of Liang Tao’s essay. See fn. 109.
277 Liang Tao 2008. I would be ready to carry this logic further. In early dictionaries, ren is 
said to mean qin (亲). As a verb, qin means ‘to feel close to someone, to love (one’s close 
ones)’, and as a noun, ‘a close person, kinsman, relative’. It is conceivable, in my opinion, 
that ren originally denoted ‘kinship’ and acquired the meaning of general ‘humaneness’ as 
a later extension. 
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Liang Tao proposes that contemporary Confucians should learn 
from the Song dynasty Neo-Confucians who absorbed Taoist and 
Buddhist inﬂ uences and were therefore able to make new, innovative 
interpretations. Similarly, contemporary Confucians should 
integrate Western philosophy and science into Confucianism. Th e 
basis of Confucianism is to be found by studying the Guodian texts. 
Such a new synthesis would enable China to continue the kind of 
enlightenment that emerged during the Ming and Qing dynasties 
and to rejuvenate her democratic tradition. According to Liang, the 
Confucians should discard the old Four Books (see “Th e early lineage 
of Confucianism” above) and replace them with a set of New Four 
Books, namely the Analects, the Mencius, the Book of Rites and the 
Xunzi.278 
All in all, Liang sees it as the contemporary Confucians’ duty to 
transform the old, neisheng oriented Confucianism into a new waiwang 
orientation. In other words, studying the classics must be replaced by 
political action.279 Although Liang doesn’t directly say what kind of 
action would be needed, reading between the lines suggests that he 
is using the Guodian texts to ﬁ nd arguments in favour of reforming 
the current political system.
Jiang Guanghui (姜广辉, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 
Institute of History of Chinese Th ought) thinks initially along the 
same lines as Liang Tao , but arrives at a diﬀ erent conclusion. Th e 
Confucian lineage, established by Zhu Xi , passed from Confucius 
to Zengzi and from him to Zisi and Mencius. Kang Youwei already 
held a diﬀ erent view and saw Zisi as the follower of Ziyou (子有, a 
disciple of Confucius) instead. According to Jiang, the Ziyou School 
of early Confucianism promoted the right of the people to overthrow 
a bad ruler, and the central slogans in the school were ‘Great 
Community’, ‘Modest Welfare’ (Xiaokang) and ‘All-Under-Heaven 
is one community’. It was the most rebellious of the early schools.280 
278 Th e Great Learning and the Doctrine of the Mean are actually two of the 49 chapters in 
the Book of Rites. Traditionally, these two chapters were attributed to Zisi, and they were 
elevated to a special position by Zhu Xi during the Song dynasty. Liang Tao (2009) calls for a 
new edition of the Book of Rites which should be based on the Guodian texts.
279 Liang Tao 2009.
280 Th is and the following paragraphs are based on Jiang Guanghui 2007.
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Jiang further identiﬁ es two other early Confucian schools, those 
of Zixia (子夏, also a disciple of Confucius) and Zengzi. According 
to Jiang, the Zixia school concentrated on the study of the ancient 
ways and scriptures. Unlike the rebellious Ziyou school, they sought 
cooperation with the rulers. Th e exegetical studies (jingxue) continued 
the heritage of the Zixia school, claims Jiang. 
Jiang further describes the Zengzi school as concentrating on the 
concept of ﬁ lial piety, both in the family and in a wider context. Any 
behaviour which brings shame on one’s parents is to be regarded 
as non-ﬁ lial. In addition, the Zengzi school is also responsible for 
making the discussion on metaphysics, the yin and the yang, part of 
later Confucianism. 
Jiang believes that the Confucian texts unearthed in Guodian 
belong to the school of Ziyou and his follower Zisi.281 According 
to Jiang, the Ziyou–Zisi–Mencius school has the following special 
characteristics. First, their ideal for society was the Great Community. 
Second, their political ideal was abdication in favour of the able. 
Th ird, they emphasized man’s free will. 
Traditionally, the ideal of the Great Community was believed to 
have been a reality during the reigns of the Five Emperors, especially 
Yao and Shun. Th e ideal rulers of the Th ree Dynasties, Xia, Shang 
and Zhou, supposedly reigned during an era of Modest Welfare. 
According to Jiang, the era preceding the Xia dynasty was indeed 
a time of primitive communism when “All-Under-Heaven was one 
community” and the people “held not only their own blood relatives 
as their relatives and their real sons as their sons”.282 
Jiang quotes Kang Youwei, who stated that Confucius himself 
advocated abdicating the throne in favour of the able. According 
to Jiang, this view is proven right by the Guodian text “Tang Yu zhi 
Dao”. Jiang further states that particularly through the writings of 
Mencius, the succession of the able became a political ideal with 
clear democratic overtones. In addition, both Mencius and Xunzi 
proposed that the people have the right to overthrow an unjust ruler. 
Th is interpretation is somewhat diﬀ erent from the view of Liang Tao . 
281 Jiang makes particular reference to the texts “Tang Yu zhi Dao”, “Xing zi ming chu”, “Lu 
Mu Gong wen Zisi”, “Zi yi” and “Wu xing”. He also notes that some scholars attribute two 
Guodian texts directly to Confucius himself, namely “Zun de yi” and “Qiong da yi shi”. 
282 不独亲其亲子其子, a quotation from the Book of Rites, “Liyun”.
Original Publications | 167
FIIA REPORT  27    113
According to Jiang, the Ziyou school believed that man has 
free will. Th is idea is advanced by the concept of ‘sensibility’ or 
‘sympathy’ (qing, 情). Th is concept is in contrast with xing (性) or 
man’s ‘nature’, which is innate. According to the Guodian text “Xing 
zi ming chu”, man’s nature gives birth to man’s sensibilities (to the 
feelings of others) and sympathy (for one’s fellow humans), which 
in turn are the starting point for the Way (of society). According to 
Jiang, qing is a yardstick against which to measure right and wrong, 
and it is formed in a person through the process of socialization and 
education.283 
In conclusion, Jiang Guanghui argues that the Guodian texts 
force us to re-evaluate the lineage of Confucianism. Very boldly, 
Jiang states that both Zhu Xi and Wang Yangming were wrong in 
their interpretations of Confucianism. Neither of them knew the real 
tradition which has now been revealed by the Guodian texts. Jiang 
criticizes Mou Zongsan and the New Confucians for making the Wang 
Yangming school the core of their view on the true lineage. 
Jiang himself gives credit to the Qing dynasty Confucians Huang 
Zongxi (黄宗羲, 1610–95), Dai Zhen (戴震, 1724–77) and Kang 
Youwei . According to Jiang, they restored to Confucianism the 
original ideas of respecting the interests of the people, seeing people 
as active subjects, and rebelliousness, and their thinking bore a 
resemblance to the European Enlightenment. Th e general ethos of 
Jiang’s analysis suggests that rather than extolling the virtues of the 
enlightenment, he wishes to prove the compatibility of Confucianism 
with communism. 
It is my own humble view, based on my very limited reading of 
the Guodian texts, that the diﬀ erences between the Mencian tradition 
and the Guodian corpus are more striking than the similarities.284 
Th erefore, I would be inclined to see the Guodian ﬁ nd as proof of 
the existence of diﬀ erent branches of (what later became known as) 
Confucianism during the 4th century BC. 
283 Th e concept of qing is diﬃ  cult to translate here. In later Confucianism, it refers to ‘feelings’ 
or ‘emotions’, but it is my understanding (and seemingly also Jiang Guanghui ’s) that in the 
Guodian text “Xing zi ming chu”, qing is both more active and conscious than an emotion.
284 I have translated (into Finnish) excerpts from four texts belonging to the Guodian corpus, 
pending publication.
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It also seems plausible that the texts originate from the Jixia 
Academy, where they were used as reading materials, as has been 
suggested by Gao Zheng (高正) from the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences.285 Many philosophers of diﬀ erent schools were active in the 
academy during the years of its existence (from ca. 360 BCE to 284 
BCE), including Mencius and Xunzi. 
Th e discussion on the right method of succession, central to the 
text “Tang Yu zhi dao”, could be related to the events in the state 
of Qi around the year 386 BCE, when the throne was seized from 
the ‘rightful heir’ by the ‘able ruler’.286 Thus the Guodian texts 
would, at least in part, be coloured by political instrumentalism. It 
is no wonder, then, that interpreting the texts today has become a 
politicized issue. 
285 Gao Zheng 2001.
286 Th e Tian family assumed the Qi throne formally in 386 BCE, putting an end to a long power 
struggle. Th e establishment of the Jixia academy was a means to bolster the family’s legitimacy 
and power. Th e academy combined academic freedom with economic security and thus 
succeeded in enticing many talented men to the service of the state. 
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Chapter IV 
Conclusions
Confucianism in contemporary China
Guo Yingjie, lecturer in Chinese Studies at the Institute for 
International Studies, University of Technology, Sydney, writes: 
“Fortunately for the Confucians, both Marxists and liberals have 
moderated their antitraditional stance in varying degrees in the last 
decade in contrast to the May Fourth era or the 1980s.” Guo concludes 
boldly: “As a result, China is witnessing a reformist ethos that ﬁ nds 
no parallel since May Fourth.”287 
Guo’s conclusion may be an exaggeration but the discussion on the 
social and political value base is certainly not at a standstill in China. 
As mentioned in the Introduction to this report, Li Xiangping and Shi 
Dajian argue that the Confucian revival movement and the eﬀ orts by 
the state to strengthen its legitimacy are interdependent processes. 
While the Confucian revival movement provides legitimization for 
national and local authorities, the latter in turn mobilize resources 
which further enhance the former. Let us assume that Li and Shi are 
right in their analysis. Th en we need to return to the critique of the 
Confucian revival and its desirability in order to be able to assess the 
sustainability of the circle of interdependency between the revival of 
Confucianism and the legitimization of the authorities. 
Th e critique centres on at least three aspects. Th e ﬁ rst of these is 
the compatibility of Confucianism with modernization. Th e second 
is the relation between Confucianism and the ideal of unity. And 
the third relates to the complicated issue of the religiousness of 
Confucianism. 
Since the 1980s, some Mainland scholars have claimed that 
sinicized Marxism is similar to the Confucianism of the Mencius-
Lu-Wang lineage. Both Marxism and Confucianism stressed 
self-cultivation and collectivism. Other uniting elements are the 
ideal of ‘people as the basis’ (minben), the Great Community as the 
287 Guo 2004, 89. 
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ultimate goal, and a dislike of individual beneﬁ t.288 At the same time, 
Confucianism has been seen as a threat to Marxism. 
Fang Keli, who led the research project on New Confucianism 
launched in 1986, has taken a positive attitude towards many 
Confucian ‘traditional virtues’, such as respect for the aged, harmony 
and solidarity. Such a stance has laid a positive foundation for New 
Confucianism in China, but only within strict parameters. Fang has 
emphasized that Confucianism can only add to the ‘vocabulary’ of 
the future civilization, not its ‘grammar’.289 
Fang Keli has stated that because New Confucianism is mainly a 
philosophy of life, one could not reach a true understanding of the 
thought without a sympathetic attitude towards one’s own history and 
culture. Th is statement was clearly directed against the anti-Marxist 
New Confucians in Taiwan and elsewhere outside Mainland China. 
Fang has also written that in order to nullify the schemes to replace 
Marxism with Confucianism, one needs to study the New Confucian 
movement in depth. In Fang’s analysis, New Confucianism is an 
episode in China’s history which demonstrates an eﬀ ort to liberate 
Chinese capitalism from feudalism.290 In eﬀ ect, Fang rules that New 
Confucianism is outdated in regard to China’s socialist modernization. 
Senior editors in the People’s Daily, Ling Zhijun (凌志军) and 
Ma Licheng (马立诚), explore the discussion on the societal role 
of Confucianism in their book entitled Huhan (呼喊), “Voices”, 
published in 1999. Ling and Ma give most space to the critical views. 
Th ey quote several scholars in support of their argument: the New 
Confucians are wrong in trying to negate the May 4th Movement as 
an ‘anti-traditionalist’ movement. Th e New Confucians emphasize 
the necessity for Inner Sageliness (neisheng) as the basis for Outer 
Kingliness (waiwang), but in reality, Outer Kingliness today is a 
matter of established societal, economic and legal systems and 
practices.291 
288 Makeham 2008, 237–238.
289 Ibid., 248, 250–251.
290 Bresciani 2001, 426–427.
291 Ling & Ma 2008, 272–273. Ling & Ma aim their criticism especially at a book by Lin Yusheng, 
Th e Crisis of China’s Consciousness: radical antitraditionalism in the May Fourth era 
(University of Wisconsin Press, Madison 1979). Li Zehou (1994, 152) also saw reason to criticize 
the same book. 
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Li Ling (李零), Professor of Chinese Literature at Peking University, 
discusses the relevance of Confucius in the modern world in his book 
Sangjiagou (丧家狗, “Stray Dog”, revised edition 2007). Th e title of 
the book refers to Li’s desire to present Confucius as a failed sage—a 
homeless, disdained roamer who did not succeed in getting any ruler 
to follow his advice—and not the kind of exalted ﬁ gure popularized 
in canonized Confucianism. Li reaches a cynical conclusion. 
Confucius’s utopia was the revitalization of the political system in 
the early Western Zhou era. Th is utopia was impossible to attain even 
in Confucius’s own time. Furthermore, he targeted his message at 
the scholar-oﬃ  cials, his peers. Confucius had nothing to oﬀ er to 
the common people even originally, and even less after the reforms 
of Wang Mang (王莽), the founder of the short-lived New Dynasty 
(9–23), which restricted the scope for non-Confucian religious rites 
and practices. It was Westerners who recognized in Confucius the 
Philosopher King they had been looking for. Th ey put Confucianism 
on a pedestal as one of the great world religions.292 
For centuries, Confucianism was an ideology of scholars who 
adopted meddling with politics as their mission—a trait which Li 
Ling calls harmful. Echoing Yu Dan (于丹, b. 1965, f.), the author of a 
best-selling, trivialized popularization of the thought of Confucius, 
Confucius from the Heart (original Lunyu xinde, 论语心得, 2007),293 
Li Ling quotes Confucius who said: “If you are not in government 
oﬃ  ce, do not engage in government.”294 Li Ling translates that into 
modern parlance as: “Mind your own bloody business.” Li Ling 
argues that Neo-Confucian ‘innate knowledge’ can be used to guide 
politics as little as democracy can be used to guide scientiﬁ c research. 
Th is is how politics and science diﬀ er, says Li and laments that few 
contemporary Confucians seem to realize that. Confucius cannot 
save China, nor can he save the world. We must do that ourselves, 
concludes Li Ling.295 
292 Li Ling 2007, 374–390.
293 I have brieﬂ y presented some criticism targeted at Yu Dan ’s book in China in Kiina sanoin 
ja kuvin 4/2009–1/2010 (243), 16–19 (“Yksinkertaisen elämän kaipuu – mitä Mestari Kong 
sanoisi tänään”). 
294 Analects VIII.14.
295 Li Ling 2007, 374–390.
172 | Jyrki Kallio: Towards China’s Strategic Narrative
118     FIIA REPORT 27
As mentioned in Chapter I, there are those who claim that 
Confucianism stands for ‘pluralist unity’ and others who extol 
the virtues of decentralization. Neither of these viewpoints is in 
accordance with the current, communist orthodoxy. Referring 
especially to the ideas presented by Ge Jianxiong and Yan Jiaqi (see 
Chapter I), Victoria Tin-bor Hui concludes pessimistically: “Recent 
developments suggest that [China remains stuck on the age-old 
model of Legalism with a Confucian façade], and it is diﬃ  cult to 
expect younger generations, who have grown up with intensiﬁ ed 
‘patriotic education’, to steer China away from the Legalist path.”296 
Th e traditional Marxist view equates unity with progress. For 
example, Li Zehou maintains that Confucian thought reﬂ ected the 
ideals of a clan society at a time when history was, inevitably, moving 
towards a system of regional states. Li Zehou describes how the clan 
states were faltering, rulers of the new regional states were getting 
richer following the military conquests, and the foundations of the 
communal communities were crumbling. Th e old order, where the 
rulers of the clan states had been vassals of a Son of Heaven, was 
turning into a battle for supremacy. Th e importance of Confucius 
stemmed from the fact that he transmitted the code of propriety (li) 
of the old order to his followers. Th e code of propriety that Confucius 
wished to revitalize echoed the original norms of the primitive 
communities, even though it had already been transformed into 
rituals serving the interests of the ruling class. For instance, ﬁ lial piety 
and respect for the elderly stems from a time when decisions were 
made ‘democratically’ by a council of elders. Th e code of propriety 
of the old order could not compete with the new teachings. Legalism 
in particular answered the needs of the new order.297 
According to Li Zehou , Confucius stood in the ranks of the 
conservative and backward forces of his time. Confucius promoted 
the code of propriety that had been in place to protect the personal 
power of the clan leaders, and stood against the rule based on 
institutions and law. He favoured the old, communal, economic 
system and opposed the desire of the rulers to strive for riches. All this 
shows how Confucius’s teachings reﬂ ected the declining destinies of 
296 Hui 2008, 63, 65.
297 Li Zehou 2008, 11–16.
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the clan leaders, who were being surpassed by the wealthy, concludes 
Li Zehou.298 
From the perspective of historical determinism, Li Zehou ’s 
analysis makes sense. Feudalism and capitalism had to be born so 
that communism, in turn, could enter the stage. Th e ‘primitive unity’ 
of the Zhou rule by the Son of Heaven had to turn into a division of 
the Warring States so that it, in turn, could turn into the unity of 
the Qin, gloriﬁ ed by Mao Zedong . Reading diﬀ erently, we may see 
that Li Zehou describes the value system of the communal societies 
as a kind of proto-communism. Th us the teachings of Confucius, 
reﬂ ecting—albeit inadequately—this value system, must be seen as 
progressive from an ideological point of view. We may perhaps also 
interpret Li’s analysis as a positive appraisal of the ‘primitive unity’, 
a fengjian system with nominal unity.
However, Li Zehou does not explicitly draw the conclusion that 
Confucianism actually had progressive elements, although such an 
implication may be hidden between the lines. Th is is the problem 
with those bright thinkers who wish to get their writings published in 
communist China: it is often next to impossible to decipher their real 
meaning. On the other hand, these kinds of interpretational problems 
may simply attest to the ﬂ aws in the internal logic of communist 
historiography. 
It is conceivable that a certain religiousness of Confucianism 
might have its uses. Th e Communist Party does not want the Chinese 
population to turn to questionable cults for spiritual inspiration, 
and any religion may be seen as a rival for loyalty. Th erefore, if 
Confucianism as a non-religion may somehow fulﬁ l the spiritual 
needs of the people, and even turn people away from religions, it is to 
be welcomed.299 On the other hand, Confucianism as a ‘state-religion’ 
is obviously not desirable. 
Professor Liu Dongchao (刘东超) from Beijing Business and 
Technology University questions whether contemporary China 
needs Confucianism either as a school of thought or as an ideology. 
298 Ibid.
299 We may recall how Han Yu ﬁ ercely attacked religions in his essay “Yuan Dao”, defending 
Confucianism. “Let us make proper citizens of their priests and monks, let us burn their books, 
let us turn their temples into dwellings”, he wrote of the followers of Taoism and Buddhism 
in (ca.) 805. (Translated into Finnish in Kallio 2007, 112–119.)
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Liu claims that all nation states have both a leading ideology and 
several schools of thought; while the former enhances stability and 
unity, the latter foster intellectual diversity and systemic harmony. 
Naturally, if the former is too strong, it may suppress the latter, and 
if the latter gain the upper hand, societal stability and development 
may be jeopardized. According to Liu, China aims to maintain a 
balance between the two under the principle of “one pillar with 
many supporters” (yi zhu duo fu, 一主多辅). Th e ‘one pillar’ ideology 
is Marxism “with its Chinese fruits”, Deng Xiaoping Th eory, the 
Th ought of Th ree Represents and Scientiﬁ c Development Worldview. 
Th e ‘many supporters’ include Buddhism, Taoism, Christianity and 
Islam as well as Liberalism, New Leftism and New Confucianism.300 
Liu Dongchao opines that due to the moral impoverishment in 
contemporary China, people who truly acted upon Confucian values 
would be welcome. Th erefore, Confucianism serves a purpose as one 
of the ‘supporters’. However, Liu does not think that Confucianism 
could or should rise to the status of a religion. It could not, because 
Confucian values are too vague, and because it lacks divine and 
mystical elements which could appeal to modern people. It should 
not become a religion, particularly not the national religion, because 
the time is not ripe for replacing China’s current ‘pillar’ ideology.301
Somewhat unexpectedly in this context, Liu cites the Taiwan 
issue as the biggest stumbling block standing in the way of China’s 
modernization. According to him, the Taiwan issue is especially 
difficult to solve because of foreign interference and China’s 
troublesome relations with the United States and Japan. Adding 
the domestic challenges, caused by the ongoing transition from a 
traditional society to a modern one, to the international situation 
makes it too risky for China to make any adjustments to its current 
ideological basis, Liu argues.302 
Liu concludes that in the future, China’s ‘pillar’ ideology will 
eventually absorb both modern and ancient as well as Chinese and 
Western elements. Confucian values, such as the emphasis on ethical 
government and harmonious society, will thus have a role to play, but 
300 Liu Dongchao 2008, 79–81. Th e Th ought of Th ree Represents is the ideological grand 
achievement of Jiang Zemin . Interestingly, Liu fails to mention Mao Zedong Th ought.
301 Ibid. 82–85.
302 Ibid. 83.
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China does not need Confucianism to become the dominant ideology. 
Liu criticizes the proponents of a Confucian religion (he especially 
mentions Kang Xiaoguang ) for being unrealistic and unhistorical. 
Finally, Liu dismisses their Confucianism as a mere icon, propped up 
by nothing more than abstract slogans.303
Fang Keli has been especially hostile towards the interpretation of 
Confucianism promoted by Jiang Qing . Fang Keli sees Jiang Qing as 
working for the overseas New Confucians who aim at ‘renurturing’ 
Confucianism at its place of origin.304 Jiang’s ideas have attracted 
major international publicity, particularly due to a recent book by 
Daniel A. Bell (2008), Professor of Political Philosophy at Tsinghua 
University. 
Although Fang Keli links Jiang Qing with the overseas New 
Confucians, Jiang Qing himself is most critical of the ‘idealist’ 
Confucianism of the Mou Zongsan lineage. Jiang praises Wang 
Yangmi ng (who promoted ‘innate knowledge’) highly as the person 
who elevated Confucianism to its full glory during the Ming dynasty. 
In contrast, Jiang classiﬁ es Zhu Xi ’s Confucianism as a mere branch. 
However, Jiang accuses the (overseas) contemporary New Confucians 
of over-emphasizing introspection and the individual at the expense 
of practical orientation and society. Th erefore, the contemporary 
New Confucians have bifurcated from the main tradition into another 
branch.305 
Jiang Qing ’s views on Confucianism are dogmatic, if not 
fundamentalist. He depicts Confucianism not as one among many 
schools of thought during the Warring States period, but as the one 
and only school embodying China’s cultural heritage. According to 
Jiang, the other schools, such as Taoism, Mohism and Legalism, were 
the creations of their founders. In contrast, Confucius did not create 
anything but transmitted the age-old traditions of the ancient sage 
kings. Th erefore, Confucianism alone can be said to be the legitimate 
representative of the Chinese culture.306 Among others, Qin Hui has 
303 Ibid. 84–86.
304 Makeham 2008, 78.
305 Jiang Qing 2009, 52–53.
306 Ibid., 19–20.  
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criticized this view of diﬀ erentiating between Confucius and the 
other heads of schools.307
Th e most controversial of Jiang’s theses were originally published 
overseas and in Taiwan, accessible to the scholarly community on 
the Mainland but not to the general public. In those articles which 
have not been published in China, Jiang calls for replacing Marxism-
Leninism with Confucianism. 
Jiang Qing accuses Marxism-Leninism of being a ‘foreign culture’ 
which has stolen the position of a ‘national doctrine’ (guojiao) under 
the protection of the Communist Party. Yet Marxism-Leninism has 
proved to be “incapable of solving China’s problems … [and] has 
delayed the course of modernization.” As a result, there is a ‘crisis 
of belief’ in China, and Confucianism should therefore be allowed 
to “replace Marxism-Leninism and revive its orthodox historical 
position… .”308 In eﬀ ect, “Confucianism naturally should replace 
Marxism and Leninism as ‘the national religion’ and recover its 
position in history.”309 It needs to be pointed out that there is no 
diﬀ erence between a ‘national doctrine’ and a ‘national religion’ in 
the Chinese language; both are called guojiao. Jiang believes that the 
Confucian religion actually existed in remote antiquity even before 
the time of Confucius.310 
Jiang Qing has also called for reforming the Communist Party of 
China into a Confucian Party of China, and has sketched a tri-cameral 
national legislature whereby the uppermost house would consist of 
Confucian scholars, versed in the ancient classics. Jiang claims that 
the legitimacy of that house comes from “sacred sources in Heaven”. 
As such, it would act as a counterbalance to the democratic power of 
the people, which is needed because the uneducated masses do not 
always know what is best for the country.311 
In an apparent attempt to curb the more extreme ideas by Jiang 
Qing , a collection of essays discussing his thought was published in 
Mainland China in 2008. Th e book carries the subtitle “Dialogue with 
Jiang Qing” and, interestingly, also Jiang Qing’s replies to each of the 
307 Qin Hui 2009.
308 Translated and quoted in Makeham 2008, 262. 
309 Translated and quoted in Song Xianlin 2003, 94.  
310 Wang Zhicheng 2009.  
311 Bell 2008, 180–181, 186, 190–191.  
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essays are included in the book. Th e editor of the book, Professor Fan 
Ruiping (范瑞平) from the City University of Hong Kong, calls Jiang 
Qing a “big-shot Confucian” in his “Introduction” and says that 
Jiang’s fame is one reason why it is necessary to engage in dialogue 
with him.312 Nevertheless, the general tone of the book is mostly 
critical towards Jiang’s thinking. 
China Daily published a commentary in 2006 entitled 
“Confucianism will never be a religion”. According to the article, 
Confucianism has never been a religion and, in any case, religion as 
a state power should never be allowed in China. Th e article claims 
that the goal of Jiang Qing ’s “fallacy” is to “restore the feudal order”. 
Furthermore, to call Jiang’s theory ‘fundamentalist Confucianism’ is 
mistaken and “disgraces the name of Confucius”.313 
Interestingly, it seems that there have been no attempts to limit 
the freedom of Jiang Qing by the authorities. Jiang is operating a 
Confucian ‘retreat centre’ near Guiyang where he meets his visitors 
dressed in traditional hanfu clothing and discusses classical texts with 
them. Perhaps Jiang is simply deemed harmless in his extravagant 
extremism. Certainly, the fundamentalist character of his thought 
does not make it easy to make his ideas the starting point for 
meaningful discussion. Even Daniel A. Bell is cautious and quotes 
Qin Hui in his comments: “[S]etting up Confucianism as the national 
doctrine seems to imply treating opposition to Confucianism as 
heresy. … I am very much against it.”314 
Let us return once more to Li Zehou . In a book article from 1994, Li 
questions the need for any guojiao. Li wrote that he believed there was 
a need to break the prevailing (and traditional Confucian) oneness of 
politics and ideology (zheng jiao heyi, 政教合一) in order to overcome 
China’s moral impoverishment and spiritual crisis. Li Zehou claimed 
that the enthusiasm with which the Chinese intelligentsia in 1919, as 
well as in 1989, called for National Salvation, patriotism, science or 
312 Fan Ruiping 2008, 2. Th e book contains one essay (in Chinese) by Daniel A. Bell which 
is also included (in English) in Appendix 2 of Bell’s aforementioned book. In his essay, Bell 
gently questions the rationale behind the tri-cameral national legislature envisioned by Jiang.
313 “Confucianism will never be a religion”, by Huang Qing, in China Daily, 6 January 2006, 
available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2006-01/06/content_509753.htm. 
Accessed 8 Feb 2010.  
314 Bell 2008, 188–189. 
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democracy reﬂ ects a quasi-religious ferment which stems from the 
unrealistic tendency to see politics as ethics and ethics as politics.315 
In that same article, Li Zehou commented on the discussion on 
the role of Confucianism in tackling the aforementioned challenges 
and stated that while he did not agree with those who fully negated 
Confucian values, nor did he believe that metaphysical New 
Confucianism could promote the development of democratization in 
China. Instead, the Chinese should rely on the tradition of rationality 
and pragmatism (or ‘rational reason’) and separate morality from 
politics.316 Here Li demonstrates a wholly materialistic, Marxist 
worldview. Translated into modern language, it would imply that 
economic development must not be hindered by anything. Th is 
indeed seems to be the prevailing ideology in today’s China; and not 
only there but in many other parts of the world as well. 
Finally, a word about the potential foreign policy relevance of 
Traditional Learning. It has been suggested that a Chinese, possibly 
Confucian, international relations theory will inevitably emerge as a 
consequence of China’s growing role on the world stage on the one 
hand and the rise of traditional values in China on the other. It is 
easy to imagine that both the concept of harmony and the Confucian 
utopia, the Great Community (Datong), which ideally refers to the 
whole world, should occupy a central position in the theory.317 
Hypothetically, nations truly inﬂ uenced by such a theory would 
essentially manifest peaceful foreign policy behaviour. 
In the oﬃ  cial rhetoric, China’s growing strength is indeed dubbed 
a “peaceful rise” and China’s ambitions are depicted as a “harmonious 
world”.318 However, China will hardly be content with being a mere 
315 Li Zehou 1994, 155. After taking up residence in the United States, Li has said that while 
Confucianism is not a real religion, the Chinese Communist Party is a “church”, clothed in 
political organization (“Modernization and the Confucian World”, address at the Colorado 
College’s 125th Anniversary Symposium on Cultures in the 21st Century; Conflicts and 
Convergences, delivered on 5 Feb 1999, at http://www.coloradocollege.edu/academics/
Anniversary/Transcripts/LiTXT.htm, accessed 29 Oct 2010). 
316 Li Zehou 1994, 152, 155, 158. 
317 See e.g. Bell 2008, 19–37; and Cheung 2008. 
318 Th e phrase “peaceful rise” (heping jueqi, 和平崛起) was coined by Zheng Bijian (郑必坚) in 
2003, then Vice-President of the Central Party School. Note that both the words ‘peace’ and 
‘harmony’ contain the character he.
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paper tiger, let alone a Confucian paper kitten, and its real political 
goals are never entirely devoid of rhetoric. Th erefore, the values of 
Traditional Learning are likely to be reﬂ ected in China’s foreign policy 
behaviour as well, and we may expect to continue hearing calls for a 
balanced and fair world order and even see some related actions on 
the part of China in the near future. It may be a sign of the nation’s 
ambitions that the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist 
Party has named the promotion of cultural development and the 
raising of China’s cultural soft power as one of the priorities in the 
12th Five-Year Plan for 2011–2015.319 
Th e projections of China’s soft power are being keenly monitored 
by other powers, albeit often with the expectation that soft power 
is going to give way to hard power when China has the potential 
to do so. It is probably not overly cynical to assume that China will 
endeavour to explain its own projections of power outside its borders 
as being conducive to world harmony and any attempts to interfere 
with its internal aﬀ airs as just the opposite. Nevertheless, this is all 
guesswork. Further research and time are needed in order to assess the 
impact of Traditional Learning on China’s foreign policy rhetoric and 
behaviour. By providing the reader with the background necessary 
for understanding the discussion related to the role of tradition in its 
Chinese context, this study hopefully makes it easier even for China-
watchers not well-versed in Sinology to make intelligent assumptions 
on the basis of the signals being emitted from this intriguing part of 
the world. 
Concluding conclusions
Th e Chinese Communist Party is attempting to anchor its legitimacy 
in history and simultaneously patch the chinks in the Party’s rusting 
spiritual-ideological armour with values adopted from traditional 
schools of thought. “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” 
seems to be gradually turning into “Chinese tradition with socialist 
characteristics”. Th e revival of Confucianism, a central component 
319 “Shouquan fabu: Zhong-Gong Zhongyang guanyu zhiding guomin jingji he shehui fazhan 
dishi’er ge wu nian guihua de jianyi”, Xinhuawang, 27 Oct 2010, at http://news.xinhuanet.
com/politics/2010-10/27/c_12708501.htm. Accessed 29 Oct 2010. 
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in the artiﬁ cial concoction called Traditional Learning, provides 
legitimization for the Party through such values as harmony and 
loyalty to the state, and thus the Party in turn mobilizes resources 
which enhance the revitalization of Confucianism. 
The Party will not allow any outsiders to participate in the 
revamping of its ideological doctrine, and it is certain that unity 
will remain the principal dogma. It is also likely that at least in the 
short term the “socialist characteristics” will remain strong, and the 
outcome will simply be touched-up communism. 
However, in the increasingly plural society in China today, the 
Party is not able to prevent the common people from engaging in a 
discussion on the role and nature of tradition on their own, although it 
will make every eﬀ ort to keep the discussion within safe parameters. 
Even that will be diﬃ  cult, as shown by the examples presented in 
this paper, and other bold persuasions by ‘public intellectuals’ and 
opinion leaders. 
While there are ongoing processes which foster the revitalization of 
Confucianism, or at least some external manifestations of it, in view of 
the political realities in the People’s Republic of China, it seems clear 
that there will be no room for Confucianism as the ‘grammar’ of Chinese 
society in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, New Confucianism 
faces diﬃ  culties in becoming just part of the ‘vocabulary’, too. 
In terms of the latter, the New Confucians largely have themselves 
to blame. Particularly on account of Mou Zongsan, who presented 
Confucianism as ‘moral metaphysics’, Confucianism has been sent 
into tangential orbit and has become distanced from society. Another 
problem is the obsession with daotong, the true genealogy. As Umberto 
Bresciani notes, it has been said that the New Confucians’ faith in 
daotong “seals them oﬀ  from any creative development and from a 
true involvement in the reality of social political developments.”320 
According to Li Zehou , “this sealed-oﬀ  attitude is completely at odds 
with the open-minded attitude of democracy.”321
I would argue that in order to survive, the New Confucian 
movement has to break away from dead ends. One possibility would 
be to follow the ‘learning concerned with life’ approach outlined by 
Zheng Jiadong . According to him, Rujia has the spirit of practice and 
320 Bresciani 2001, 481–482.
321 Quoted and translated in Bresciani 2001, 482.
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social concern. Another avenue might be something like the ‘critical 
Confucianism’ sketched by Lin Anwu . He calls for adjusting neisheng 
to ﬁ t waiwang, and maintains that “New” Confucianism should be 
rooted in deal-based, open civil society. Both Zheng’s and Lin’s ideas 
were brieﬂ y introduced in Chapter III.
Furthermore, the New Confucian movement has to cast oﬀ  the 
shadow of Marxism. On the one hand, it doesn’t help the New 
Confucians if they are accused of subversion. “What hinders [an 
alliance between the Party-state and Confucianism] is not Party-
state opposition to Confucianism but the Confucians’ unwavering 
opposition to Marxism”, claims Guo Yingjie.322 On the other hand, 
introducing Marxism-Leninism-Maoism into Confucianism (as Fang 
Keli and others have been attempting to do) would undoubtedly 
turn it into something unrecognizable: Party dogmas and personal 
enlightenment don’t mix. Th erefore, the new generation of New 
Confucians will have to be free from both the urge to support Marxism 
and the need to totally negate it. 
In all fairness, it has to be said that democracy is arguably as 
foreign to Confucianism as communism. If we take individual 
liberty and equality to be the basis of democracy, then values such 
as ﬁ liality or the emphasis on everyone keeping to one’s role—either 
as a ruler, a minister, a father or a son—would have to be removed 
from Confucianism in order to make it compatible with democracy.323 
On the other hand, Li Chenyang (李晨阳) from Central Washington 
University believes that the original Confucianism includes elements 
that could complement democracy. Referring to the overemphasis 
on liberty in America in comparison to equality and particularly to 
fraternity, he writes: “For instance, given that democracy emphasizes 
individual liberty, the Confucian emphasis on the family would make 
a better society.”324 
Th e new generation will undoubtedly also beneﬁ t from the newly 
started search for the roots and the ‘true’ nature of Confucianism. And 
although no one truth will in all probability ever be found, a return 
to the roots is valuable also from a wider perspective. If Traditional 
Learning (Guoxue) is to become the ideological foundation of China’s Soft 
322 Guo 2004, 90. 
323 See Li 1999, 188–189. 
324 Li 1999, 187–188. 
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Power, not to mention a national doctrine (guojiao), it needs to be based 
on a non-falsiﬁ ed understanding of history in order to remain healthy. 
One has to acknowledge that China was a uniﬁ ed, ‘Chinese-
ruled’ state for only two-ﬁ fths of the imperial era. Even this refers 
only to ‘China Proper’, the historical core region of the Han-
Chinese nationality. The unity of ‘greater China’ is a relatively 
modern phenomenon which has been achieved mainly through 
coercion. China’s past as a ‘culturalist’ union which has “always” 
encompassed the minority areas of the present-day People’s Republic 
is a historiographic fabrication. 
Culturalism as a historiographic fabrication is but another 
example of giving political necessities a Confucian façade. After all, 
culturalism may be seen as inherently Confucian. A culturalistic China 
was a permanent ‘value regime’ that existed as an idealistic super-
structure over the multiplicity of states during periods of division. 
Th e ‘values’ were those of the ancient sage kings whose teaching 
Confucius then ‘transmitted’ to posterity. Culturalism as such may, 
nevertheless, be a positive force. It is perhaps not entirely out of the 
question that culturalism could provide a potential foundation for 
the establishment of a new, ‘social contract-based’ unity in China. 
Similarly, the ancient, arguably Confucian ideal of regional rule 
(fengjian) could contribute to solving those present challenges which 
are due to the supremacy of the myth of unity. When Lin Anwu 
states that ‘cultural China’ should take precedence over ‘political 
China’ and ‘economic China’, it is closely related to the ideas of such 
proponents of regionalism and pluralism as Ge Jianxiong and Xiao 
Jiansheng , introduced in Chapter I.
So it might transpire that the root-searching resulting in new 
insights into history and the origins of Confucianism may help in 
ﬁ nding the right building blocks for a new moral and cultural basis 
for Chinese society, irrespective of what the Party is doing. If the role 
of the Party were to diminish, Traditional Learning or Confucianism 
might even take the place of the communist ideology. At least that 
seems to be what some dissidents are hoping for. But then the 
question arises, does China need an ideology? 
Today, China has a national ideology in the form of the ideology 
of the Communist Party. We may call this China’s guojiao, which 
translates either as ‘national doctrine’ or ‘national religion’; in fact, 
it is China’s ‘political religion’. It can be argued that whatever China’s 
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guojiao consists of in the future, it is in the nature of political religion 
that it will be inherently coercive and totalitarian. Th us, if we are to 
believe in the inherently pluralist nature of ‘true’ Confucianism, it 
will not be good for either China or Confucianism to replace Chinese 
communism with Confucianism. 
Instead, if we are to believe in the overall desirability of pluralism, 
voluntarism and individualism, China would beneﬁ t from making 
its national ideology more like a ‘civil religion’, and the promoters 
of Confucianism would beneﬁ t from presenting Confucianism as 
something diﬀ erent from a guojiao. 
History has demonstrated that conﬁ ning Confucianism to the 
straitjacket of doctrine would make it just another tool for Saving 
the Nation. Having statues of Confucius erected here and there does 
not make China Confucian. 
Fortunately, new conceptions of original Confucianism are 
emerging, suggesting that Confucius may become presented 
increasingly as a herald of enlightenment. As noted at the end of Chapter 
III, such interpretations have come even from a very inﬂ uential, pro-
establishment, academic institution. If such a Confucius were allowed 
to take up the position of the ‘patron saint’ of Traditional Learning, 
Confucianism would not only be freed from dogma and revived as 
a living thought-process again, the vitality of the debate related to 
tradition and history would also be given a major boost. 
It is a promising sign that the debate related to tradition and 
history has so far been rather open. Hopefully, the debate will 
continue in a true public-spirited manner and will not turn into a 
nasty game of king of the hill. 
In 1525, the prefect of Yuezhou had a library built and said to 
Wang Yangming : “When the scriptures have been put in order, the 
commoners will awaken, and when they awaken, they will overcome 
their evil or wrong devices.” Th e prefect then asked Wang to compose 
an inscription for the library. Wang wrote: “Who arrogantly talks only 
of himself and competes in splitting hairs and, hiding his shallowness 
and cunningness, tries to become the king of the hill at the expense of 
others, and who still claims to be a follower of the scriptures, becomes 
guilty of raping the scriptures! … Little wonder nobody understands 
what it means to revere the scriptures anymore.”325 
325 From “Inscription at Pavilion for Revering the Scriptures”, by Wang Yangming . Translated 
into Finnish in Kallio 2008, 165–170.
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Glossary of Chinese terms
ben (本), root, basis
bentu (本土), Chinese (countrymen), ‘China Proper’
bo’ai (博爱), fraternal love, universal love
buzu jiheti (部族集合体), tribal collective
da Hanzu zhuyi (大汉族主义), Han chauvinism
Da yitong (大一统), the Grand Unity
dangdai Xin Rujia (当代新儒家), contemporary Neo-Confucianism,   
Contemporary New Confucianism
daotong (道统), lineage of the (Confucian) Way, true cultural tradition
Datong (大同), Great Community, Universal Commonwealth
de (德), virtue
ding (鼎), ceremonial tripod
Fajia (法家), Legalism, School of Law
fengjian (封建), divided enoﬀ ment, regional rule
gongfu (功夫), correct method
gonggong zhishifenzi (公共知识分子), public intellectual
guojiao (国教), national doctrine, national religion
Guoxue (国学), Traditional Learning, National Learning
guwen (古文), ancient texts, ancient style
hanbenwei (汉本位), Hanishness
hanfu (汉服), traditional Han clothing
he (和), harmony
heping jueqi (和平崛起), peaceful rise
hexie (和谐), harmony
Hou Xin Rujia (后新儒家), Post-New Confucianism
Huaxia (华夏), population of ‘China Proper’ (in the pre-imperial era)
Huaxia wenhua niudai gongcheng (华夏文化纽带工程), Huaxia Cultural Links 
Project
jian’ai (兼爱), reciprocal love, universal love
jing shi zhi yong (经世致用), ancient learning applied to modern society, statecraft
jingxue (经学), exegetical studies
jinwen (今文), new texts
jiu guo (救国), Saving the Nation, National Salvation
kaozheng (考证), empirical, evidential (research, learning)
kedi (客帝), foreign emperors
li (理), rational principle
li (礼), propriety, rites
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liang zhi (良知), innate knowledge
lijiao (礼教), religion of rites
min (民), people, commoners
minben (民本), people as the basis
ming (命), destiny
minzhu (民主), people as the masters, democracy
neisheng (内圣), Inner Sageliness
qi (气), energy, ether, spirit
qimeng (启蒙), enlightenment
qin (亲), to love, kinsman
qing (情), feeling, sympathy
ren (仁), fraternity, humaneness
ren (忎), kinship, fraternity
Ru (儒), Confucian (scholar)
Rujia (儒家), Confucianism
Rujiao (儒教), Confucian religion
Ruxue (儒学), Confucian learning
san gang (三纲), Th ree Cardinal Leads, Th ree Bonds
suzhi (素质), quality
ti (体), body, essence
Tian ren heyi (天人合一), harmony between man and nature
Tianxia (天下), All-Under-Heaven
Tianxia wei gong (天下为公), All-Under-Heaven is one community
waiwang (外王), Outer Kingliness
Wang Dao (王道), Kingly Way
wei (伪), artiﬁ ce
wu chang (五常), Five Constants
xiandai Xin Ruxue (现代新儒学), modern New Confucian learning, Contemporary 
New Confucianism
xiandai/dangdai Xin Ruxue/Rujia (现代/当代新儒学/儒家), Contemporary New 
Confucianism
xiao (孝), ﬁ liality
Xiaokang (小康), Modest Welfare, moderately prosperous society
xin (心), mind, heart, heart-mind
Xin Lixue (新理学), New (rationalistic) Neo-Confucianism
Xin Ruxue (新儒学), Neo-Confucianism
xing’ershang (形而上), above form, metaphysics
xing’erxia (形而下), observable world
xuetong (学统), system of knowledge, true academic tradition
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yi (义), justice
Yi (夷), barbarians
yi zhu duo fu (一主多辅), one pillar with many supporters
yizu (异族), foreign race, non-Chinese
yong (用), practical usefulness
zheng jiao heyi (政教合一), oneness of politics and ideology
zhengtong (政统), true political tradition
zhengtong (正统), proper succession, legitimacy, orthodoxy
Zhongguo wenhua shuyuan (中国文化书院), Chinese Cultural College
Zhonghua (中华), China, Chinese
Zhonghua minzu (中华民族), Chinese nation
Zhonghua wenhua biaozhi cheng, (中华文化标志城), Zhonghua Culture Symbolic 
City
Zhongxia (中夏), (population of) ‘China Proper’ (in the pre-imperial era)
zhuzi (诸子), the Masters of all the traditional schools of thought
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